Laboratories of democracy and state brownfield programs. by Opp, Jaclyn Susan Marie
University of Louisville 
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
5-2007 
Laboratories of democracy and state brownfield programs. 
Jaclyn Susan Marie Opp 
University of Louisville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Opp, Jaclyn Susan Marie, "Laboratories of democracy and state brownfield programs." (2007). Electronic 
Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1082. 
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/1082 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the 
author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 
"LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY" Al\rD STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS 
By 
Jac1yn Susan Marie Opp 
B.A., University of Colorado- Boulder, 2001 
M.P.A., Western Kentueky University, 2003 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty ofthe 
Graduate School of the University of Louisville 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Urban and Public Affairs 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, Kentucky 
May 2007 
Copyright 2007 by Jaclyn Susan Marie Opp 









Jaclyn Susan Marie Opp 
B.A., University of Colorado-Boulder, 2001 












By the following Dissertation Committee 
 
 




      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 ii
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to my family 
Christopher Patrick Opp 
and 
Victoria Lisa Opp 
who have given me invaluable patience and unconditional love. 
111 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Dr. Peter Meyer for being the most patient, helpful, and 
valuable advisor any student could ask for. He has given me invaluable assistance, 
advice, opportunities, and guidance over the past several years. Working with him has 
truly been a pleasure and will be greatly missed in the future. I also would like to thank 
all of my committee members. Dr. Cynthia Negrey, who introduced me to the beauty of 
qualitative research; Dr. David Imbroscio who has always helped me think outside of the 
box; Dr. Gennaro Vito, who has given me a very unique and valuable perspective; and 
Dr. Thomas Lyons who, in addition to a multitude of academic contributions, has 
graciously and routinely served on this dissertation from New York. Each has provided 
valuable input, guidance, and comments over the course of this research. Finally, I would 
like to express my thanks to my family. My husband and daughter are owed a deep debt 
of gratitude for so patiently waiting and encouraging me through this process. Also the 
deepest thanks and gratitude is owed to my grandmother, Louise Watkins, and my 
mother, Lisa Macner, the two strongest women I have ever known. 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
"LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY" AND STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS 
Jaclyn Susan Marie Opp 
May 12,2007 
Public investment and interest into brownfields has increased markedly in the past 
two decades. However, scholarship has not kept pace with this growth. Every state in 
the U.S. has created a brownfields program to deal with the presence of these properties 
in their state. However, the mechanisms offered in these state programs to facilitate 
brownfield remediation and redevelopment has gone untested and underresearched. This 
dissertation gathered data on all fifty state brovvnfield programs and the related Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) enforeement and inspection data. The fifty 
state data was then supplemented with three state case studies using in-depth interviews 
with key participants and policymakers. 
The findings of this dissertation demonstrate that a great diversity in mechanisms 
to facilitate brownfield remediation and redevellopment exists across these programs. The 
findings also illustration a level of disinterest by political officials in the monitoring of 
these programs. Furthermore, program officials indicate a significant connection and 
responsibility to the entity that gives them the most money- the EPA. Overall, the 
diversity across the states, lack of political interest, and influence of individual EPA 
Regions offers some insights into the potential for serious unanticipated consequences of 
v 
the movement to protect liability from environmental contamination while offering public 
resources to redevelop brownfields. This disseJrtation also finds that the related RCRA 
program may offer an indicator for environmental protectiveness of a particular state. 
VI 
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Over the past several decades contaminated land issues have increasingly moved 
to the forefront of political, social, and economic debates in the United States and other 
western nations (see for example Barnett, 1994;, Bartsch and Wells, 2005; Coleman, 
1994; Dente, 1995; Meyer, Williams, and Yount, 1995; and Syms, 2004). Over 150 
years of neglect and ignorance has contributed to an environmental crisis. Virtually 
every community in the United States is plagued by some form, and some level, of 
environmental contamination as a result of past decisions. One environmental problem 
that has steadily been increasing in recognition, and in corrective action, is that of 
brownfields. 
Brownfields are defined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as, " ... 
real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by 
the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant" 
(US EPA, 2005). Estimates of the number ofbmwnfields are generally accepted to be at 
least 450,000 nationwide (U.S. EPA, 2005; NOItheast~Midwest Institute, n.d.). As local 
and state governments find themselves under pressure to provide more services to their 
constituents with fewer resources, brownfields become both an obstacle and an 
opportunity to them. Uremediated brownfields produce few jobs, provide little to no 
property tax revenue, and contribute to community blight. Communities that can 
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redevelop their brownfields are in the position to reap real benefits- environmental, 
social, and economic. 
The private sector has been slow in remediating and redeveloping brownfields for 
a variety of reasons. Concerns about potential llegal liabilities, perceived and actual 
financial costs of cleanup, technical burden of dealing with contamination, the 
uncertainties associated with regulatory oversight, and the perceived stigma associated 
with brownfields all tend to make greenfields more attractive to prospective developers. 
For all ofthese reasons brownfield redevelopffii~nt is an issue in which the private sector 
has been unsuccessful in addressing quickly or routinely, even in exceptionally strong 
real estate markets. Having recognized both thl! benefits to be had, and the associated 
costs of brownfields, governments at all levels have taken a lead role in brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment. 
The decision to pursue brownfield remediation and redevelopment has been a 
political choice that has been made and repeated at all levels of government in the United 
States. These political choices almost always entail creating a government program to 
deal with the issue. "A program consists of governmental action initiated in order to 
secure objectives whose attainment is problematical" (Pressman, 1984, p. xx). 
Brownfield properties by virtue of their definition are problems for the local, state, and 
federal governments. Much like other political choices made in the twentieth century to 
address a perceived problem, administrative agencies are one of the most heavily relied 
upon means to achieve the brownfield-related goals of the local, state, and federal 
governments (KettI and Fesler, 2005; Rosenbloom and Kravchuk and Rosenbloom, 
2005). 
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Although the administrative state in the United States has received significant 
criticism over the past century, it is still a primary means of carrying out the 
government's policy mandates (Huber and Shipan, 2002; KettI et aI, 2005; Rosenbloom 
et aI, 2005). A Brownfield program, like any other government program, is faced with 
the same problems, constraints, and benefits that the American Administrative State 
presents to other areas of government intervention. 
As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis so eloquently stated, "It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country" (New State Ice Co v. Liebmann, 1932). State experiments into 
brownfield programs can lend a great deal of information to citizens, government 
officials, and scholars. These state programs are largely under-researched and provide a 
valuable opportunity to investigate brownfield programs, program implementation, 
bureaucratic discretion, and political control of the bureaucracy. The problems that occur 
as a result of brownfields are of concern to many different groups of people including 
nearby residents and property owners, political officials, and businesses (both those 
owning brownfields and those who would benefit from facilitated remediation 
opportunities). Given this broad impact that brownfields have on society, understanding 
the government's intervention into this area will likely provide a benefit to a diverse and 
large group of individuals. To be sure, possessing a deeper, more complex understanding 
of the government intervention into brownfield remediation and redevelopment can 
enable and foster the pursuit of viable solutions to the problem of brown fields. 
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Research Objectives and Significance 
Brownfield research has been increasing in the past few years and most 
commonly includes descriptive studies, best examples of innovation in redevelopments, 
and manuals of resources for prospective developers. Although some research into the 
local and state government's role in brownfield remediation and redevelopment has been 
conducted over the last two decades the studies are very underdeveloped and the area 
remains largely under-researched (See for example, Northeast-Midwest Institute). As 
research is conducted it is becoming increasingly clear that across the fifty State 
Governments brownfield programs take a varied approach to facilitating remediation and 
redevelopment of these properties. Some states have comprehensive resources and 
opportunities for local governments and individuals to invest in brownfields, while others 
have minimal influence and resources. This variation provides an interesting and unique 
opportunity to better understand government intervention into brownfields. 
" ... Brandeis viewed the states as laboratories in which the Progressives could 
experiment with new solutions to social and economic problems. Those that worked 
could be applied nationally; those that failed could be discarded" (Osborne, 1990, p. 2). 
Brownfield programs offer a unique opportunity to research and record what the different 
laboratories are doing in respect to brownfield programs. By examining fifty unique 
programs that are all directed at solving a common problem it will be possible to gain a 
deeper understanding of the diversity of the mechanisms for government intervention into 
brownfields, details concerning the implementation and administration of these programs 
all while providing some insight into the use of public resources. Given the diversity of 
issues surrounding brownfield redevelopment and the government programs directed at 
addressing them, this dissertation takes an interdisciplinary, multifaceted look at state 
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brownfield programs. This research seeks to further the knowledge of what states are 
doing in relation to their brownfield programs, how related regulations may impact the 
programs, and how the complex relationships between the bureaucracy and political 
officials exert control over these programs shaping them into what they are. In order to 
effectively understand all of these issues, this dissertation consists of two distinct 
research steps-with the second step building on, and stemming from, the first step. 
With little up to date data available on these brownfield programs, this research will 
require the use of multiple methodologies that are discussed further in Chapter Two. 
All Fifty State Programs 
The first step of this research deals with the fifty state brownfield programs as a 
whole. Utilizing an annual survey (which is currently overdue for an update) conducted 
by the EPA this research adds to and expands upon this basic information into state 
brownfield programs in order to better understand some of the variations that exist in 
state programs across the fifty u.s. states. The end product of this data gathering is a 
fifty state database that allows for a deeper understanding and analysis of these programs. 
In essence the overarching research question in the database of the fifty states is: What 
are the fifty laboratories doing about their brownfields? Following from that large 
question several related questions are raised. These questions include: How, if at all, 
does the regulatory environment of a state influence their brownfield program? What can 
the states learn from each other? Are there any commonalities across the fifty states that 
are interesting to the quest for remediation and redevelopment of brownfields? 
Although the database of the fifty states provides an expansive view of the variety 
of programs directed at brownfields-it does not provide a great level of depth on the 
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specific day-to-day administration of any of the programs. The complex nature of 
intergovernmental relationships is particularly interesting to these programs and requires 
a smaller scale examination to untangle that web. In order to further provide the depth 
needed to understand the complex nature of these programs a second step of this 
dissertation involves three comparative case studies directed at further understanding 
these programs. The use of qualitative research enables this dissertation to better 
understand the contextual differences that exist in these programs. Drawing upon 
theories of political control and bureaucratic discretion, this research analyzes three states 
in depth to try and gain a better understanding of the real story of state brownfield 
programs. The usage of qualitative methodology to gain insights into these programs is, 
alone, a significant contribution to this topic. As will be discussed further in Chapter 
Two, these political control theories and bureaucratic discretion theories are concentrated 
at the federal level and in the usage of quantitative models-studying far more complex 
and interdependent state level provides an opportunity to expand on these theories while, 
at the same time, offering policy suggestions for brownfield programs. The basic 
research questions in this second step include among others: What are the experiences of 
the administrators in these programs? How do state political officials impact and monitor 
these programs? How does related regulation impact the operation and administration of 
the program? How does the EPA get involved in the administration and implementation 
of the programs? In the pursuit of these answers the dissertation is organized in the 
following manner. 
Chapter Two provides the overarching theories and expectations for this research. 
Environmental federalism, regulation, and political control and bureaucratic discretion 
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theories are discussed. This chapter provides the theoretical background and expectations 
required to understand and appreciate the complexities of the remaining chapters in this 
dissertation. Environmental policy and the shifts in relationships is a very complex 
subject, which requires an understanding of several pieces of environmental-related 
literature. Chapter Two provides the necessary information to understand the complex 
context this dissertation is working in. Chapter Three discusses the methodology used to 
gather and compile the database. This chapter also outlines the methodology and for the 
three case studies. Chapter Four presents the findings of the fifty-state database as well 
as the specific rationale for the selection of the three state case studies which emerges 
from the findings of the database. Related to Chapter Four is Appendix A and Appendix 
B which provides a detailed outline of what is included in the database created. This 
database will be placed online at http://cepm.louisville.edu. Chapter Five presents the 
findings of the three state case studies. Chapter Six analyzes the data compiled in the 
database as well as in the three case studies, offers some policy recommendations, and 
concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORIES AND EXPECTATIONS 
"Brownfields are real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which 
may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, 
pollutant, or contaminant" (Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act, 2002). The presence, or potential presence, of contamination has led 
to reluctance to invest in brownfields on the part of many developers. Although, as 
pointed out in Chapter One, redeveloping brownfields can reap many rewards, a variety 
ofliability, regulatory, and economic concerns prevent more widespread brownfield 
redevelopment. The remediation and redevelopment of brownfields has become an area 
where policymakers have become very interested. "Policy makers at all levels of 
government have sought ways to encourage the redevelopments in order to generate tax 
revenues and employment, curb urban sprawl, and remediate contamination that threatens 
public health and the environment" (Yount and Meyer, 1999, p. 179). Although it is 
recognized that the public sector has taken a keen interest in brownfields, little is known 
about the specific processes, successes, and potential lessons of this involvement. 
The protection and regulation of the environment is an area where the 
fundamental tenets of the American government system are tested and are not always in 
concert with each other. Intergovernmental relations in this area pose some interesting 
circumstances under which the public brownfield programs operate. The relationships 
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that exist across the states, localities, EP A Regions, and national EPA headquarters is a 
strong influencer on the outcomes and outputs of certain, particularly environmental, 
programs. "Congress cannot control every decision to be made in implementing a public 
program ... Every policy contains the ability of implementers to make choices, and those 
choices are made by different people in any number of federal or state agencies ... " 
(Scheberle, 1997, p. 10-11). Understanding the current and evolving context under which 
these programs operate is both necessary and important to an analysis of public 
brownfield programs. In order to begin to understand the government's intervention into 
the brownfield problem it is necessary to understand the history and context in which this 
intervention is working. This chapter of the dissertation will present the related literature 
and theories necessary to understand the problem of brown fields and the purpose of this 
dissertation. Specifically this chapter will start with an overview of environmental 
federalism and regulation highlighting the logic for studying state level programs. This 
chapter will then move on to discuss and outline theories concerning the administration 
of public programs illustrating the importance of understanding the influencers on 
brownfield program implementation; and will conclude with an overview of the current 
landscape of brownfield programs in the United States. 
Environmental Federalism- So why the states? 
The government at all levels in the United States intervenes in areas and issues 
considered to create environmental harms. Environmental harms represent a variety of 
" ... physical, biological, and chemical threats to human health or the health of the 
ecosystems on which we depend ... " (Etsy, 1996, p. 2). These environmental harms 
jeopardize social welfare because of both the damage to human health and because 
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environmental resources are a fundamental component, or input, to production 
processes-be it land, water, or air (Etsy, 1996; Higgs and Close, 2004). Given the 
complexities of property rights, externalities, and transaction costs it is generally agreed 
upon that some form of public environmental regulation and intervention is necessary to 
protect social welfare (Farber, 2005; Higgs et aI, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2005; Welborn, 
1998). 
With regard to personal liberties and property rights, most processes of production 
exhibit very blurry boundaries-something often referred to as spillovers in the literature 
(Stewart, 1977) ...... the effects of local waste entail both local pollution and some 
external effects on other (most likely neighboring) jurisdictions" (Oates, 2001, p. 4). For 
example, if property owner A uses his property to dispose of toxic wastes which then 
travel to property owner B's property, whose property rights should be upheld? Does 
property owner A have the right to dispose on his own personal and private property? Or 
does property owner B have the right not to be subjected to the runoff from the 
neighboring parcel? "Cross-boundary pollution, like any interstate externality, is a valid 
concern in environmental policy" (Adler, 1998, p. 3). These are questions that have been 
subject to a number of high-profile and contentious court cases and requires government 
intervention to ensure a predictable and fair answer (Demsetz, 1967; Farber, 2005; 
Merrill, 1985; Revesz, 1992). Environmental harms tend to be too complex and 
complicated to be handled solely in the private market and as such the public sector has 
been involved for many years. 
Although the public sector has been involved with regulating and controlling 
environmental hanns for many years, the level of participation at the different levels of 
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government has evolved over time. This changing and shifting roles over environmental 
protection and regulation is often referred to as Environmental Federalism. Much like the 
overarching arguments and shifts in responsibilities of the varying levels of government 
in the United States, Environmental Federalism has undergone similar shifts. 
In the earliest years the protection of the environment tended to be highly 
decentralized (Percival et aI, 2006; Melosi, 1981; Reitze, 1991). With origins in the 
1880s and 1890s many large cities, like New York and Chicago, adopted nuisance laws 
to deal with garbage dumping and smoke (Melosi, 1981). It was generally believed that 
the protection from environmental harms was a power and duty of the local governments. 
It was not until much later that environmental protection became more centralized in 
nature. 
As problems of pollution crossing political boundaries became more widespread -
or were recognized as such by evolving scientific analysis - the efforts to protect and 
regulate the environment grew more centralized (Stewart, 1977). "Although some states 
adopted air and water pollution laws as early as the end of the nineteenth century, state 
regulation of environmental problems did not begin in earnest until the post-World War 
II industrial boom. The state regulatory efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, however, did 
little to stem the flow of pollution, and by the mid-60s, the demand for more centralized 
regulation was growing" (Etsy, 1996, p. 16). With Congress' passage of the Clean Air 
Act in 1963 and the Clean Water Act in 1965, environmental protection began to move in 
a more centralized direction with the federal government taking more responsibility for 
the protection and regulation of environmental related issues. These two federal acts 
were shortly succeeded by the passages of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control 
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Act of 1972, the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act, the 1976 Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), and the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 
Many scholars have identified a variety of logical reasons that support a more 
centralized approach to environmental protection (see, for example, Etsy, 1996; Higgs et 
al, 2004; Oates, 2001; Scheberle, 2005; Stewart, 1977). One most widely touted and 
discussed idea is that of the 'race to the bottom' problem associated with a decentralized 
approach. Under the 'race to the bottom' premise a decentralized approach to 
environmental protection will ultimately fail as a result of the state and local governments 
that choose to neglect environmental protection in favor of economic development 
(Percival, Schroeder, Miller, and Leape, 2006; Sheldon, 2006). 
Although many scholars believe the central government is the most logical place 
for environmental regulation and protection, the past several decades has seen a shift to a 
more decentralized environmental approach--that is the bulk of environmental protection 
and regulation responsibilities have been shifted down to the state level (Stewart, 1977; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1995). "Under the Reagan Administration several actions were taken 
that moved the responsibility for some environmental management back to the states. 
Indeed, one of Reagan's principles was to shift environmental responsibilities back to the 
states 'whenever feasible'" (Oates, 2001, p.15). The most recent public involvement into 
environmental protection and regulation continues to place the central government behind 
the state governments in terms of implementation and administration. "Since 1970, 
which marks the beginning of the first significant involvement of the national 
government in environmental protection, Congress has designed most federal 
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environmental programs so that they could be administered at the state and local levels" 
(Sheberle, 1997, pg. 4). In fact, according to the Environmental Council ofthe States 
(ECOS), approximately 90% of all federal environmental programs are meant to be 
implemented and administered by the state governments (ECOS, 2006). Outside the 
normative views about the proper level of environmental regulation and protection, states 
have, indeed, become a pivotal and primary actor in the protection and regulation of the 
environment making this level of government intervention into brownfields logical to 
study. Although environmental protection and regulation takes on many different and 
varying types of environmental harms, of particular interest to this research are the laws 
and regulations contributing to and influencing brownfields. The Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) are the most salient federal acts for this 
purpose. 
RCRA and CERCLA 
Hazardous substances can be defined as ..... a very large category of chemicals 
that exhibit corrosive, ignitive, reactive, or toxic characteristics" (Ringquist, 1993, p. 18). 
"Hazardous wastes pose a substantial threat to public health and the environment. When 
hazardous wastes are disposed of improperly, they contaminate soil, air, surface water, 
and ground water and threaten the well-being of humans and other organisms" (Barnett, 
1994, p. 9). Prior to the enactment and implementation of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976 only air and water were protected from hazardous 
disposal (Meyer, Williams, and Yount, 1995). With the passage ofRCRA and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), both in 1976, and the Comprehensive Environmental 
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Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 contamination of land 
became an area where regulation intervened. 
" ... two federal statutes are most important in regulating the treatment and 
disposal of hazardous substances. These include CERCLA and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act ... " (Meyer et aI, 1995, p. 60). While RCRA seeks to 
ensure hazardous waste is not disposed of improperly-thereby threatening the 
environment and human health; the original language of CERCLA sought to deal with 
the sites that were abandoned or where the person responsible can not be found or did not 
have the capacity to pay for the damages caused. CERCLA was subsequently amended 
in 2002 with the passage of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act which worked to shift the focus of CERCLA away from only 
orphaned sites. This change to CERCLA sought to eliminate some of the liability 
concerns associated with CERCLA and to promote the cleanup ofbrownfields. These 
two federal acts have instigated cleanup of contaminated sites and helped prevent future 
contamination- but at the same time may have discouraged their redevelopment. 
RCRA 
RCRA was passed in order to closely monitor the utilization of toxic materials in 
production and the generation and disposal of hazardous waste. It was created initially as 
an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, which had no specific focus on 
toxics in the waste stream. In its current form RCRA has ten subtitles: A-J. Of these 
subtitles, three create programs while the remainder deals with provisions of oversight, 
duties, and other regulatory issues. The three regulatory programs established through 
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RCRA deal with both land and water. These programs are Solid Waste, Hazardous 
Waste, and Underground Storage Tanks (USTs). 
Subtitle C ofRCRA deals with hazardous waste. This portion ofRCRA is often 
referred to as a "cradle to grave" control mechanism since it regulates the entire life of 
hazardous materials. RCRA has two major parts to it as they related to hazardous waste. 
First, all treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities must obtain, and periodically 
renew, a permit. Permitted facilitie.s are also required to demonstrate financial capacity 
to pay for the closure, cleanup, and post closure care of their site. This feature is 
particularly important in regards to the past creation of, and the avoidance of future, 
brownfields. A second major part to RCRA is the creation of a system of inspections and 
enforcement actions on facilities that generate or transport hazardous wastes. Unlike the 
TSD facilities, these entities are not required to demonstrate financial capacity to pay for 
cleanups, however, they are subject to corrective action orders as a result of violations of 
RCRA. An interesting component to RCRA that is worth noting is that " ... EPA's 
regulations have long provided that a generator may accumulate its own hazardous 
wastes in tanks or containers for up to 90 days without triggering TSD status" (Percival et 
aI, 2006, p. 358). This means that many generating facilities that are not subject to the 
financial assurance and permitting requirements of TSD' s can continue being classified 
as a generator, even if they have continuously full containers or tanks of hazardous 
wastes. This can be achieved by storing wastes for 90 days, sending that waste to a TSD, 
and replacing that waste with new waste. This loophole in RCRA can potentially have 
significant implications for brownfields and brownfield programs. 
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Intergovernmental relationships and interdependencies strongly influence the 
processes and administration ofRCRA. The EPA sets basic minimums and requirements 
while states do much of the front line implementation and administration. "When RCRA 
was written, it was Congress' intent for the states to assume primary responsibility for 
implementing the hazardous waste regulations, with oversight from the federal 
government" (US EPA RCRA Orientation Manual, III-137). States may be granted the 
authority to carry out the duties of the EPA with regards to RCRA by enacting a similar 
hazardous waste program, so long as it is at least as comprehensive and strong as the 
federal guidelines. Currently 48 states operate their own base RCRA program authorized 
by the EPA, with Alaska and Iowa having no EPA authorizations (US EPA StA IS 
database, 2006). 
In most instances, State environmental agencies take the primary role in 
compliance assurance. This role includes educating the regulated community on 
the requirements, reviewing and approving necessary permits, inspecting for 
compliance with applicable laws and permit terms, detecting violations and taking 
appropriate enforcement response ... (US EPA ECHO FAQ). 
RCRA administration by the states is an example of how multiple levels of government 
can all be involved and impacting on the results and outputs of a government program. 
In addition to the minimum requirements outlined by the federal EPA, each state's 
program is also impacted by their EPA regional offices, state oversight, and state capacity 
to run the program. The state level administrative agencies capacity to properly and 
comprehensively regulate and inspect the population of regulated entities is something 
that has been called into question in the past (Barnett, 1994). The complex and 
interdependent relationships existing in the administration ofRCRA poses interesting, 
and potentially harmful, questions for brownfields and the programs directed at cleaning 
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and redeveloping them. In all ofthe RCRA authorized states, RCRA programs are 
administered through the same administrative agency that deals with Superfund and 
Brownfields. Although at this juncture brownfields and RCRA are not absolutely 
connected or reliant upon each other, a state's performance in RCRA may be a useful 
indicator for the regulatory nature of a state may be. More will be said on this in the 
following chapter. 
CERCLA 
"After 1980, the history ofRCRA became tightly intertwined with that of 
CERCLA ... by and large, RCRA has become the locus of Congress's prevention 
concerns, while CERCLA tackles the problems of cleaning up past mistakes ... " (Percival 
et aI, 2006, p. 320). The act has direct implications for brownfield sites and has gained 
greater publicity than RCRA. CERCLA established prohibitions and requirements for 
dealing with brownfields, provided for liability or financial responsibility for 
contamination, and established a trust fund (Superfund) to finance cleanup when no 
responsible party could be identified. 
After the EPA began seriously enforcing CERCLA, courts broadly interpreted the 
Act with regard to strict 'joint and several liability '. This meant that each of the 
responsible parties at a site can be Hable for the entire cost of cleanup, so long as the 
harm caused by each party is indivisible from harm that other parties caused (Grayson, 
1995). Under the original CERCLA regulations new owners- sometimes not even 
knowing the contamination existed-could be, and sometimes were, held liable (Coffin 
and Shepherd, 1998; Ellerbusch, 2006; Hodge, 1996; Ryan 1998; Schwab, 1997). 
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Of particular concern are the principles of "strict" and "joint and several" 
liability. "Strict" liability does not require the demonstration of any 
wrong-doing. This means that even if the contamination actions taken 
were legal at the time they were done, a party may still be held 
accountable for the costs of clean-up and environmental damages. This 
liability is also retroactive, meaning that even if the pollution occurred 
prior to the passage of CERCLA in 1980, one may still be held 
accountable. "Joint and several" liability comes into play when there are 
several PRPs, and means that anyone or all of the parties who might be 
even remotely associated with the pollution may be held responsible for 
the entire cost of clean-up (Meyer and Van Landingham, 2000, p. 4). 
The aftermath of the liability concerns associated with CERCLA resulted in a negative 
stigma and a widespread reluctance by the private sector to deal with brownfields. In fact 
even financial institutions were reluctant to lend money for brownfield projects for fear 
of becoming liable themselves under broad court interpretations of liability under 
CERCLA. "Large cleanup expenses combined with a lack of legal finality leads potential 
developers and investors to choose uncontaminated suburban land (greenfields) over the 
more risky brownfields" (Eisinger, 2001, '1). 
CERCLA underwent several amendments attempting to ease liability concerns. 
Some of the most notable amendments occurred in 1996 with the passage of the Asset 
Conversion, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act to offer lenders 
liability protection against being held liable for contamination on properties that they may 
have provided financing for. Additionally and more recently, CERCLA was amended in 
2002 with the previously mentioned Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act. Regardless of these amendments, stigma over brownfields has 
remained. " ... CERCLA liability has significantly retarded efforts to renovate brownfield 
lands and buildings through its impacts on perceived real estate investment returns is a 
belief widely promoted by policy analysts and practitioners" (Meyer et al, 1995, p.84-5). 
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More than 25 years have passed since CERCLA was created and it has been extensively 
analyzed. The major complaints, as summarized by Percival et al (2006) are: 
• Joint and Several Liability results in unfair allocations offmancial 
responsibility 
• A litigation-driven system funnels too much CERCLA money into 
transaction costs and too little into site cleanup 
• The cleanup process is too slow and often ineffective 
• Cleanup standards are too stringent; one size fits all health based standards 
are inappropriate and impair productive uses of land 
• Where EPA does have discretion, remedies are uneven from site to site 
An important difference exists between a Superfund site and a Brownfield site 
that must be understood. There are approximately 1300 Superfund sites out of an 
estimated 500,000 or more sites with contamination (brownfields). Superfund sites are 
listed on the NPL and undergo a federal cleanup. In addition to the federal Superfund 
sites there are also State Superfund sites. Each state determines their list in its own way, 
and some states do not even have one. Some of the state Superfund sites are the same as 
the federal sites; others are different. Many states have modeled their state program after 
the federal law or have tried to improve upon the federal law. Generally, the state 
programs have allowed the states to take emergency response activity, compel 
responsible parties to perform cleanup, develop its own state list and cleanup standards, 
and fmance staff, studies, and remediation. 
CERCLA and State Superfund lists have markedly become less active over the 
past several years with brownfield programs taking a much more upfront role in 
contaminated properties, a fact that many do not realize. 
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In fact, because federal and state CERCLA programs are close to moribund with 
respect to the identification and remediation of new sites, brownfields programs 
are likely to be used to address even very seriously contaminated sites that are not 
already subject to a CERCLA cleanup. (Dana, 2006, p. 87) 
CERCLA decline is often attributed to several factors. First, the Superfund Tax expired 
in 1995 and was never reauthorized, leaving Superfund cleanups fighting for an ever 
shrinking pool of discretionary funds at the federal level (Percival et al, 2006). 
Additionally, judges have become less inclined to enforce CERCLA as strictly as in the 
past (Dana, 2006). State brownfield remediation programs are increasingly taking on 
more of the extremely contaminated sites and most do not have provisions excluding 
properties based on level of contamination (Environmental Law Institute, 2002). 
RCRA, Superfund, and Browrifield Programs 
In principle, RCRA sites can become Superfund sites. A RCRA regulated facility 
that does not properly close or does not adequately protect the environment and human 
health can become a Superfund site. Given that the EP A provides authorizations to the 
state to administer the RCRA program, a state failure to properly oversee and enforce 
RCRA regulations can also transform a RCRA facility into a Superfund site. "State 
failure to adequately oversee existing facilities and to enforce compliance with regulatory 
requirements increases the likelihood of ground water and other environmental 
contamination" (Barnett, 1994, p. 88). 
Given the fact that additions to the Superfund site lists have markedly decreased 
in the past several years, RCRA facilities that are not properly inspected, enforced, and 
closed will likely have an impact on a state's brownfield problem- not on its Superfund 
problem. More specifically, in addition to possibly becoming Superfund sites, RCRA 
facilities that contaminate land or ground water can become brownfields if the 
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responsible party does not properly address the contamination through response actions, 
closure, or post closure care. Again, given that 48 states administer their own base 
RCRA program; wide differences often exist across the states in relation to RCRA 
inspections and enforcements. Significant differences in inspections and enforcements 
can contribute to a state's brownfield problem. 
As Barnett (1994) points out "[ t ]he characteristics and strengths of state Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act programs depend on the current activism and political 
power of affected interests as well as on historic patterns of environmental policy making 
and control" (p. 89). Inevitably variations across the fifty state's RCRA programs will 
result in impacts on a state's brownfield problem either through an increased inventory of 
brownfields or by jeopardizing the effectiveness of the public solution (program). 
The public solution to a state's brownfield problem has been to create and 
administer state remediation and redevelopment programs. In public administration 
literature a great deal of scholarship exists concerning how and why policies get 
implemented as they do. Specifically, a stream ofliterature exists that deals with what 
influence political actors and non-elected administrators have on policies and programs. 
This literature is particularly important and salient to the study of brownfield programs. 
As brownfield programs take on more of the heavily contaminated properties, invest 
millions of dollars, and become more widespread it is an ideal time to explore how these 
programs facilitate brownfield remediation and redevelopment, as well as why they work 
the way they do. The following sections outline the theories associated with 
implementation variations as a result of elected and non-elected administrators' 
influences. 
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Political Control and Bureaucratic Discretion Theories 
In the last century Americans have demanded much more of and from their 
government. These demands have contributed to the wide expansion of what is often 
termed the American Administrative State (KettI and Fesler, 2005; Rosenbloom et al, 
2005). This expansion and growth of afourth branch of government has spurred 
numerous debates and lengthy discourse over the relationships and the proper role of a 
non-elected administrative cadre in a democracy (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast, 
1989; Davis, 1976; Gilmour and Halley, 1994; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001; 
Huntington, 1952; Kingdon, 1995; Meier, 1993; Svara, 1994; Wilson, 1989; Wood and 
Waterman, 1994). 
This immense growth in bureaucracy has not been without resistance and calls for 
change and reform. In fact, over the past two decades Americans have seen two large-
scale federal initiatives to fix the bureaucracy- reinforcing the widely held idea that the 
bureaucracy is broken. In 1993 the federal National Performance Review was initiated to 
deal with the bureaucracy and its inefficiencies. .. ... to change the culture of our national 
bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and 
empowerment" (Clinton NPR Speech, 1993). Less than a decade later a new president 
and a new initiative surfaced, again to fix the bureaucracy. "The need for reform is 
urgent" (President'S Management Agenda, 2002, p. 3). Although these two reform 
efforts are the most recent and notable, bureaucracy reform efforts span over the past 
century. In fact one prominent scholar aptly noted that, "No politician ever lost votes by 
denouncing the bureaucracy" (Wilson, 1989, p. 236). 
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The bureaucracies that are charged with carrying out so many of America's 
programs, regulations, and policies are generally regarded in a less than favorable 
manner. "Citizens widely believe that bureaucracies are slow, lumbering giants that 
accomplish little and are generally unresponsive to public preferences" (Wood and 
Waterman, 1994, p. 2). The rhetoric that surrounds the ideas that bureaucracies are 
wasteful, inefficient, and incompetent is often connected to an idea that administrators or 
bureaucrats ignore or change the policy mandates given to them by the elected officials 
(Bawn, 1995; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001). This presupposition, if true, is 
antithetical to the entire foundation of the American democracy. By constitutional design 
the democratic control of government relies upon the relationship between the elected 
representative and his or her constituents. The voters' ability to elect representatives and 
subsequently elect different representatives at their discretion provides some semblance 
of assurance that the citizens' wills are being expressed in the policies promulgated in the 
federal and state legislatures. As our society has grown increasingly more complex, the 
delegation of power to non elected administrators has grown immensely. It has been 
pointed out that many bureaucrats exercise managerial (executive), legislative, and 
judicial power as a result of elected officials' delegation of powers to them (KettI and 
Fesler, 2005; Rosenbloom et al, 2005; Wood and Waterman, 1994). This delegation of 
power seemingly opens the door for the unelected bureaucrats to manipulate and shape 
policies without any accountability to the citizenry. Wood and Waterman (1994) point 
out that "[t]his extensive delegation of power to the bureaucracy also violates the 
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances" (p. 7). 
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Interestingly enough, many of the current facets of bureaucracy that are perceived 
to be problems were deliberately created over a century ago. Still reeling from the 
corrupt and inefficient spoils system it was widely accepted that politics and 
administration should be separate-the so called politics-administration dichotomy. "The 
proposed politics-administration dichotomy was a normative, not an empirical, debate" 
(Wood and Waterman, 1994, p. 15). Early public administration scholars viewed the 
proper role of administration as simply administering the policy mandates as dictated by 
the elected officials (Wilson, 1887; Goodnow, 1900). "The dichotomy was broadly 
accepted in American public administration until the mid-I900s, when Dwight Waldo 
and Herbert Simon challenged the dichotomy ... " (Frederickson and Smith, 2003, p. 16). 
These first two scholars to recognize that administration is not, and cannot be, truly 
separate and insulated from politics came to this realization for different reasons. 
Dwight Waldo, writing in 1946, believed all administrative acts were inherently 
political. Conversely, Herbert Simon, writing in 1947, believed it was empirically 
difficult to separate politics from administration and administration from politics. 
Following from these initial two scholars, it became widely accepted that, in fact, no 
politics-administration dichotomy exists (Appleby, 1949; Long, 1949; Simon, 1947; 
Waldo, 1946). However, ", . .in the 1980s, the dichotomy reemerged and is now alive and 
well and found in control of bureaucracy theory" (Frederickson et al, 2003, p. 16). 
Control of bureaucracy theory has several assumptions and characteristics inherent with 
those who study it. First, bureaucracy theory allows for a distinction between political 
and administrative acts thereby allowing for valuable analysis of the interaction and 
relationships between the two. Secondly, the theories often rest upon an inherent distrust 
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of administrative power. Finally, theorists studying the political control of the 
bureaucracy often subscribe to the belief that the elected officials should control the non-
elected administrators. One prominent scholar explains the context of these theories 
well: 
., . different approaches to the study of administration usually come from 
one of two conflicting traditions in American politics-and each tradition 
leads to a very different perspective on the role of administration in 
American democracy. Some students of administration come to the 
subject with a fundamentally Hamiltonian bent. Like Alexander Hamilton 
they seek a vigorous state vested with a strong administrative apparatus. 
Other students of administration, however, are fundamentally 
Madisonians. Like Madison, they see a delicate balance of power the best 
protection against tyranny. The competitions of political interests, in their 
view, lessen the risk that bureaucracy can abuse individual liberty (KettI, 
1993, p. 407). 
Although opinions on whether the bureaucracy can be controlled by elected 
officials or whether the bureaucracy influences policy in its own right are still extremely 
varied and as of yet unresolved, one thing tends to be agreed upon across relevant 
scholarship. That is, a general consensus exists across scholars that a variety of forces 
shape policy during implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Lipsky, 1980; 
Palumbo and Calista, 1990; Rosen, 1998; Wood and Waterman, 1994). Some scholars 
point to bureaucratic discretion (Handler, 1992; Hawkins, 1992). Other scholars point to 
legislative or political control mechanism's influence on implementation (Banks, 1989; 
Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gallen, 1987; Aberbach, 1990; Huber, Shipan and Pfahler, 
2001). 
Given the pervasiveness of bureaucratic activity, it is not surprising that 
political scientists long have sought to understand the relationship between 
legislatures and agencies. Understanding this relationship is essential to 
democratic theory, as it focuses attention on the legitimacy of the role 
played by unelected policymakers in a representative democracy. 
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Furthermore, it sheds light on the actions, abilities, and motivations of 
legislators (Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001, p. 330). 
In the quest to understand and deal with the relationship between bureaucracy and elected 
officials two distinct approaches have been taken in scholarship. The first is that of the 
traditional or bureaucratic dominance approach. The second is that of the political or 
legislative control approach. 
Traditional or Bureaucratic Dominance 
Under this approach to the study of administrative-political power views power 
delegation to administrative units and officials as creating a heavily insulated 
bureaucracy with a substantial principle-agent problem (Kaufman, 1981; Rourke, 1976; 
Wilson, 1980). In essence scholars taking this approach recognize that bureaucrats have 
information, time, and resources concerning their activities that elected officials do not 
have-leading many scholars to believe that the balance of power is tipped in favor of the 
bureaucrats (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Niskanen, 1971; Katzmann, 1980). Relevant 
literature has identified several related facets of bureaucracy that lend credence to this 
view of bureaucratic dominance. For example, lengthy career service is viewed as 
creating a close-knit community that often outlasts political appointees enabling them to 
capture even more power (Heclo, 1977; Kaufman, 1981). 
Scholars writing about and in this approach to political-bureaucratic power 
dynamics tend to view the outlook in a very dismal manner for an effective political 
control of the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are seen as power hungry and self interested 
with political officials having little means or even desire to control them (Cronin, 1980; 
Huber and Shipan, 2002; Noll 1971; Ogul, 1976). Several related and early streams of 
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research also imply that political officials have little control over bureaucrats. Paramount 
to this research came from many early economic analyses of the bureaucracy which 
regarded the bureaucracy as a self-seeking individual in a market which seeks power and 
hides information (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1967). Another notable 
example is that of capture theory which often pays close attention to regulatory agencies. 
Capture theorists emphasize the clientele relationships that develop between various 
agencies and their respective groups to demonstrate that bureaucracies are captured by 
these groups and therefore are even further insulated from political influences (Bernstein, 
1955; Lowi 1969; Stigler 1971). Other arguments exist that expand upon individual's 
distastes and distrust of bureaucracy. For example, KettI (1993) states: 
Americans have long had a reverence for private markets to match their dislike of 
public power. Markets seek efficiency; government may not. Markets promote 
choice, in quality and price; government does not. Markets offer competition; 
government has a monopoly. The distinction between private liberty and public 
authority has always been a critical one in American society. 
In addition to the scholarship on how elected officials can't control the 
bureaucracy, some scholars go so far as to state that the political officials voluntarily or 
strategically design policy so that administrators have discretion (Huber and Shipan, 
2002). More specifically, in the face of divided political ideology or interests 
policymakers may develop policies that are deliberately vague so that the policy passes 
through the legislature. American distrust of bureaucracy is not likely to be easily 
changed; however, competing theories have emerged. 
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Political Control of the Bureaucracy 
In response to theories and research that indicated that political officials had little 
control or influence over bureaucratic affairs a competing approach emerged. This 
approach is sometimes termed congressional or legislative dominance, legislative control, 
or political control theories. Proponents and subscribers to political control theories 
argue that elected officials, in fact, have very powerful means by which to control the 
bureaucracy. Earlier examples tended to focus on ex post controls-that is reactive 
measures to get bureaucrats to cede to political officials wills. Common ex post controls 
include new legislation, oversight and monitoring arrangements, budget cuts, and new 
political appointees (Key, 1959; Meier 1993; West, 1997). Political dominance theorists 
often cite ex post controls as enabling the current legislatures to control bureaucrats now, 
that is the current elected officials are able to pressure the bureaucracy to cede to its' will. 
theory. 
The most recent and popular addition to this approach is often termed agency 
Agency theory explicitly assumed that elected officials (principles), such as the 
president and members of Congress, had political incentives to control the 
bureaucracy (agents). Unlike the earlier writings on bureaucracy, which were 
historical studies based on subjective assessments, most of the agency theory 
literature was based on hard quantitative evidence" (Wood and Waterman, 1994, 
p.22). 
Agency theorists tend to believe that political officials control the bureaucracy because 
they create/design the bureaucracy (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987). That is, 
these theorists tend to believe political officials exercise powerful ex ante controls. 
"Studies of ex ante influence look at the ability of the current legislature to influence the 
future activities of agencies. These studies argue that through careful design of structures 
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of bureaucracies and bureaucratic life shape and control policies and implementation. 
These aspects often include: administrative resources, agency values, public demand for 
services, and citizen ideology (Keiser and Soss, 1998). 
Bureaucratic Discretion. Political Control, and State Brownfield Programs 
Although, as evidenced by the scholarship outlined in this chapter, some 
interesting and powerful insights into the relationships between the elected legislators and 
the non-elected bureaucrats have been presented in past literature, this dissertation 
provides several valuable additions to this topic and is directed at expanding on current 
theories, not testing them. First, the majority of political control and bureaucratic 
discretion studies have been conducted at the federal level (Frederickson, 2003). Rather 
than study the federal government, this dissertation studies the state level bureaucracy 
and political actors. The state level provides a rich, complex set of actors to study in 
uncovering influences on brownfield programs. Secondly, it has been pointed out that 
most of the political control studies have involved complex quantitative models. Having 
a rich body of research on bureaucratic and political control issues at the federal level, 
this dissertation seeks to inform theory by analyzing state level bureaucracy where more 
complex relationships exist. Since an exploratory inquiry to state brownfield programs is 
a primary purpose of this dissertation, qualitative research methodology is used for this 
purpose. This research attempts to shed light on the complex nature of state brownfield 
programs in relation to bureaucratic discretion and political control coupled with the 
complexities of intergovernmental and inter-programmatic relationships which are 
germane to environmental programs and regulations. The following chapter of this 
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dissertation provides details on how this dissertation will proceed methodologically to 
accomplish the goals of this dissertation which were outlined in Chapter One. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS 
In order to accomplish the goals of this dissertation this project involves two 
distinct data collection methods and outputs. First, as pointed out previously, this 
dissertation seeks to inform and add to theory, not test it. In order to accomplish this goal 
a two step data collection process was employed. First, in order to begin to understand 
how state governments are intervening in brownfield remediation and redevelopment, it 
is necessary to have a clear understanding of what exists across the fifty states. The first 
step in data collection for this dissertation involved creating an exhaustive database of 
key components of state brownfield program efforts. Following from the insights and 
lessons of the fifty-state database, three states were selected for in depth comparative case 
studies. 
Database Data Collection and Methods 
The database created in this dissertation drew initial and basic information from 
an annual EPA survey (State Brownfields and Voluntary Response Programs: An Update 
from the States, 2005). Although the EPA survey provided some valuable information, 
the survey is not completely accurate and lacks a number of important and relevant pieces 
of information. In order to properly and accurately record and expand on this survey, this 
dissertation undertook a multi-step process that was partially driven by the theories 
presented in the previous chapter of this dissertation. 
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The first step of the data collection process included inputting all information 
from the EPA survey into a spreadsheet. The data contained in the survey was then 
checked across all fifty states using state statutes, administrative codes, web pages, news 
articles, and personal contacts. In the EPA survey the data is contingent upon the return 
of the survey by the individual state. With this reliance on personal survey responses, the 
data is not always answered by the most knowledgeable person. The survey lacks an 
effective check on this fault to determine whether it is accurate information. In a number 
of states the data was found to be inaccurate in the EPA survey. Additionally, a number 
of states were missing some of the most basic information fields. This dissertation 
checked and filled in all gaps in the basic information. Basic information included the 
year the program was created, number of programs, liability protections offered, financial 
assistance offered, and state statute references. 
Given this dissertation in drawing upon intergovernmental relations, bureaucratic 
discretion, and political control theories, data was added to the database based upon the 
findings of previous scholarship. In order to properly encompass previous scholarship 
the key pieces of information that were added included: administrative organization, 
ideology measures of policy inception year, employees in agency, appointed or merit 
status of head of agency, formal name of the program(s), types of liability protections 
offered, 3rd party liability information, financial assistance offered in minute detail, costs 
to enter the program, relationships with other administrative agencies in the state, 
CERLCA 128a Funding, and RCRA inspection and enforcement data. Most of this data 
was retrieved from statutes, web pages, documents from programs, and personal 
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communications. However, the RCRA information was retrieved from an EPA database 
called ECHO or Enforcement and Compliance History Online. 
The RCRA information was retrieved over several days in July 2006. In the 
online database only the previous three years of data are available. The information 
retrieved included all regulated industries in the state for the immediate three year period 
before July 2006. The following pieces of information were retrieved and calculated: 
Number of regulated facilities, number of inspections, number of informal enforcements, 
number of formal enforcements, number of EPA enforcements, and number of facilities 
in significant non-compliance (SNC) status. A second step of data collection was 
completed in this ECHO database. The specific facility type information was gathered in 
much the same way the entire universe was collected. RCRA regulates specific types of 
facilities: Large Quantity Generators (LQG) that produce more than 1000 kg of 
hazardous wastes a month; Small Quantity Generators (SQG) that produce less than 1000 
kg but more than 100 kg of hazardous wastes a month; Conditionally Exempt Small 
Quantity Generators (CESQG) that produce less than 100 kg of hazardous wastes a 
month; Transporters that transport hazardous wastes between sites, to disposal facilities, 
and to storage locations; and Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) facilities that treat, 
store, or dispose of hazardous wastes. These specific facility types were examined for 
inspection rates across them. More will be said about the implications for specific 
facilities in the following chapters. After collecting this information on RCRA 
inspections and enforcements, all of the related percentages were calculated to enable 
comparison across the states. The RCRA data is used for two purposes in this 
dissertation. First, in order to ascertain the regulatory nature of the state the percentage 
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inspection and enforcement rate is used to proxy how 'environmentally strict' that 
particular state is. Secondly, it is expected that RCRA programs and brownfield 
programs are interrelated and interconnected in many ways. This interconnectedness 
may prove to be an important factor in the in-depth case studies and analysis of the fifty 
state programs. 
Upon the completion of the fifty state brownfield program database it is possible 
to answer the following question: What are the Laboratories of Democracy doing with 
their brownfields? This database enables a broad description and understanding of the 
variety of mechanisms, methods, and roles of the state brownfield programs. Although 
this database is a powerful tool in understanding what states are doing in their programs, 
it cannot answer some of the questions about why the programs function and look as they 
do. In order to provide a deeper level of analysis this dissertation utilizes a multiple case 
study approach to enable a better understanding of the variety of influencers on these 
programs---particularly bureaucratic and political control influences. 
Case Study Methods 
Utility of Qualitative Research 
Phenomenological inquiry, or qualitative research, uses a naturalistic approach 
that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings. Logical 
positivism, or quantitative research, uses experimental methods and quantitative 
measures to test hypothetical generalizations. Each represents a fundamentally 
different inquiry paradigm, and researcher actions are based on the underlying 
assumptions of each paradigm (Hoepfl, 1997, p. 1). 
Rather than rely on numbers which often do not capture the real story, this part 
of the dissertation obtains in-depth information about these programs, political officials' 
and administrative officials' understanding and role in the program, and specific 
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documents through in-depth open-ended interviews and document analyses. Anonymity 
was promised to all interviewees in return for their candid answers. In order to better 
protect identities, names and specific job titles are omitted. Job roles, as opposed to job 
titles, are used. This use of qualitative data allows for a richer understanding of what is 
truly going on within these programs (Patton, 2002). 
Two key components of this dissertation make using a qualitative methodology 
logical and necessary. First, a key component of the dissertation involves understanding, 
learning, and potentially offering policy recommendations from an analysis of what the 
various states are doing in relation to their brownfield programs. The level of 
understanding required to provide potential policy recommendations for other states 
requires a qualitative methodology. "Generative research is concerned with producing 
new ideas either as a contribution to the development of social theory to or to the 
refinement or stimulus of policy solutions" (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 30). Secondly, 
this dissertation seeks to potentially add and expand theories of bureaucratic discretion 
and legislative control. Given that this part of the dissertation does not seek to test these 
theories, but add to and infonn it through the study of state level programs with a high 
level of intergovernmental and inter-programmatic dependence, qualitative research 
provides the necessary depth of infonnation required to do so. "It therefore has the 
potential to ... detennine actions that are needed to make programmes, policies or 
services more effective" (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 30-1). 
It has been noted that a key strength of qualitative research is the ability to 
explore unanticipated issues (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Stake, 1995). This is an important 
aspect to this particular study as the variation across the states combined with the relative 
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lack of research in these programs leaves a great deal of room for unanticipated issues. 
Statistical analysis of these programs would likely miss important facets of these 
programs which are of interest to this research. For example, in Indiana a portion of their 
brownfield program has recently (2005) broken off into a separate quasi-governmental 
organization. Statistical analysis of this program would not be ideal or even yield as deep 
of a level of understanding for this particular aspect and rationale for this change in this 
particular program. Furthermore, the complexities of these programs and the 
relationships each hold with the federal government, local governments, regional EPA 
offices, various other administrative units, various other regulatory and non-regulatory 
programs, and citizens of each respective states, make qualitative research methods both 
more appropriate and more fruitful than quantitative methods. 
Case Studies 
"Qualitative inquiry is not a single, monolithic approach to research and 
evaluation" (Patton, 2002, p. 76). As Cresswell (1998) points out, it is possible to 
distinguish five qualitative traditions: biography, phenomenology, grounded theory, 
ethnography, and case study. Case study methodology " ... investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context" (Yin,2003). This dissertation's subject is very 
appropriate to case study research. This dissertation specifically utilizes a comparative 
case study methodology. "Almost any observation, whether one makes it in academic 
research or real life, implies some form of comparative assessment, such as big-small or 
tall-short. Without comparison, one cannot tell whether an object is big or small" (Pierre, 
2005, p. 454). Keeping with the view that comparison is essential to a deep 
understanding in research, this part of the dissertation examines three specific state cases. 
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In order to learn the most from these cases, these states were selected for their uniqueness 
using a purposive maximum variation sampling method stemming from data gathered in 
the fifty state database (Patton, 2002). This method of selecting cases is particularly 
important and logical for this dissertation as it allows for a selection of information-rich 
cases for study. "Studying information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth 
understanding rather than empirical generalizations" (Patton, 2002, p. 230). 
"Qualitative research can contribute by: ... exploring how the manifestations of 
phenomena vary between groups, exploring how the reasons for, or explanations of, 
phenomena, or their different impacts and consequences vary between groups ... " 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 50). As Patton points out, the first step in maximizing 
variation "involves identifying diverse characteristics or criteria for constructing the 
sample" (Patton, 2002, p. 235). Drawing upon existing scholarship on political control 
and bureaucratic discretion and this dissertation's fifty-state program database of 
characteristics of the brownfield programs and related RCRA programs, the following are 
selected key considerations to this research when selecting the three cases: 
• Administrative Organization 
o Given the interest in potential bureaucratic influence over these programs 
diversifying the administrative organization of the program is of interest. 
To provide the potential for rich analysis and information requires a 
diverse set of environments by which the programs operate. Key 
considerations here include how the program is structured in the 
administrative agency and the level of fragmentation that exists across the 
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program. Data gathered and presented in Chapter Four will provide the 
basis for this classification. 
• Regulatory Environment (agency values proxy) 
o Drawing upon relevant scholarship in control and discretion theories, this 
dissertation posits that with all fifty state programs residing in the same 
administrative body as their RCRA program, it is useful to measure 
agency values with that state's stance on inspection and enforcement of 
RCRA. That is, a state with a more lax approach to inspection and 
enforcements indicates a certain value. That value may be expected to 
carry over to the brownfield program. Attention is also given to states 
with EPA Performance Partnership Agreements (PPA) concerning their 
RCRA programs (approximately 64% have PPA and the remaining 36% 
do not). In addition to the utility of a state's regulatory nature based upon 
RCRA performance, it is posited that RCRA is a program with a great deal 
of overlap and connection to brownfield programs, making the connection 
worth more inquiry. 
• Ideology of Government 
o Referring back to studies that use government ideology as an explanatory 
variable for proving political control over the bureaucracy, it is logical to 
factor ideology scores into the selection of cases. Using the Berry et aI, 
measure of ideology, a range of political ideology scores from the most 
recent year and the year of the program's creation is an important 
consideration in selected the cases. 
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• Age of Program 
o This facet is less driven by theory and more driven by an interest in 
information rich cases. Attention is given to ensuring the selection of 
cases with enough history and time to provide this information rich 
potential. 
This dissertation will draw from the details learned in the database and presented in 
Chapter Four concerning the fifty state brownfield programs to select the final cases for 
mqUIry. 
As with any research methodology a comparative case study has its own 
limitations. Specifically, case studies are not necessarily able to be generalized. What 
happens in one state may be a product of the uniqueness that is that state and the lessons 
learned there may only be applicable there. Individual states have unique contexts that 
hinder the ability to assume the lessons are applicable elsewhere. A common way of 
validating qualitative data is to see if other data sources seem to point to the same 
conclusion as gained from the interviewees. This dissertation reviewed thousands of 
pages of documents that included news articles, published reports, statutes, bill tracking 
reports, policy analysis documents, and personnel documents. By following the 
interviews with the other forms of research this dissertation is better able to be confident 
in the findings. In a number of cases the interviewee was contacted multiple times to 
discuss a new finding or to verify information. 
The database of the fifty state programs is intended to provide a broad description 
of what is going on in the laboratories. Conversely the case studies are intended to 
provide a detailed story of what is going on and influencing the programs. These case 
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studies provide a deep level of understanding concerning the roles, expectations, daily 
operation, and environment of these programs. Through discussions with front line 
administrators and political officials enables an understanding of the context under which 
each of these programs operate. 
Although interviews and data collection were intense and inclusive, some 
limitations in this exist. Unfortunately, given both time constraints and reluctance on the 
part of certain individuals to participate in an interview, some potentially valuable 
individuals were not able to be included. Specifically, appointed officials in the three 
case study states were not available for this research. Although a number of front line 
administrators and higher up supervisors were interviewed, it is possible that the 
appointed officials would have added valuable insights. Furthermore, the Governors of 
the three states were not included in this research for much the same reasons. To be sure, 
administrative agencies are entities of the state's executive branch and as such, the head 
of the executive branch may have provided more valuable insights into a state's 
brownfield efforts. 
A further limiting factor in this research has to do with the economic climate of 
the three states. Different levels of deindustrialization, economic capacity, and market 
structure may very well play important roles in determining a state's capacity and 
willingness to act upon brownfield remediation and redevelopment. This type of 
limitation must be taken into consideration when attempting to draw policy 
recommendations and lessons from the data. Although any research method is likely 
imperfect, this research, as designed, will certainly fill a gap in knowledge by providing a 
deeper, contextual understanding of the influences on state brownfield programs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIENCES OF THE LABORATORIES 
Academic and practitioner literature is dominated by liability issues surrounding 
and contributing to the problem ofbrownfields (Bartsch, Collaton, and Pepper, 1996; 
Coffin and Shepard, 1998; Ennist, 2006;Whitney, 2003), financial concerns over cleanup 
costs (Connolly and Daddario, 1995; Depass, 2006; Schwab, 1997; Wernstedt et al, 2006; 
Meyer and VanLandingham, 2002), and stigma attached to brownfields (Roddewig, 
1996; De Sousa, 2003). Recently scholars have turned to the role public brownfield 
programs take in aiding the remediation and redevelopment of these sites (Bartsch and 
Walls, 2005). In many ways the state governments' various brownfield programs can be 
seen as a creative mediatory working to level the playing field between brownfield and 
greenfield sites. 
As discussed and outlined earlier in this dissertation a major part of this 
dissertation included collecting and organizing a database of details concerning the 
various fifty state brownfield programs. The final database covers a number of details 
concerning the scope and approach each state took to facilitate brownfield remediation 
and redevelopment and the related RCRA regulatory stance. The details in this database 
not only show the sheer diversity in programs across the fifty states, but it also enabled 
the educated selection of cases for the next stage of inquiry of this dissertation. The 
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details covered in the database included a wide range of information intended to gain 
insights into the various participation requirements, administrative make-up, liability 
protections, financial incentives offered, ideology of government and citizens in year of 
program creation, RCRA facility inspections and enforcements, and any specific cleanup 
provisions of note. The final database contains over 4000 different pieces of information 
across the fifty states. Appendix A provides the template of the information gathered on 
each state in the U.S, while Appendix B offers the three case study states as examples of 
the complexity of this database. Unfortunately, due to the extensive size and scope of the 
database, it cannot be included in this printed dissertation, but will be available online at 
http://cepm.louisville.edu. Data pertaining to an average state can run well over ten 
pages in length. 
A key to learning from other state's experiences is to have a clear understanding 
of what others are doing. Drawing from previous scholarship several facets of the 
brownfields problem, of which state programs are presumably attempting to remedy, are 
focused on in this database and chapter of this dissertation. As explained by the 
Northeast-Midwest Institute (2001): 
Developers and investors, cautious of environmental liability, have shied away 
from brownfield sites. Contaminated properties, which are subject to many 
environmental regulations and procedures, also are vulnerable to costly 
construction delays. Pollution concerns have led developers to pass up 
opportunities in urban centers for ones in rural and suburban areas (a.k.a. 
greenfields) where land is perceived to be less expensive and free from unknown 
liability. If these barriers to brownfield reuse are to be overcome, site reusers need 
funds to perform site assessment, funds to develop a cleanup plan, and funds to do 
the cleanup (p. 2). 
Drawing from the previous quotation, it can be inferred that among other things, the 
following components are important and integral to getting brownfields redeveloped: 
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liability abatement concerns, regulatory process concerns, and minimizing the financial 
costs of cleanup and redevelopment. The overall findings of the diversity of the 
programs as recorded in the fifty state database are elaborated upon in the following 
sections not only using the three factors mentioned here but also by providing a 
description of the major aspects that exist across the fifty states. This chapter first details 
the most common brownfield program across the states-Voluntary Cleanup Programs 
including a discussion of liability issues; then moves on to a discussion of the variety of 
financial opportunities across the fifty states for brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment; next moves to a discussion of states' approaches to RCRA; and 
concludes with the detailed rationale for the case study selection to be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs-a consistent overall approach by the States 
Voluntary Programs-What are they? 
As has been previously stated in this dissertation, all fifty states have some form 
of a brownfield program. Brownfield programs take a number of different forms across 
the fifty states. Some states have only one program while others have multiple programs. 
Forty seven of the 50 states have a standard voluntary cleanup program (VCP); 
sometimes called a Voluntary Response Program (VRP) or a Voluntary Remediation 
Program. Only Alaska, South Dakota, and North Dakota do not have the typical 
Voluntary Cleanup Program-although they do have some form of a brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment program. Regardless of the exact title of a state's 
voluntary cleanup program they all loosely follow the same procedure: upon the 
completion of an agreed upon cleanup the voluntary party receives some sort of liability 
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protection such as Covenants Not to Sue (CNTS), Certificate of Closures (COC), or No 
Further Action Letters (NF A). As the Environmental Protection Agency (1997) explains: 
Many states have established voluntary cleanup programs. The key ingredients of 
a documented State voluntary cleanup program include established authority, 
investigative and remedial procedures, cleanup targets appropriate to sites, State 
sign-off conditions and procedures, and liability provisions. These voluntary 
cleanup programs allow volunteers, such as site owners and developers, to 
identify and clean up sites, to use less extensive administrative procedures, and to 
obtain some relief from future state liability for past contamination. These sites 
might otherwise not be cleaned up because of their relatively low priority, and 
because these sites are too numerous for other state or federal cleanup programs 
to address within a reasonable time frame (US EPA Guidance for Developing 
Superfund Memoranda of Agreement, 1997). 
In many states Voluntary Cleanup Programs coexist with a variety of other programs 
directed at remediation or redevelopment of brownfields. 
Almost all of the Voluntary Cleanup Programs require some fee for participation. 
These fees are most often used to facilitate the program's existence without relying solely 
upon appropriations from the state. Oftentimes the fees are required by state statute. For 
example in North Carolina, " ... [t]here is a statutory fee of $2,000 for obtaining a 
brownfields agreement" (North Carolina Program FAQ). At least two states, North and 
South Dakota who do not possess a formal VCP, do not charge for participation in their 
programs. Of the states with standard voluntary cleanup programs, only Florida does not 
charge a fee. However, Florida does charge for other brownfield programs separate from 
the VCP. 
The VCP fees come in the form of oversight fees, sliding scale fees, and fixed 
fees. Some states require both a flat application fee and an oversight charge. For 
example New Mexico requires an upfront $1000 application fee to apply to participate in 
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their YCP as well as oversight charges of $65 per hour (New Mexico Ground Water 
Quality Bureau- Voluntary Remediation Program). 
EPA's Role-MOAs 
Although the voluntary cleanup programs are both state instigated and state run, 
the EPA plays a role through a voluntary agreement-or a Memorandum of Agreement 
(M.O.A.). Any state in which the EPA grants an M.O.A. to is one where the EPA has 
determined the program meets minimum adequacy standards across six dimensions: 
minimum community involvement levels, protective of human health and environment, 
technical and financial resources, mechanisms for certification of response plan, 
oversight, and enforcement ability (US EPA Guidance for Developing Superfund 
Memoranda of Agreement, 1997). "The MOA gives the state YCP credibility and 
autonomy; EPA has stated, in agency guidance, that it will not investigate or "second 
guess" sites that have successfully completed the state's program unless there is a 
compelling reason to do so - like previously unknown contamination that presents an 
imminent threat to health and the environment" (Bartsch and Dorfman, 2000, p. 2). 
Twenty-Three states currently have active voluntary cleanup program M.O.A.'s 
with the EPA. 
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STATE DATE SIGNED 
Illinois, April 1995 
Minnesota May, 1995 
Wisconsin October, 1995; Revised 
November 2006 
Indiana December, 1995 
Colorado April 1996 
Texas May, 1996 
Michigan July, 1996 
Missouri September, 1996 
Maryland February, 1997 
Rhode Island February, 1997 
Delaware August, 1997 
Oklahoma April,1999 
Florida December, 1999; Revised 
November, 2005 
New Mexico December, 1999 
Arkansas December, 2000 
Kansas March,2001 
Ohio July, 2001 
Virginia January, 2002 
Wyoming March,2002 
Pennsylvania April,2004 
Iowa June, 2004 
Louisiana October, 2004 
Nebraska November, 2006 
Table 4.1: States possessing vep Memorandum of Agreement's with the E.P.A. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the range of states with MOA's for their VCPs. Of note are Florida 
and Wisconsin which have both revised their MOA's since the original agreement. 
A state with an MOA will be able to extend greater certainty to the participants of 
their program that the EPA will not intervene and that the cleanup will not only suffice at 
the state level but also at the federal level. "The EPA added to the authority of states in 
1995 when the Agency similarly began providing state memorandums of agreement 
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("SMOA") that granted assurances that the EPA will not require subsequent liability after 
compliance with the state VCP had been achieved" (Collins, 2003, p. 304). This is of 
particular importance because, "CERCLA does not preempt state cleanup laws, and thus 
both the federal CERCLA and state's environmental laws must be applied in determining 
the requirements and the liabilities for remediation of a brownfield" (p. 304). 
As previously stated in this chapter a key component to a state's brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment efforts is to provide liability protections. In the 47 states 
with VCP's, liability protections are provided within that program. However, in North 
and South Dakota no liability protections are apparent with their brownfield programs. 
Of additional note is Alaska, which offers a mechanism where a prospective purchaser of 
a property can receive a Prospective Purchaser Agreement (PPA) offering some liability 
protections to that party. 
Liability Protections 
One of the primary and most important components of state brownfield efforts, 
and more specifically their voluntary cleanup programs, are liability relief provisions. 
The various voluntary cleanup programs' liability provisions usually come in the form of 
a document issued by the overhead I agency, governor, state attorney general, or state 
Department of Justice. In some cases more than one of these entities will issue a liability 
release document. These various liability relief documents range in names with the 
following being noted in this database: No Further Action Letters (NFA), Certificate of 
Closures (COC), Covenants Not to Sue (CNTS), Prospective Purchaser Agreements 
(PPA), No Further Remediation Required (NFR), Innocent Owner/Operator Certification 
(IOC), Innocent Party Agreements (IPA), Case Closure Letters, Letters of Concurrence, 
I The Administrative Agency or Department in which the program is housed. 
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Closure Letters, Site Status Letters, and Comfort Letters. In fact some states issue 
several different types and with a sometimes varying level of protection based upon the 
initial negotiated cleanup agreement. For example, in New Hampshire 
... an eligible person can obtain a "Covenant Not to Sue" from the N.H. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and a "Certificate of Completion" from the N.H. 
Department of Environmental Services (DES) when site investigations and 
remedial actions are performed in accordance with DES cleanup requirements 
(New Hampshire's Brownfields Covenant Program, 2005). 
Comparing Wyoming to New Hampshire reveals how liability relief mechanisms can 
vary from state to state. Wyoming uses the same terms but issues the documents for 
different purposes and at different times. 
DEQ expects that covenants not to sue will most often be issued while a cleanup 
is ongoing, rather than at the end of a cleanup, and that in many cases, covenants 
not to sue will be issued at the same time that a remedy agreement is signed. In 
general, a certificate of completion documents DEQ's opinion that all cleanup 
requirements for a site (or a portion of a site) have been successfully implemented 
or satisfied (Wyoming Fact Sheet #5 Liability Assurances, 2003). 
Responsible Party Participation 
Regardless of the name and varying levels of liability protection offered, other 
aspects of a states liability relief are important. More specifically, a key liability relief 
component of state brownfield efforts is whether a party who is responsible for the 
contamination in whole or in part can participate in the various programs and receive 
benefits. Thirty three states offer the opportunity for the responsible party to participate. 
The remaining states with liability protection programs explicitly deny responsible party 
access to the program. For example, Maine has it written in statute that in order to 
participate in the Voluntary Response Action Program that person shall be: "Subject to 
the provisions of this section, a person may not be deemed a responsible party and that 
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person is not subject to department orders or other enforcement proceedings or otherwise 
responsible" (Maine Voluntary Response Action Program, 1993). 
Many of the states that allow participation by the responsible party place additional 
constraints that non-responsible parties do not face. In fact five states will not give the 
responsible party liability protection, but they are allowed to reap the benefits of 
oversight through the program. Other states place financial or cleanup standard 
restrictions on the responsible parties participating. For example Louisiana's Voluntary 
Remediation Program allows responsible parties to participate, but with additional 
constraints. The state notes that "All persons are eligible except that only non-
responsible persons (as defmed in LAC 33:VI.903) are eligible to perform Partial 
Voluntary Remedial Actions" (Louisiana Voluntary Remediation Program Description). 
Other states allow the responsible party to participate but explicitly do not allow a 
responsible party to utilize financial incentives associated with the program allowing 
them instead to receive the technical assistance and assurance they are performing an 
adequate response action. For example in New Jersey, " ... in accordance with N.J.S.A. 
58:lOB-13.1, nothing in this Covenant [NJ Liability Protections] shall benefit any person 
who is liable, pursuant to the Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), N.J.S.A. 
58: 1 0-23.11, for cleanup and removal costs and the Department makes no representation 
by the issuance of this Covenant, either express or implied, as to the Spill Act liability of 
any person" (New Jersey Chapter 26C Department Oversight of Contaminated Sites, 
2006). 
A number of states do allow the responsible party to participate and allow them to 
receive liability protections and financial assistance. For example, in Oklahoma as long 
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as the responsible party is not already under order by the EPA to perform a cleanup, they 
are allowed to participate fully in all aspects of the state VCP. One other variation on the 
allowance of responsible parties, however, that exists across the :fifty states is that certain 
states will not allow responsible parties to use land use controls on sites they cleanup 
under the various brownfield programs even if they are allowed to receive liability 
protection and financial assistance-generally meaning that they will be required to do a 
complete cleanup as opposed to a risk based cleanup. Table 4.2 presented below shows 
the states with additional constraints on the responsible party participating in the state's 
brownfield program. Of particular note here are: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. These states both allow the responsible party to 
participate and to receive liability protections, while at the same time have a MOA with 
the EPA. These states are providing a route for responsible parties to receive liability 
















Only relieves liability from future cleanup 
The contamination must have occurred 
before 1997 
No Liability Prote~:;tions for RP 
No Liability Protections for RP 
Can't use department funding; Can't use 
Institutional Controls 
RP cannot have knowingly violated any 
laws. 
No Assessment Money Provided to RP 
No CNTS awarded to RP 
No liability relief for RP 
No liability relief for RP 
Contamination must have occurred before 
2000; For post-2000 contamination the RP 
must have had a prevention plan in place 
(per department's rules) in order to 
participate fully. 
Table 4.2: State Programmatic Constraints on Responsible Party Participation 
What is actually covered in these liability documents and the relative level of 
liability protections offered through the various mechanisms is quite diverse across the 
states. Virtually all of the states with liability provisions provide: that eligible recipient a 
liability assurance that the state will not instigate a lawsuit for further cleanup or for 
liability to the state. However, in a majority of states 3rd Party lawsuits resulting from 
off-site migration of toxins or other related property or personal harms are not covered in 
the liability release documents. Whether 3rd Party lawsuits are covered or not is very 
complex across the fifty states. In some states, such as Kentucky, 3rd party rights to 
bring a lawsuit against an individual for harms resulting from brownfields are not 
allowed to be barred by the brownfield programs as a result of other aspects of state law. 
As was so eloquently detailed in an issue of the Brownfield News: 
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"The bill [a 2006 bill expanding on liability relief for brownfields] also preserved 
the right of a third party or any person, other than the cabinet, to bring claims for 
injury to property or person resulting from contamination migrating onto an 
adjacent property. Such a provision is necessary due to Kentucky's "jural rights" 
doctrine imbedded in case law and Kentucky's Constitution. The jural rights 
doctrine restricts the authority of the General Assembly to limit common law 
rights of recovery (Manning, 2006). 
Across the fifty states the most common states to have liability provisions against suits by 
3rd parties are those states that issue CNTS. States noting 3rd Pruty liability protections 
include: Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigrul, New Jersey, New 
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Only Pennsylvania leaves 
the potential open for 3rd Party Liability Relief for responsible parties. In fact, this is 
written in statute: 
Any person demonstrating compliance with the environmental remediation 
standards established in Chapter 3 shall be relieved of further liability for the 
remediation of the site under the statutes outlined in section 106 for any 
contamination identified in reports submitted to and approved by the department 
to demonstrate compliance with these standards and shall not be subject to citizen 
suits or other contribution actions brought by responsible persons. The cleanup 
liability protection provided by this chapter applies to the: following persons: (l) 
The current or future owner of the identified property or any other person who 
participated in the remediation of the site. (2) A person who develops or otherwise 
occupies the identified site .... (Pennsylvania Land Recycling and Environmental 
Remediations Act, 1995). 
Pennsylvania also possesses an MOA for its program, making these liability protections 
even more powerful for participants. The remaining states with yd Party Protections 
explicitly do not allow the responsible party, even if that state allows responsible parties 
to participate in the overall program, to obtain 3rd Party liability relief. Table 4.3 















CNTS, 3rd Party, NRP 
PPA, 3rd Party, Superfund Sites, NRP 
CNTS, 3rd Party only NRP, MOA 
CNTS, 3rd Party only NRP 
CNTS, 3rd Party only NRP, MOA 
CNTS, PPA, NFA, 3rd Party only NRP 
CNTS, COC, 3rd Party 
NFA, PPA, 3rd Party, NRP 
CNTS, 3rd Party, MOA 
CNTS, yd Party NRP Only 
NF A, 3rd Party NRP only 
Table 4.3: Liability Details for States with 3rd Party Protections 
Additional states of note here are: Washington which is reviewing the ability to provide 
these waivers; and Rhode Island that deals with 3rd Party Protections on a case by case 
basis. In Florida the only thing barred pertaining to 3rd Party claims is that a 3rd party 
cannot compel a participant with relief documents to cleanup the property any further. 
Finally of note is Alaska which is able to offer some prospective purchaser liability relief 
documents that cover 3 rd Party claims. 
In addition to the complexities of what is covered under the liability relief 
documents, differences exist concerning how far reaching into the future the liability 
protections are. For example, in some states liability protection documents do not allow 
for the voluntary party to be held responsible for any of the contamination formerly on 
the site both at the time of completion and any that may be discovered at a later date 
(with usual notable exclusions for fraud and illegal activities). However, most states, 
such as Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina do allow for what 
is termed reopeners. Reopeners are "[ e ]xpress exceptions to liability releases or 
agreements that reserve the government's right to require further cleanup under certain 
conditions. These conditions typically include fraud by parties responsible for the 
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cleanup, discovery of previously unknown contamination, and discovery that 
contamination remaining on the site is significantly more toxic than originally believed" 
(Brownfields Center, 2006). 
Across the 48 states with liability protection, all but Alaska have those protections 
embedded within their Voluntary Cleanup Program; Alaska offers the PP A in their 
general state cleanup process. However, one notable exception to this exists in Indiana. 
In Indiana the state offers both a Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP) and a 
Brownfields Program. Under the VRP participants receive both a Certificate of Closure 
and a Covenant Not to Sue. These are the state's most powerful liability protections. 
Alternatively, under the Indiana Brownfields Program participants can receive Comfort 
or Site Status Letters. These do not necessary protect participants from liabilities but 
provide them with assurances about the status of a particular site and is aimed more at 
facilitating a sale of a low-to-no contamination present on the property site. If a property 
is deemed to have more significant contamination present the property will likely be 
referred to the VRP (Brownfield Director, IFA). 
A relevant related point worth mentioning here concerns liability protections for 
brownfield remediation and redevelopment and sovereign immunity. Although the courts 
interpretation of CERCLA initially indicated that States were potentially liable under the 
law, court cases since have reversed that finding based upon an interpretation of the 11 th 
Amendment (Percival et al' 2006). Under the U.S. Constitution local governments are 
not granted the same protections as states. However, across the fifty states exists a wide 
variation in whether States grant their instrumentalities (municipalities, redevelopment 
agencies, counties, etc) immunity from being sued by private parties. In fact Percival et 
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al (2006) note that, " ... counties and municipalities are sued for contribution most often" 
(p. 391). Whether instrumentalities of a state are granted sovereign immunity is a very 
complex and disputed topic in whole that often changes with new court rulings. 
Although it is not in the scope of this dissertation to examine the potential implications of 
sovereign immunity being granted to states' instrumentalities, it is worth noting in 
reference to liability protections. It is likely that some of the states in the U.S. offer 
sovereign immunity to their instrumentalities thereby potentially eliminating some of the 
liability concerns surrounding brownfields on the part of local governments and 
redevelopment agencies who find themselves in a position to remediate a brownfield. 
One additional, but rare, liability relief provision that exists in a few states is that 
of state involvement in environmental insurance. At least four states have some form of 
environmental insurance assistance: Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Yode, and 
Connecticut. Each of these states involvement in offering environmental insurance is 
varied from tax credits for the purchase of insurance (NY), to endorsement and a discount 
for insurance (WI), to actual state subsidized insurance (MA and CT). 
Financial Considerations, RBCA, and Land Use Controls 
In addition to liability concerns, the perceived and actual costs associated with the 
remediation aspect of brownfield properties is a major obstacle in getting them cleaned 
up and redeveloped. As a primary concern, the various state brownfield programs each 
offer a variety of financial incentives and avenues available in the remediation process 
for developers to help lessen the costs associated with the cleanup ofbrownfields. This is 
where other programs other than the voluntary cleanup programs are commonplace 
across the states. Some states will have incentives and methods for lessening the cleanup 
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costs existing within their voluntary cleanup programs, while others will have their 
offered incentives in separate brownfield related programs which are called something 
different entirely and may have different rules for participation. The various programs 
have both real financial offerings in the form of grants, assessments, or loans as well as 
available and allowed cleanup methodologies for lessening the cleanup costs. The 
standard methodologies that exist are the use of risk based cleanup levels, often termed 
risk based corrective action or RBCA [pronounced Rebecca], and the ability of 
developers to use Land Use Controls on a property being cleaned up. More will be said 
about the cleanup methodologies in the f{)llowing sections following a discussion of the 
monetary offerings across the states for brownfield remediation ~md redevelopment. 
Monetary Offerings 
The states have approached real financial incentives or offerings in a variety of 
ways. According to the data gathered all of the state programs offer some kind of 
financial consideration for brownfield remediation through their various programs. The 
fimmcial incentives offered across the fifty states ranges from monies available as a result 
of a specific EPA grant to actual state supported granting programs. Several states 
exhibit a plethora of incentives while others will only have the barest incentives available 
based upon EPA support. In a few cases, the financial considerations are only offered to 
public entities. For example in Alaska the state's Contaminated Sites Program only 
offers, " ... DEC, with support from EPA's Region 1 0, wishes to assist non-profits, 
municipalities, local governments, and their communities by conducting environmental 
site assessments at potential brownfield sites" (Alaska's Brownfields Program). The 
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most common financial incentives offered across the states are assessment grants, 
cleanup grants, revolving loan funds, and tax incentives. 
Assessment Grants 
A majority of the states offer some form of assessment grants. Virtually all of 
these assessment granting programs actually stem from an EPA grant awarded to the 
states by their respective EPA region in the form of a Targeted Brownfield Assessments 
[TBA] grant. For example, Arizona offers assessment grants, "lbrough an EPA grant, 
the VRP will contract a consultant to perform an environmental site investigation for a 
qualifying brownfield property. The program is available to municipalities, prospective 
purchasers, and parties who would not be found liable for any existing contamination at 
the property" (Arizona Voluntary Cleanup: Brownfields Assistance). As the EPA points 
out: "The TBA selection process varies with each EPA Region and by state Voluntary 
Response Programs. Each Region is given an annual budget to spend on TBAs. State 
Voluntary Response Programs allocate TBA funding on a case-by-case basis" (US EPA 
Targeted Brownfield Assessments Fact Sheets, 2003). 
A few states have internal assessment granting programs separate from the EPA 
TBA program. For example, Michigan once offered the Site Assessment Fund (SAF) 
grant to eligible public entities. The SAF is funded by the Michigan Environmental 
Protection Bond Fund of 1988. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
currently notes that no funds are available under this program at this time-however it is 
still noted as an available program with the hope that the state will be able to offer 
funding again under this program in the future. Assessment grants, although not 
necessarily pivotal to getting brownfields remediated, do enable states, localities, and 
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developers to better understand what the status of a particular site is. Some sites thought 
of as brownfields turn out to be either uncontaminated or less contaminated than feared, 
and assessment grants can provide the necessary information to get that site cleaned up 
and successfully reused. 
Cleanup Grants 
Outside of assessment grants the other most common granting program offered 
across the states is cleanup grants. These cleanup granting programs are far rarer than the 
assessment granting programs and are most often targeted to public or non-profit entities. 
For the states offering actual cleanup money most have very specific restrictions on 
whom and what site can receive the grant money. For example Michigan offers a Clean 
Michigan Initiative (CMI) grant program that allows, "Any county, city, village, 
township, Brownfield Redevelopment Authority, or other authority or other public body 
created pursuant to state law may apply for a grant. Eligible activities include 
environmental investigations and assessments, interim response, and due care response 
activities necessary for the proposed development" (Michigan CMI Brownfield 
Redevelopment Grants, 2006). A few states offer cleanup grants to a wider audience that 
includes private entities. For example, in Delaware a brownfield granting program exists 
that " ... authorizes the appropriation of $3,000,000.00 annually from the Hazardous 
Substance Cleanup Act Fund (HSCA Fund) for the purpose of reimbursing reasonable 
remedial costs ... " (Delaware Hazardous Substance Cleanup Act Mixed Funding and 
Brownfields). 
In addition to brownfield cleanup grants available within the brownfield programs 
some states have enabled and encouraged the use of granting mechanisms from other 
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programs and administrative agencies. For example in Oklahoma in 2000 a seemingly 
unrelated grant program was amended to better allow redeveloped brownfield properties 
to access to the funds. 
The Oklahoma Quality Jobs Act was amended to apply to basic industries that 
locate their principal business activities on contaminated properties of at least ten 
acres in size which qualify as 1) a federal Superfund removal site, 2) National 
Priorities List (NPL or Superfund) site, 3) a site fonnally deferred to the state in 
lieu ofNPL listing, or 4) a site that was remediated pursuant to an order of the 
DEQ. These companies may be eligible for the Quality Jobs Program incentive 
payments irrespective of their actual gross payroll or the number of full-time-
equivalent employees in new direct jobs [68 O.S. Supp. 2000 § 3604 (E - H)] 
(Oklahoma Brownfields Financial Incentives Fact Sheet). 
Variations do exist on the specifics related to the use of other programs' financial 
mechanisms. For example, Ohio provides an example where one of their granting 
programs requires a fund match by the recipient. 
Another interesting component of some state brownfield programs is the use of 
CERCLA 128a funds to public entities for cleanups, assessments, and other related 
expenses. "Section 128(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), as amended, authorizes a noncompetitive 
$50 million grant program to establish and enhance state and tribal response programs" 
(US EPA Funding Guidance for State and Tribal Response Programs, 2007). All fifty 
states get CERCLA 128a funds. 
Grant applications are required by the states in order to receive funding under this 
program and states are granted considerable leeway in detennining how to use these 
funds. Tracking down how much funding each state gets has proven to be a difficult 
endeavor. None of the EPA grant databases provides details on the amount of 128a 
funding awarded. The EPA allows the individual regions to handle that grant, and only 
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Region 1 (CT, ME, NH, RI, VT) has made that data available in published form. 
Requests for data from the EPA and other regions are met with guidance to ask individual 
states for that information. Calls and emails to the remaining states have provided spotty 
results of how much each state gets. Additionally, some states only provide cumulative 
totals, while others provide the most recent year. These programs have only been eligible 
to receive funding from this since 2003, making the cumulative totals useful as welL The 
following charts outline the known CERCLA 128a Funding to states for the most recent 
year and cumulatively since the program's inception. 
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Figure 4.2: CERCLA 128a Funding, Cumulative over life of grant 
As stated previously, some states use this 128a funding to provide grants and 
assessments to participants in their programs. As with the actual funding amounts, it is 
not entirely clear how many states use their funding, or how much is used, for this 
purpose. However, Nevada and Florida are examples where they provide grants to the 
public sector with 128a funds; with Nevada using the entire amount for grants and 
administration of the Land Recycling Program (not the Voluntary Cleanup Program). 
Judging from the three case study states, some states use these funds primarily for 
providing grants, others use them for some combination of grants and administrative 
costs. 
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Overall in terms of grants available-assessment grant programs, particularly 
EPA supported TBA's, are much more common than any state supported cleanup grant 
programs. Important and of particular educational value to other states is that, a number 
of states have started to make the connection from brownfield property needs to other 
state supported economic development grant programs, which often have many more 
grant opportunities than the brownfield programs do-but there exists a lot of room for 
improvement in this connection. 
Loan Programs 
Outside of assessment and cleanup grant programs, loan programs are the next 
most common form of financial assistance offered by states for brownfield remediation 
and redevelopment. The most common form of loan program is an EPA originated 
Revolving Loan Fund (RLF). 
A major component of the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative is the 
award of pilot cooperative agreements to States (including u.S. territories), 
political subdivisions (including cities, towns, and counties), and Indian tribes to 
capitalize Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund (BCRLF). The purpose of 
the pilots is to enable States, political subdivisions, and Indian tribes to make low 
interest loans to carryout cleanup activities at brownfields properties (US EPA 
Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund Pilot Program). 
Approximately twenty states have received EPA capitalized revolving loan funds. 
Important to note here is that many cities and counties across the United States have also 
applied for and received funds from the EPA to capitalize revolving loan funds. So even 
in the thirty states without an EPA capitalized RLF, larger cities or counties may have 
actually received these funds enabling developers within that state access to revolving 
loan funds for brownfield redevelopments. 
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In addition to the EPA capitalized RLF's a nwnber of states have created loan 
programs of their own. Oftentimes these loan programs will involve a low-to-no interest 
loan program similar to the EPA capitalized RLF. For example, New Jersey provides a 
wide expanse of loan programs to a variety of individuals including private parties: 
"Loans are available to private entities for up to 100% of the funding needed to remediate 
a discharge of hazardous substances up to $1 million per year. The interest rate is the 
Federal Discount Rate with a minimwn of 5% and is determined by the NJEDA. The 
maximwn term for any loan is 10 years" (New Jersey HSDRF Fact Sheet). Some states, 
such as Michigan, have created more than one loan fund. 
Brownfield redevelopment loans provide funding to local units of government and 
other public bodies to investigate and remediate known sites of environmental 
contamination, which will be used for identified economic redevelopment 
projects ... The Revitalization Revolving Loan (RRL) Program is designed to 
support local community efforts to redevelop brownfield properties by providing 
eligible entities with low-interest loans which may be used to evaluate 
contaminated or potentially contaminated properties, demolish dangerous or 
hazardous buildings that obstruct redevelopment, and to conduct interim response 
actions necessary to investigate a property or demolish a building (Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality-Brownfields Grants and Loans). 
In addition to the more common low-to-no interest loan programs, several states 
have loan guarantee programs directed at enabling investors to obtain outside financing in 
place in their brownfield programs. For example, in Oregon the state offers a program 
named the Capital Access Program (CAP). "Capital Access program offers loan 
portfolio insurance for environmental evaluations and brownfield redevelopment 
projects" (Oregon Brownfields Program: An Overview). Although CAP was initiated in 
1991 for economic development purposes, the program has grown to include 
brownfields. This program does not provide loans, but it offers a state guarantee on the 
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loan thereby increasing the likelihood that a bank will approve an applicant. Other states 
noting loan guarantee programs include Florida and Missouri. 
Tax Incentives 
In addition to upfront money programs such as the grants and loans available, 
many states offer a variety of tax incentives. According to data gathered at least 32 states 
offer some form of a tax incentive. The types of tax incentives offer vary widely with the 
following types being noted: credits and deductions for the cost of cleanup, tax reductions 
on increased property value for a length of time, tax credits for each new job created, 
sales tax exemptions, special provisions allowing the use of Tax Increment Financing 
(TIF), property tax abatements, various fees and tax exemptions, deductions for cost of 
environmental insurance, sliding scale tax rates on properties redeveloped, Fees in Lieu 
of Taxes, tax exemption on hazardous waste shipments, tax cancellations, and the ability 
to transfer-at no cost- tax delinquent properties to new owners willing to clean them up. 
Tax incentives vary widely across the states that offer them, with a variety of restrictions 
and eligibility rules across the states. Some of the more common and interesting of the 
various tax incentives available are elaborated on below. 
Income Tax Credits or Deductions for Cleanup Costs 
Several states offer deductions or credits on an individual or businesses' state 
income tax for the costs of cleanup. This is the most commonly available type of tax 
incentive across the states who offer tax incentives. Key examples include Colorado 
where tax credits are offered to offset the cleanup costs ofbrownfields: 
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As part of Governor Owens' smart growth initiative, the Colorado General 
Assembly passed a Brownfields Tax Credit (this has been extended to the end of 
2010) as an added incentive to develop formerly used and possibly contaminated 
properties (Brownfields). The bill provided an income tax credit of up to 
$100,000 to offset cleanup costs and make the redevelopment of such properties 
more financially viable (Colorado Brownfields Tax Credit). 
Florida also offers cleanup tax credits, but for corporations only: 
The 1998 Florida Legislature created the Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit (VCTC) 
to encourage voluntary cleanup of certain drycleaning solvent contaminated sites 
and sites in designated Brownfield areas. The 2006 Florida Legislature modified 
and expanded the VCTC. With the repeal of the Intangible Personal Property 
Tax, Section 199.1055, F.S, the VCTC is valid against Florida Corporate Income 
Tax only ... (Florida Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit). 
Income tax credits or deductions are fairly common across the 32 states offering tax 
incentives, however the requirements, eligibility, and specifics vary widely. As is 
evidenced in the two examples above, some states allow both individuals and businesses 
to benefit from the tax incentives, while others only allow businesses. As is the case with 
the liability and participation rules, some states allow responsible parties to benefit, some 
explicitly do not, and some judge it on a case-by-case basis. Most commonly the income 
tax incentives allow the individual or business to deduct a certain percentage of the costs 
associated with the cleanup ofbrownfields from their personal and/or corporate tax 
liability. These tax credits and deductions usually have a maximum cap on the amount 
able to be claimed and some allow the costs to roll over to the following year, while 
others do not. 
Property Tax Incentives/Programs 
In addition to programs that allow individuals or businesses to deduct or receive a 
credit on income taxes for cleaning up and redeveloping brownfields, some states provide 
property tax incentives. The most common property tax incentive involves enabling the 
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local or county governments to freeze or reduce property tax on a remediated and 
redeveloped brownfield. For example, in Georgia, "The Brownfields tax law allows 
property owners to apply to their local taxing authority for preferential assessment of the 
Brownfield property. The preferential assessment reduces taxes on the property for ten 
years, or until the certified assessment and cleanup costs are recouped, whichever occurs 
first" (Georgia Brownfield Redevelopment Incentives). 
Other variations and examples exist as well. In Idaho a VCP participant is 
eligible to receive a seven year, up to a 50% reduction in property taxes on remediated 
brownfield properties (Idaho Statute Title 63 Chapter 6, Exemptions from Taxation). 
Although some states, like Georgia and Idaho, require that the local taxing authority 
participate if a request is made--other states do not require subdivisions to participate 
and leave the final discretion up to the local authority. Maryland is a key example of this 
where the local jurisdiction must elect to participate in the state Brownfields 
Revitalization Incentive Program (BRIP). 
Maryland is also a good illustration of how a brownfield program's essential 
components can be distributed throughout a variety of administrative units. More 
specifically, in Maryland the liability relief and cleanup components of the VCP is 
located in the Department of Environment; however, this tax incentive is part of the 
Department of Business and Economic Development. 
Sales Tax Incentives 
Less frequently than the previously discussed tax incentives, a few states offer 
sales tax incentives. Most often these sales tax incentives involve exempting or 
refunding the sales taxes paid on brownfield cleanup equipment or machinery. At least 
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three states provide clear guidance on sales tax incentives: Alabama, New Jersey, and 
Oklahoma. A good example of a common form of a sales tax incentive exists in 
Oklahoma. "The Oklahoma Sales Tax Code allows an exemption for machinery, 
equipment, fuels, and chemicals incorporated into the treatment process to substantially 
reduce the volume or harmful properties of hazardous waste at facilities approved by the 
DEQ for the cleanup of a site of contamination" (Oklahoma Brownfields Financial 
Incentives Fact Sheet). 
Use of RBCA and Land Use Controls 
In addition to the offering of grants, loans, and tax incentives to help lessen the 
financial burden of remediating a brownfield, many states offer alternative methodologies 
for cleaning up brownfields. More specifically, many states allow for risk based 
corrective action (RBCA) and land use controls on remediated properties. Although 
these are not actual money incentives they do work to lessen the financial burden by 
making the overall cleanup less cost prohibitive--theoretically enabling and encouraging 
more cleanups and redevelopments of brownfields. 
RBCA is by far the most common alternative cleanup methodology allowed under 
the fifty state programs. RBCA is, "A streamlined approach in which exposure and risk 
assessment practices are integrated with traditional components of the corrective action 
process to ensure that appropriate and cost-effective remedies are selected, and that 
limited resources are properly allocated" (US EPA RBDM FAQ 6). Under traditional 
definitions the RBCA process is derived from ASTM (American Society for Testing and 
Materials) guidance which states, "The RBCA process ... us[ es] a tiered approach that 
integrates site assessment and response actions with human health and ecological risk 
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assessment to determine the need for remedial action and to tailor corrective action 
activities to site-specific conditions and risks" (ASTM Standard Guide for Risk Based 
Corrective Action, 2007). 
At least 40 states allow some form of risk based corrective actions in their 
brownfield programs. However, the comprehensiveness, eligibility, and specifics of the 
usage ofRBCA or RBCA-like processes vary widely across the states. For example in 
Utah one ofthe key benefits (as expressed by the agency) of their VCP's is the fact that 
"[v]oluntary cleanups can be tied to land use allowing for a risk-based approach to 
cleanup" (Utah Department of Environmental Quality Voluntary Cleanup Program). In 
many ways risk based cleanups are dependent upon some form of land use control and 
most of the states will include language in any liability relief document concerning any 
land use controls required and used by that property and developer. Land use controls, 
whether used in conjunction with risk based corrective action methods or not, is also a 
way for states to enable investors to clean brownfields at a lower cost. 
Land Use Controls (LUCS) are " ... also known as 'institutional controls', are 
defined broadly as legal measures that limit human exposure by restricting activity, use, 
and access to properties with residual contamination" (US EPA Land Use and 
Institutional Controls). Often LUCS will be a pivotal part of a state's risk based cleanup 
process. It has been pointed out that the array of terminology and definitions concerning 
risk based remediation across the states is complex and confusing (Land Use Control 
Site, 2007). For the sake of understanding and providing consistent human health and 
environmental protection the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act was proposed and 
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offered across the fifty states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Law (NCCUSL). 
Land use controls, activity and use limitations, institutional controls, engineering 
controls, restrictive covenants, and deed restrictions, etc. all may provide the same 
legal remedy for risk-based cleanup but for differing sites. The Act attempts to 
encompass all of this terminology by connecting broadly defined activity and use 
limitations with the requirement that they are enacted in conjunction with an 
agency-authorized environmental response project (Land Use Controls Site, 
2007). 
Currently 14 states have adopted the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act with an 
additiona124 introducing the bill in 2007 (Uniform Environmental Covenants Act). 
Table 4.4 illustrates the states' status in terms of the Uniform Environmental Covenants 
Act. 
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Table 4.4: Adoption Status of Uniform Environmental Covenants Act 
Understanding the lack of uniformity in definitions, tracking, and requirements 
for Land Use Controls is particularly important point for understanding brownfield 
programs. According to data gathered virtually all of the states allow for, some even 
require, land use controls on brownfield redevelopments. A lack of uniformity is an 
interesting component of state brownfield efforts and could be a point of improvement 
for many states. Some states provide an extensive and complex tracking system; others 
do not track the controls at all. Arkansas and Alabama are key examples of states that 
allow controls but currently do not track them. On the other side, some states (Florida in 
particular) have an extensive, publicly available tracking system for Land Use Controls. 
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The ability of brownfield investors to use various land use controls is likely a 
valuable and effective way of reducing the cleanup costs associated with reusing 
brownfields. It seems that almost all of the states are allowing the use of these controls, 
but the tracking and long term control of these measures is not consistent across the 
states. Furthermore, a majority of the states are not party to the Uniform Environmental 
Covenant Act which would enable individuals, businesses, and concerned parties a 
clearer, more consistent understanding of terminology, control, and requirements for 
these land use controls across the fifty states. It would also provide a much needed 
consistency for the future of these land use controls. 
RCRA Regulatory Nature 
In addition to the details concerning the actual brownfield specific programs, the 
database also collected data concerning RCRA inspections and enforcements to use as a 
proxy for regulatory stance of a state as well as to explore any possible relationships 
between the two programs. Although both RCRA and CERCLA have contributed to the 
problem ofbrownfields, RCRA is the most logical area of inquiry to characterize a state's 
regulatory nature as it may impact its state brownfield program. As outlined in Chapter 
Two, RCRA is intended to be implemented and administered by the states. In fact, 
remembering that 48 of the fifty states have received base RCRA authorization from the 
EPA illustrates the widespread nature of the state-level participation in RCRA. A state's 
activity level in relation to RCRA may be able to enable a deeper level of understand of 
an overall state's perspective on brownfields. More specifically state performance under 
RCRA may be able to be used as a proxy for state commitments to environmental 
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regulation and enforcement. The database included RCRA enforcement and inspection 
data. 
In addition to providing a proxy for a state's environmental regulation and 
enforcement stance, another issue of concern to brownfields is that ofRCRA failure. By 
RCRA failure, it is meant that a state who does not adequately inspect regulated facilities 
and enforce any violations discovered may lead to failure of the protection of the 
environment and human health. In addition to short term problems associated with it, 
RCRA failure also holds the likelihood of increasing the number of brownfield properties 
within a given state. A state that does not provide a high, or even adequate, level of 
RCRA inspections and RCRA enforcements relative to the number of establishments 
using, disposing, or treating toxic materials can be expected to not only have more 
brownfield properties (due to neglect of efforts to avoid them), but also have a lower 
motivation for state spending on remediation and redevelopment of those properties. 
Additionally it may be expected that this potentially could translate into a more liberal 
risk-based cleanup program. Conversely, a particularly strict regulatory stance on 
hazardous wastes may be expected to limit certain types of risk-based cleanups, 
institutional controls, and/or types of assistance provided under that state's brownfield 
program. That is, a state that inspects and enforces hazardous waste violations at a high 
level is logically more likely to regulate the hazardous wastes being remediated in their 
brownfield program. Across all 48 RCRA authorized states the program is operated under 
the same department, often even the same office, as the brownfield programs. The 
variations in inspections and enforcements ofRCRA regulated facilities can be 
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counterproductive to even the best state brownfield remediation and redevelopment 
efforts as well as are likely related to the efforts of the brownfield programs. 
RCRAPPA's 
Before discussing specific inspection and enforcement rates it is necessary to 
understand that the EPA offers a mechanism for states to work more closely with them 
through a Performance Partnership Agreement (PPA). PPA's are negotiated agreements 
a state agency will enter into with the EPA in order to detail the working relationship 
between the two. "The scope and contents ofPPA's varies. Individual PPA's can range 
from general statement about how the state and EPA will work together as partners 
(perhaps identifying joint priorities that will be addressed) to comprehensive, multi-
program documents that detail each party's roles and responsibilities" (US EPA About 
Performance Partnership Agreemetns). Of the 48 RCRA authorized states, 33 have 
PP A's. Under RCRA, and in some states, these PP As can dictate how many inspections 
each state will conduct annually. When statistical tests are run on this data, interestingly 
enough, states with Performance Partnership Agreements (PP A) do not have statistically 
significant differences in rate of inspections as compared to the remaining states without 
PPA's. 
RCRA Inspections 
A pivotal part of the RCRA regulatory process is inspections. Every type of 
RCRA regulated facility is subject to inspection. The EPA Enforcement and Compliance 
History Online (ECHO) database tracks RCRA regulated facility inspections. 
Inspections are available in one, two, or three year increments for the past three years 
from the date of inquiry. EPA recognizes that it is not possible to inspect ever regulated 
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facility every three years (US EPA ECHO Frequently Asked Questions). However, a 
state's commitment and commitment to inspecting facilities can be gained from an 
examination of this database. Additionally, with 48 states having their base RCRA 
program authorized by the EPA, and two being administered by the EPA, it is possible to 
compare states with state authorization to states where the EPA administers the RCRA 
program. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the percentages of facilities that received an inspection 
in the past three years in each of the fifty states, keeping in mind that two states receive 
their inspections directly from the EPA. 
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Figure 4.3: RCRA Facility Inspection in the past 3 years. States listed in Alphabetical Order 
As would be expected with the varying capacities across the fifty states, Figure 
4.3 illustrates a moderate level of variation existing across the fifty states in the 
percentage of regulated facilities that received an inspection in the last three years. 
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As of July 2006, ECHO reports a total of 653,720 RCRA currently regulated 
facilities across the United States. RCRA regulated facilities generally include things 
like furniture manufacturers, gas stations, chemical plants, and other activities that 
produce, transport, handle, or dispose of a hazardous waste as defined by the EPA. The 
average state inspected 7% of their facilities in the past three years. Nevada inspected the 
most, at 44.75% of their regulated facilities, and New Hampshire inspected the fewest, at 
just 1 % of their facilities. Alaska and Iowa, the two EPA administered RCRA programs, 
inspected 9.37% and 13.06% of their regulated facilities respectively. The state and the 
EPA rely on self-reported data to assess compliance in the facilities that they have not 
inspected. "It is possible that facilities do have violations that have not yet been 
discovered, thus are shown as compliant in the system. EPA cannot positively state that 
facilities without violations shown in ECHO are necessarily fully compliant with 
environmental laws" (US EPA ECHO F AQ). 
It has been pointed out that, " ... by several orders of magnitude the system is 
much harsher on TSD facilities" (Percival et al, 2006, p. 357). Recognizing a difference 
exists in inspection rates at the different types of facilities, information was collected on 
specific facility types. Figure 4.4 illustrates this facility specific inspection rate across 
the states. 
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Figure 4.4: Inspection rates of specific types of RCRA regulated facilities. States in alphabetic order. 
Large Quantity Generators (LQG), Treatment Storage and Disposal Faeilities (TSD), Small Quantity 
Generator (SQG), Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generators (CESQG) and Transporters. 
States are listed in alphabetical order. 
RCRA regulated facilities are broken up into five separate classifications. These 
classifications are as follows: Large Quantity Generators (LQG) which produce more 
than 1,000 kg of hazardous waste in a month; Small Quantity Generators (SQG) which 
produce more than 100 kg but less than 1,000 kg of hazardous waste a month; treatment, 
storage and disposal facilities (TSD), Transporters of hazardous waste, and conditionally 
exempt small quantity generators (CESQG) which produce less than 100 kg of hazardous 
waste per month. Examining the breakdown of types of facilities, reveals that inspections 
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across all states are performed most often at TSDs and least often at CESQG's. The high 
level of inspection at TSD's is consistent with previous scholarship indicating a harsher 
stance on these properties. What is interesting, however, is the incredibly varied 
inspection rate at the SQG and LQGs which is illustrated well in Figure 4.4. 
Table 4.5 illustrates the highs and lows across the fifty states in terms of specific 
facility inspection rates. 
Type of LQG SQG TSD CESQG Transporter 
Facility 
NTLAverage 54% 21% 75% 9% 19% 




Lowest State N.Y. CA,MD, CT (47%) MD (0%) ND(O%) 
(14%) andUT 
(1%) 
EPA AK(53%) AK (48%) AK(83%) AK(13%) AK(7%) 
Administered IA(63%) IA (13%) IA (74%) IA (15%) IA (9%) 
States 
Table 4.5: Highs, Lows, and National Averages ofRCRA specific types of facility inspection rate 
As can be seen in the table above, Montana holds four of the five highest rankings for 
inspection rates at specific types of facilities. This is a bit misleading. Montana has very 
few regulated facilities when compared to other states. In July 2006 Montana reported a 
total of 2003 facilities in their state. In fact in absolute numbers by type of facilities 
Montana only inspected a total of 292 facilities over the past three years. What is more 
important to be gathered from the scatter plot above (Figure 4.4), is that across the fifty 
states two things are fairly consistent: TSD's get the most inspections and CESQG's get 
the fewest. The remaining types of facilities are extremely varied across the fifty states. 
This variation may be an indication of discretion and political control influences at the 
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state level. This variation may also have impacts on that state's brownfield program- as 
LQG, SQG, and Transporters are not insignificant in hazardous waste generation and 
handling. This data was also checked across the EPA regions and no significant 
statistical findings were found indicating a significant variation across the various EPA 
Regions. The next stage in RCRA compliance and enforcement for the database was the 
rate of informal enforcements. 
RCRA Informal Enforcements 
When a RCRA regulated facility has been identified as an alleged violator, the 
usual first step in the enforcement process involves the state or the EPA issuing a 
warning letter or notice of violation (NOV). These warning letters and NOV s are 
considered informal enforcements. This process generally serves as the notification to a 
facility that it is in violation of the law and that it should remedy the situation or face 
formal enforcement actions. Important to note here, is that a RCRA regulated facility 
may not even be subject to an informal enforcement if the inspector believes the violation 
to be insignificant enough not to warrant any enforcement. Informal enforcement 
measures are most often the result of discoveries made during standard inspections. 
"[Informal Enforcements] ... reflect determinations made by EPA or States when 
conducting inspections or reviewing facility self-reports" (US EPA ECHO F AQ). Across 
the fifty states an average of 97.8% of informal enforcement measures occur in facilities 
that have been inspected. It is expected then that most of the remaining 2.2% of informal 
enforcement measures result from self reported or complaint information. 
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Table 4.6 illustrates the distribution of the state's percentages of facilities 
receiving informal enforcements in the past three years as reported by ECHO. The 



































National Average 2% 
Table 4.6: Notice of Violation Rates for RCRA regulated Facilities 




















Alaska and Iowa, the two EPA administered RCRA programs, have informal 
enforcement measures of 3.39% and 2.30% respectively. As would be expected, the rate 
of inspections is positively correlated with the issuance ofNOVs (see table 4.7). 
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PERCIN8P PERCNOV 
PERCIN5P Pearson 1.000 .516** 
Correlation 
8i9. (2-tailed) .000 
N 50 50 
PERCNOV Pearson .516** 1.000 
Correlation 
5ig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 50 50 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.7: Correlation oflnspections to notice of violations 
Referring back to Figure 4.3, it is logical to assume that states with low inspection rates 
will have less opportunity to identify regulated facility non-compliance. In fact the EPA 
recognizes this, "If ECHO shows a recent inspection and the facility is shown with no 
violations, user of the ECHO site can be more confident that the facility is in compliance 
with the programs ... " (US EPA ECHO FAQ). In essence a state who conducts 
comparatively few inspections on regulated facilities is relying more heavily upon self 
reporting for compliance information. An unusually low inspection rate logically can 
contribute to RCRA failure, which in turn can contribute to an increase in brownfields 
and/or Superfund sites and also indicates a state's regulatory environment. 
The fact that over 97% ofNOVs are issued to facilities who received inspections 
seems to imply that a heavy reliance on self reporting does not ensure a high level of 
RCRA compliance. If, as more inspections are performed more violators are discovered, 
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states with low inspection rates likely are exposing their citizens to a greater likelihood of 
exposure to toxins as a result of RCRA failure. 
RCRA Formal Enforcement and SNC Status 
The next step in the RCRA enforcement process is what is termed a Formal 
Enforcement procedure. "The next step, or in a number of cases, the first step in the 
enforcement process is the initiation of a civil administrative action or civil judicial 
action (in some serious cases, criminal enforcement actions may be taken)" (US EPA 
ECHO FAQ). The national average for formal enforcement measures is 65.28 formal 
enforcements over the past three years. The average state has 0.54% of their regulated 
facilities with a formal enforcement measure in the last three years. Hawaii has the 
highest percentage of formal enforcements at just over 2% of its RCRA regulated 
facilities. North and South Dakota possess the lowest level of formal enforcements: 
neither had any in the last three years. 
A facility that is deemed to be in 'Significant Non-Compliance' or SNC status 
means that it has done one or more of the following: caused exposure or has a threatened 
exposure to hazardous waste; is a chronic violator; or it deviates substantially from the 
terms of a permit, order or agreement, or from RCRA statutory or regulatory 
requirements (US EPA ECHO F AQ). South Dakota, North Dakota, and New Hampshire 
have the fewest facilities in SNC with 0 facilities reported. As a percentage of total 
RCRA regulated facilities, Hawaii has the most SNC facilities at 0.76% of their RCRA 
regulated facilities falling into SNC status. Unlike informal enforcement measures, 
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formal enforcement measures and SNC status are not uniformly correlated with a state's 
frequency of inspections. This lack of correlation is likely a result of the level of 
discretion a state RCRA inspector has in enforcement measures. 
Regulatory Nature and Expected Impacts 
Having reviewed state RCRA enforcement and compliance information it is 
possible to draw some broad conclusions about what the likely impacts are on a state's 
brownfield situation. Although further study of this issue will allow for a deeper 
understanding of this relationship, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions 
across the fifty states. 
Important to reiterate here is that all 48 RCRA authorized states house their 
RCRA program in the same department or agency as a main part of their brownfield or 
Voluntary Cleanup Program. In most situations, the same overhead administrator sets the 
budget, mission, and goals for both programs. Several states appear to be particularly 
strict in terms of its RCRA inspection and enforcement statistics. These stricter 
regulatory natures will likely reduce the likelihood of an increase in RCRA failure, 
thereby reducing the risk of an increased prevalence ofRCRA brownfields. 
Brownfield redevelopments are directly connected to regulations, although a 
brownfield sitting idle is not necessarily subject to regulatory action. The American 
Federalist system has created a myriad of political, regulatory, administrative, and social 
conditions across the fifty states. This variation is apparent in the regulatory nature of 
each state. Examining RCRA regulatory activity has shown that states are not consistent 
in their inspections or their enforcement measures. As state governments continue to 
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spend increasingly scarce tax dollars on programs it is important to understand the 
connections, and sometimes the counterproductive nature, of other state programs. In 
this case a state's RCRA program may logically impact its brownfield problem and 
program-thereby making it essential to understand if one is concerned about the 
presence and correction of these properties. 
Although the database created in the research for this dissertation enables a very 
broad and important look at state brownfield efforts and state regulation of hazardous 
waste, it does not speak about the specific nuisances of the programs. In order to gain a 
more in-depth look at these programs and better tell the story, it is necessary and 
worthwhile to take a look at three specific cases. The cases can be selected using 
information gathered in the database. The final section of this chapter outlines the 
rationale stemming from this database for the three cases to be studied in depth. 
Case Study Selection Rationale 
Drawing from the rationale outlined in Chapter Three, three state case studies 
were picked for maximum variation in several components. These states are Florida, 
Indiana, and Nevada. Each of the components used as a selection tool is outlined below 
providing justification for the selection of the three cases. The individual components 
were taken collectively before selecting the three cases and are presented individually 
below. 
Administrative Organization 
In gathering data about the fifty state programs it became apparent that certain 
states organize their programs in an administratively interesting manner. While many 
states clearly have their brownfield program located in one administrative unit, others 
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have the various components of their brownfield program spread throughout a number of 
other administrative agencies. Of the states who exhibit an administrative fragmentation 
their programs the most common organization included having the economic incentive 
part of their program located in an Economic DeVelopment agency while the remediation 
aspect of their program located in the Environmental agency. To account for this 
variation, and keeping with the rationale of maximum variation sampling, this 
dissertation selected a case that was administratively fragmented (Indiana) and cases that 
were administratively unified (Florida and Nevada). 
In addition to a level of fragmentation of the program one particular state 
exhibited an additional administrative aspect that was unique and potentially valuable to 
this research. Florida exhibits a very unique organization that seems to be echoed 
throughout its state. That is, Florida requires participation from the local government 
before anyone or any entity can participate in the liability protection or economic 
incentive aspects of their brownfield program. This devolution of responsibility is an 
interesting case study of how to organize a brownfield program and certainly provides an 
interesting and information rich case to analyze for this dissertation. With specific 
attention to the potential to offer policy guidance to other states, Florida is a potential 
gold mine of information. 
Regulatory Environment 
In order to learn about any connection between brownfields and ReRA, including 
a state's regulatory stance, it is logical to select cases that have variation in this aspect. 
The first consideration revolves around selecting at least one case that possesses and one 
state that does not possess an EPA Performance Partnership Agreement (PP A). Ensuring 
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a case selection that includes variation in the presence or absence of a PP A is a logical 
consideration. Of the three selected cases for this dissertation, Nevada and Florida do not 
have PP As and Indiana has one. Although this ratio is not consistent with the percentage 
of states with the PPA nationally, it does not jeopardize the validity of this selection. 
Recall that states with PPA's do not show a statistically significant difference in 
inspections from those states without a PP A. However, it is useful to take into 
consideration at least one state with a PPA so that any connections and impacts ofPPA's 
not caught in the database can be potentially discovered in the case studies. 
Further consideration in terms of regulatory environment centers on the inspection 
and enforcement levels of the state as recorded by EPA ECHO database and is evidenced 
in this chapter. The three states selected provide an interesting and information rich 
variation in terms of regulation and enforcement of RCRA. Specifically, Nevada has the 
highest level of inspections of all fifty states, with approximately 44.75% of their 
regulated facilities showing inspections over the other states. This will provide an 
interesting variation from Florida where approximately 9.5% of their facilities received 
an inspection over the last three years and Indiana where the PP A agreement spells out 
certain percentages which have been recorded as approximately 11 % over the last three 
years. This variation in regulatory environment is particularly useful for this type of 
study. 
Ideology of Government 
In literature concerning bureaucratic discretion and legislative control theories, a 
common theme used to examine the influences of each revolves around operationalizing 
policy preferences of legislators and bureaucrats. Several authors have pointed to 
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ideology as a mechanism for demonstrating and testing these policy preferences (Clark 
and Allen, 2004; Huber and Shipan, 2002). This dissertation also uses ideology as a 
proxy for policy preferences of government employees (bureaucrats) and political 
officials. Drawing on work done by William Berry in which he measures and records 
both citizen and state government ideology, this dissertation will use his ideology 
measures as a proxy for policy preferences of bureaucrats and political officials. "We 
construct dynamic measures of the ideology of a state's citizens and political leaders, 
using roll call voting scores of state congressional delegations, the outcomes of 
congressional elections, the partisan division of state legislatures, the party of the 
governor, and various assumptions regarding voters and state political elites" (Berry et ai, 
1998, p. 327). Berry's measure of ideology ranges from a 0 to a 100. The closer the 
score is to 0 the more conservative it is; the closer the score is to 100 the more liberal it 
is. "One is state citizen ideology, generally conceived as the mean position on a liberal-
conservative continuum of the active electorate in a state. The other may be termed state 
government ideology---the mean position on the same continuum of the elected public 
officals in a state, weighted according to the power they have over public policy 
decisions" (Berry et aI, 1998, 327-8). For the sake of maximum variation in cases this 
dissertation used ideology measures as a factor in determining the cases. 
Of the three selected cases each show ideology variation. Florida has an 
approximate ideology measure of 55 for the state government (thought to represent the 
policymakers) and 45 for the citizens (thought to represent the bureaucrats) in the year of 
the creation of the brownfield program. For the most current year available Florida offers 
a government ideology score of 7 and a citizen ideology score of 46. This compares to 
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Indiana at 63 government and 46 citizens for the year the brownfield program was 
created and 57 government and 43 citizens for the most recent year available; Nevada at 
47 government and 57 citizens for the year the brownfield program was created and 37 
government and 46 citizen for the most recent year available. Although these particular 
states do not have the most extreme ideology scores across the fifty states, they offer 
variation on each side of the spectrum for citizen versus government. More simply 
stated, these cases represent both a more liberal government and conservative citizen 
(Indiana); a more conservative government and liberal citizen scores (Nevada); as well as 
a government that changed scores drastically from the year the program was created until 
the most current year (Florida). This variation will potentially enable more insights on 
the argument that political officals and bureaucrats would attempt to shape policy based 
upon individual policy preferences. 
Political Appointees 
All fifty states possess a political appointee at the top of the bureaucracy that 
administers the brownfield program. Without interviewing and studying each state in 
depth, understanding any small differences in changes in these political appointees as a 
way of selecting cases is not feasible. However, besides being an interesting component 
of the study of the cases individually, this aspect did enable and expand on the rationale 
for selecting Indiana. As will be elaborated on in the following chapters, Indiana has a 
very fragmented program where one large aspect of it falls into a quasi-governmental 
authority with reporting requirements to a completely politically appointed board. This 
will provide some interesting variation in this aspect. 
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CHAPTER V 
CASE STUDY PRESENT A nON 
The implementation and administration of state level brownfield programs are 
likely impacted by a multitude of things. Although this research cannot point to all the 
potential influencers some valuable and significant contributions can come from this 
research. As has been outlined in Chapter Four, state intervention into the remediation 
and redevelopment of brown fields is both complex and widely diverse. Although the 
overall database provides keen insights into this diversity, the in-depth interviews and 
document review has enabled this research to go one step further in detailing the specific 
complexities and the influences elected and non-elected officials can have on these 
programs. 
Drawing on the theories of political control and bureaucratic discretion, this 
research is able to demonstrate some of the influences each have had on the 
implementation and administration of the various brownfield programs. In each of the 
case studies a number of key individuals were interviewed. Depending upon the state 
and organization, the number of interviews conducted in each state differed. In Indiana a 
total of seven interviews were conducted; in Nevada a total of five interviews were 
conducted; and in Florida a total of nine interviews were conducted. These interviews 
lasted anywhere from 45 minutes to two hours in length. In some cases interviews were 
conducted more than once with the same individual as a result of new information and 
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questions. The individuals being interviewed ranged from brownfield program heads to 
political officials involved in the crafting of the enabling legislation. RCRA officials 
were also interviewed in each state. Unfortunately in no state was the appointed official 
in the overall department interviewed. These individuals were very reluctant to discuss 
their jobs and the programs. However, unfortunate this lack of interview opportunity is, 
the findings from these individuals are very worthwhile and significant. These appointed 
department heads change with each administration, are located many offices above the 
brownfield programs, and can likely provide little additional information on the programs 
that is not able to be gleaned from the individuals interviewed. The individuals in the 
administrative capacities of the programs provide keen insights concerning the impact, or 
lack of, by the appointed head of the overall department or agency. 
As outlined in Chapter Four these cases were selected for their variation on the 
key components outlined in political control and bureaucratic discretion theories. These 
cases represent three different EPA regions, varied environmental and economic 
histories, and very different programs for their brownfields. This chapter records the 
findings and specific details discovered during the interviews and document reviews; the 
following chapter discusses these findings in relation to bureaucratic discretion, 
legislative control, regulatory environment, and intergovernmental relations. In all cases 
the names of the interviewees are intentionally omitted per an agreement of 
confidentiality in return for the candid answers received for the interview questions. 
Additionally, the job titles are omitted and replaced with job roles to provide more 
obscurity to the individuals participating in these interviews. The three cases are 
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presented individually in preparation for a synthesis and analysis in Chapter Six. The 
following text outlines the findings for Indiana, Florida, and Nevada. 
Recalling from the previous chapters, these states were selected for their variation 
on several key points. Both Florida and Nevada show administrative unity, while Indiana 
shows a greater level of fragmentation. All three states show a stark difference on their 
regulatory issues as they relate to RCRA. Indiana possesses a PP A with the EPA for 
their RCRA program, Nevada exhibits an extremely high level of RCRA inspections and 
enforcements, and Florida shows a lower than national average inspection rate. Ideology 
scores varied across the three states as well. Finally, all three states have been in 
existence for several years allowing for a richer set of experiences than if they were 
particularly new programs. 
Indiana 
Indiana is a state that has dealt with significant deindustrialization over the past 
several decades. According to the United States Census Bureau the following reflects the 



















Table 5.1: Source: US Census Bureau. NOTE: Classifications of industry changed in 1997, 
discrepancy may exist in 2000 data as a result. 
As the table indicates, from 1970 to 1990 Indiana experienced a sharp decline in 
manufacturing. Employment in this industry dropped by over 36% in this thirty-year 
period. Logically, this may be indicative of prevalence in brownfields within the state of 
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Indiana. That is, as deindustrialization occurs brownfield sites are potentially left behind. 
Over this same period Indiana experienced only a marginal growth in terms of population 
change. Overall from 1970 to 2000 Indiana's population grew by about 17%. It is not 
easy to assess what Indiana's brownfield situation may actually be. Even the officials 
dealing with brownfields in the state admit: "A lot of people don't want it public that 
their site is a brownfield and as a result we may never know it exists" (VRP 
administrator, 11/9/2006). 
Although making a clear and completely accurate statement surrounding the 
potential applicable population for the public brownfield programs in Indiana is nearly 
impossible, it is still fruitful to examine this program in this research. In response to the 
known presence and potential presence of additional contaminated sites in their state the 
policymakers created public programs directed at these properties. Indiana currently has 
two major brownfield programs-the Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP) and the 
Brownfields Program. The brownfield remediation and redevelopment efforts began in 
earnest in 1993 when the state passed legislation creating IC 13-25-5 forming the 
Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP) housed within the Indiana Department of 
Environmental Management's Office of Land Quality. Alternatively, the Brownfields 
Program as currently organized and functioning was created in 2005 with the passage of 
Senate Enrolled Act 578. Each ofIndiana's two programs will be detailed in the 
following sections. The findings from the Indiana RCRA program will also be detailed. 
Indiana's VRP 
The passage of the enabling legislation for the VRP made Indiana one of the first 
states in the country to have a voluntary cleanup program. According to one elected 
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official in the state legislature at the time of the creation of this program the VRP was at 
least partially directed at the problems Indiana faced stemming from deindustrialization 
in the state (Policy Maker #1. 11111/2006). The statutorily stated purpose of the Indiana 
VRP is to: " ... provide an alternative procedure to assure compliance with the law and to 
encourage the voluntary remediation of hazardous substances and petroleum" (IC 13-25-
5 Sec la). The statutes creating the VRP are very broad and offer guidance concerning 
the purpose of the program, eligibility for participation. appeal processes, fees, public 
comments and notices, and other broad details concerning the work plan creation and 
approval process. Although the statute allows for administrative rulemaking concerning 
the implementation of this program, none are noted in the Indiana Administrative Code 
and only guidance documents have been created, not formal rules. 
This particular program is located in the Office of Land Quality in the Indiana 
Department of Environmental Management. The Office of Land Quality encompasses a 
variety of programs dealing with, " ... waste management, site cleanup or spill prevention" 
(IDEM Office of Land Quality, 2007). Of note here is that the RCRA program is also 
operated out of this same group of programs. Although all the programs within this 
office have similar roles, the VRP administrator reports little overlap and day-to-day 
working relationships between the various programs with the slight exception of RCRA. 
We don't really work with any other program. Well, we have some sites that 
overlap with RCRA the RCRA folks. There's a couple of different parts to 
RCRA. One part of RCRA is called RCRA corrective action and we have some 
RCRA corrective action sites that are completing their responsibilities to RCRA 
through the VRP. So we probably have a half a dozen of those or so. On those 
we will interact with RCRA staff pretty hard on those. But I would say in general 
outside of those we don't really have that much interaction with the RCRA 
program (VRP Administrator, 11/9/2006). 
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The VRP program has eight project managers working in it. Like all the other 
voluntary cleanup programs across the United States, Indiana's VRP provides a 
mechanism for obtaining liability relief for completing a certain level of cleanup of a site. 
Specifically, participants receive a Certificate of Completion (COC) leading to a 
Covenant Not to Sue (CNTS) upon the completion of the cleanup. The chief 
administrator in this program views the CNTS as the key benefit to this program: 
... for our participants if they successfully conclude our process they get a 
Covenant Not To Sue which relieves them of any environmental liability for 
issues that were addressed in their project. So essentially the state says we will 
not be coming after you for any future cleanup for anything you do in the VRP .... 
Covenant not to sue and Certificate of Completion essentially goes together. And 
when a site completes our process the agency, IDEM, issues the COC and then it 
is the responsibility of our participant to record that certificate onto the property 
deed just to show the work has been done. Then once they have done that they 
automatically get the covenant not to sue. It is the only thing we offer. We don't 
offer any other form of liability protection or different levels like some states 
(VRP administrator, 11/9/2006). 
An additional liability abatement assurance that goes with the CNTS is the fact 
that Indiana possesses an MOA with the EPA for their VRP. As discussed in Chapter 
Four Indiana's VRP possesses a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the EPA that 
was signed in December 1995. This MOA certifies that the federal government will not 
seek to intervene in sites that have successfully completed Indiana's VRP. 
When a site in Indiana has been investigated or remediated in accordance with the 
practices and procedures of the VRP and IDEM has issued a Certificate of 
Completion for the site, Region V will not plan or anticipate any federal action 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act of 1980 (Brownfields and Voluntary Remediation Program MOA, 1995). 
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In addition to CoC, CNTS, and the MOA the VRP in Indiana allow responsible 
parties to participate and allows all participants to use risk based cleanups and 
institutional controls: 
... in fact most of them are responsible parties. They don't necessarily have to but 
certainly that tends to be the biggest percentage of our sites. We do [allow 
institutional controls]. We track them somewhat informally. One thing we do 
require is that they have to be formalized through an environmental restrictive 
covenant that gets recorded on the deed indicating which land use restrictions that 
property has (VRP administrator, 1119/2006) 
The VRP administrator also notes that reopeners are virtually unheard of but are allowed. 
"Our assumption is that we issue closure and it is final" (VRP administrator, 1119/2006). 
For sites entering the VRP a fee is required ofthem. In fact the VRP was 
designed with intent to make it almost exclusively self-funded. "We associated a fee 
with the program in order to help pay for, to make it almost entirely self sufficient to 
cover the costs of the program and not rely on departmental budgets or appropriations" 
(Policymaker #1, 11119/2006). According to the chiefVRP administrator: 
Our program is primarily self-funded through cost recovery. We have an 
agreement with all the sites in our program that they will reimburse us for our 
time and effort for the management of their project. That doesn't account for 
100% of our time but in terms of a budget it is difficult to say exactly. Weare 
mostly self-funded. In addition to that since it is not possible to fill 100% of your 
time we have an EPA grant we are part of and we get money from the EPA for 
our work not specifically related to a project (VRP administrator, 1119/2006). 
It is this cost recovery and lack of direct funding from the state that is cited as key to the 
lack of any formal oversight or reporting mechanisms to state elected or appointed 
officials. Both the elected officials and the administrators state that they do not have a 
real relationship. "As far as any reporting to the legislature, governor, or towns-we 
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don't have those requirements" (VRP Administrator, 11109/2006). Policy makers also 
concede a lack of oversight and influence on this program. "We don't really get involved 
with that program or anything on a real basis" (Policymaker #3,0113112006). In addition 
to no real relationships with elected officials, the VRP also reports little to no relationship 
or influence by appointed officials. In fact the VRP administrator reports little-or-no 
noticeable changes upon changes of administration in relation to their appointed 
commissioner ofIDEM (VRP Administrator, 11109/2006). In the hierarchy of the overall 
department the appointed commissioner is at least three steps above the overall office that 
houses the VRP. 
Although the VRP seems to have little connection or oversight by Indiana 
policymakers or elected officials, they are somewhat more connected to and constrained 
by their EPA region. "We submit semi-annual reports to the EPA. We are required to 
report what we have done with the funds they have given us" (VRP administrator, 
1119/2006). Although the administrator of this program acknowledges reporting 
requirements to the EPA he also goes further to explain the relationship is not a strong 
one. 
We have a MOU [MOA] with the EPA. For any site that completes a cleanup in 
our program they will essentially not consider taking any action against those 
sites. So essentially what that says is they have reviewed our program and like 
what we are doing well enough to give us free reign to run it how we see fit and 
they will not take any federal actions against those facilities. But they are not 
really involved with us directly on a day to day basis in our projects. As far as the 
regional office in Chicago a couple times a year we will go to a meeting. There is 
usually a mid year and an end year meeting that we go to and talk about issues 
related to brownfields and remediations projects. At the federal level we don't 
have any contact at all and the regional level we have a very distant relationship" 
(VRP administrator, 1119/2006). 
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The Indiana VRP does not provide any financial assistance within its own 
program. As the VRP administrator noted: "No [we do not provide financial assistance]. 
There are some tax incentives for cleanups. Our only real participation advantage is to 
certify that the cleanup has been done. But we don't offer any sort of incentive 
ourselves" (VRP administrator, 11109/2006). 
To date this program has completed 190 brownfield sites with approximately 360 
currently in the program (VRP administrator, 11109/2006). The administrator reports that 
the most recent and biggest challenge with this program in his opinion is the prevalence 
of sites that are eligible for the VRP but do not fit in really well. He explains: 
We do find sometimes that there are sites that are eligible to participate in our 
program that just don't fit in real well for one reason or another. For example, 
landfills. And this is not the big municipal landfills you might imagine. But there 
are a lot of old decades old abandoned landfills that will apply to our program. 
And there are really pretty difficult to manage in terms of risk related to health 
risks. So we just find sometimes that we have problematic sites that just don't fit 
real well within the framework of the intention of the program. I think that when 
it was first devised the legislature didn't really anticipate that we would be 
looking at sites like landfills. But there's nothing in our statutes or process that 
allows us to keep them from entering and participating in our program. So we are 
sort of stuck with figuring out a way to evaluate those complex sites and make 
sound and technical decisions on them" (VRP administrator, 11/9/2006). 
Indiana Brownfields Program 
Unlike Indiana's VRP, the Brownfield Program does not provide liability 
protections to would-be redevelopers and is primarily directed at political subdivisions 
and redevelopment agencies as opposed to a private developer or responsible party. 
Although both programs facilitate the redevelopment ofbrownfields, both are voluntary, 
both use risk based closure levels, and both issue closure documents- the mechanisms and 
levels of protections offered are quite different across the two programs. 
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"The Indiana Brownfields Program was created by 2005 legislation that merged 
the brownfield technical review and fInancial review programs into one program" 
(Indiana Brownfields Program Financial Incentives, 2006). "This merger and 
reorganization was really aimed at making Indiana more responsive, efficient, and 
customer friendly. Now one place has control over most of our fInancial programs. 
Rather than go to multiple places and have competing offices, we have one" (Policy 
Maker #2, 10/20/2006). Before this merger several small brownfield related programs 
existed in IDEM. The new organization took all debt issuing programs and placed them 
under one organization called the Indiana Finance Authority (IF A). Indiana's Public 
Finance Director is appointed by the governor and is the chief of the IF A. 
In the 2005 General Assembly, the Public Finance Director was given statutory 
oversight of all state debt issuance and is the chief executive of the Indiana 
Finance Authority (IF A), leading a staff of 50 and reporting to the IF A Board. 
The IF A is the successor entity to the former Indiana Transportation Finance 
Authority, the State Office Building Commission, the Recreational Development 
Commission, the Indiana Development Finance Authority and the State 
Revolving Fund Loan Programs (Biography of the Public Finance Director of the 
State of Indiana, nd). 
In addition to the Public Finance Director's role in the management of the IF A, it is also 
managed by a board of five statutory individuals. These" ... members are the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Treasurer of the State, and three other 
members appointed by the Governor. No more than two of the Governor's appointees 
may be members of the same political party, and they all must be residents of the State" 
(Indiana About IF A, 2006). 
The legislation creating the Indiana Brownfields Program is much more detailed 
than the VRP laws. Under the new legislation procedures for debt issuing are outlined in 
great detail, explicitly who will serve on IF A's board of directors, and what funds can be 
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used for what purpose. Administrative procedures are still being worked out for the new 
organization in terms of the brownfields program. According to brownfield program 
employees the IF A board provides some oversight but hasn't really impacted the day-to-
day operations of the program as of yet. " ... there are monthly board meetings where 
sometimes the brownfields program will present information or present grants to be 
approved and things like that. But other than that we do not really have any real 
relationship" (Brownfield Program Coordinator, 11106/2006). To the individuals 
working in the Brownfields Program this reorganization is seen as a good thing. " ... it' s 
been mostly positive. It helps make it a more efficient program. And with everyone 
working together and in one location it is more unified and easier for people on the 
outside to contact us and everyone seems to really like it" (Brownfield Coordinator, 
11/06/2006). As of November 2006 the Brownfields Program employs twelve 
individuals ranging from attorneys to geologists to biological scientists (brownfield 
program coordinator, 11106/2006). The program does not yet maintain a solid tracking 
system of sites going through the program but it is estimated that over 400 separate sites 
have entered the Brownfields Program through the history of the technical assistance and 
financial granting programs that existed before IF A was formed in 2005 . 
. . . we have recently started to try and go out and get all of that information but it 
is still in progress. So our problem is that a lot of times when people come to us, 
they are coming to us looking for assessment money. Or sometimes some 
cleanup money. But then we don't really know what they don't really keep in 
touch with us as to when the project is redeveloped" (brownfield program 
coordinator, 11106/2006). 
Probably one of the biggest differences in the two programs comes with the type 
of closure documents offered. While the VRP offers the CNTS, the Brownfields 
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Program offers Comfort Letters and Site Status letters. These comfort and site status 
letters do not actually offer any liability release-just a statement defining or easing the 
concerns surrounding contamination at a site. Oftentimes the Brownfields Program is a 
first stop for brownfield sites in Indiana. An individual working in the Indiana 
Brownfields program notes that, " ... a lot of times sites will start in our programs and they 
will find out that either through their bank or through the developer that wants a property 
that they need a higher level of liability protection than what we offer in this program. So 
then they go over to the Voluntary Remediation Program" (brownfields program 
coordinator, 11106/2006). 
The brownfield program's guidance indicates that the Brownfields Program is 
more geared towards redevelopment while the VRP is geared towards environmental 
remediation. "Brownfields Program's main goal is to provide government guidance 
assistance for the assessment, cleanup and redevelopment or reuse of properties to 
revitalize communities. VRP's main goal is to provide government oversight of privately 
conducted remediation projects" (Crosswalk Brownfields Program Document, 2006). 
Unlike the VRP which had no direct financial aspect, Indiana's Brownfield Program has 
a number of financial incentives. 
Most ofthe financial incentives offered by the Brownfields Program are reserved 
for municipalities, counties, or redevelopment agencies. In some cases a private party 
can be a co-applicant, but a public entity must be part of the application. Financial 
incentives noted include: Site assessment grants, remediation grants, petroleum 
remediation grants, low-interest loans, and tax credits. The low-interest loan program 
allows for a municipality, county, or redevelopment agency to re-Iend to a private 
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individual. In whole the Brownfield Program individuals indicate that the reorganization 
and merger's details are still being worked out. " ... we are constantly reevaluating our 
new program and structure and how we respond to the needs of the public since we are 
still newly reorganized and still in that stage of constantly evaluating how we are doing" 
(brownfields program coordinator, 11106/2006). However, they feel that they are able to 
offer more streamlined services to Indiana's communities. 
Although program officials and political officials interviewed do not indicate a 
strong monitoring of this program, the EPA regional office does require reporting 
concerning the grants that the program receives from them. This program indicates a 
strong relationship with the region in terms of communication. " ... we communicate with 
them for many things. For example, we had a workshop on November 2nd to help send 
the applicants to the federal grant round that is going on right now and our Region V 
person Deborah Orr came down and gave a presentation" (brownfields program 
coordinator, 11106/2006). 
Overall the Brownfields Program's goals are to get publicly held brownfields 
remediated and ultimately redeveloped. However, they have not yet been able to 
determine the impact they are having in Indiana. With the newly organized program the 
impacts and day to day operations are still in flux and program employees are still 
working out the kinks from the reorganization. 
ReRA in Indiana 
Given the logical connection between RCRA inspections and enforcements and 
brownfields interviews in all states included officials in that state's RCRA program. 
Indiana's ReRA program's duties are located within the Office of Land Quality of 
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IDEM, the same office where the VRP is located. Within the Office of Land Quality is a 
multimedia office with four sections: air enforcement; water enforcement; solid waste, 
underground storage tanks, leaking underground storage tanks, and confined feedings; 
and a section that does hazardous waste and industrial waste enforcement (RCRA 
enforcement, 10/1412006). 
Indiana has an Environmental Performance Partnership Agreement (EnPPA) with 
the EPA concerning its RCRA program. "It is an agreement we have in order to get 
funding grants from the EPA. A certain percentage of our program is actually funded by 
the EnPP A grant. It has some fairly specific measures we have agreed to" (RCRA 
compliance, 12/05/2006). Basically this agreement requires a specific percentage of the 
various RCRA regulated facilities be inspected annually. This percentage is determined 
through negotiations and agreements between the EPA Region and the State. Although 
the percentage of facilities to be inspected is detailed in this agreement, the staff selects 
which of the actual facilities will be inspected. For the negotiated percentage the 
employees look back at what previous inspections have been done and choose facilities 
that have gone the longest without an inspection. It usually comes to a five year 
frequency (RCRA compliance, 12/05/2006). The inspections are not announced in 
advance to the facilities being inspected. 
If the inspectors find a violation they have some discretion in what the 
enforcement route will be. "When they [the inspectors] find violations ifthey are pretty 
minor they will not refer them to my office. They will take care of it on site or in a 
follow up inspection" (RCRA enforcement, 10114/2006). However, if the inspector finds 
a violation that he or she feels is serious enough to warrant a more formal enforcement 
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measure they will be referred to the enforcement office within the Office of Land 
Quality. 
The enforcement office in Indiana has six case managers. When a violation is 
referred to them the case manager will take over. 
We have pretty much two enforcement routes that we do. We can do a violation 
letter. Which all it is, is a letter that says there are the violations that we found 
and generally you have thirty days to make corrections and submit documentation 
showing it has been corrected. There's no civil penalty or anything. That is 
really the minority of our cases. Most of those kinds of things are handled with 
the inspector themselves. We do some of those that we feel are a little more 
severe but don't really warrant a penalty. If a problem is not corrected after a 
violation letter or if the violation is more severe to begin with, we can issue a 
notice of violation. At this point we are trying to reach an agreed order that 
would include injunctive relief and civil penalty (RCRA Enforcement, 
10114/2006). 
During the enforcement process it is possible that the appointed head of IDEM can be 
involved. " ... most of our cases are done through the notice of violation and agreed order 
process that the commissioner does not get involved with. However, sometimes a 
respondent or their attorney will want to discuss it with the commissioner and so the 
commissioner would meet with them. That does happen fairly often" (RCRA 
enforcement, 10/14/2006). 
The RCRA enforcement process in Indiana frequently involves elected and 
appointed officials. In addition to the likelihood that the commissioner will be called 
upon to discuss a case with a violator after receiving a notice of violation, one of the 
biggest penalties in the enforcement process is called a Commissioner's Order. 
We have a fairly successful rate in getting agreed orders negotiated. However, if 
we can't get it resolved we go to what is called a Commissioner's Order. This 
basically recites the issues in the notice of violation. However, there have been 
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different administrations when it is difficult to issue those commissioner's orders. 
So when we tell a company that they need to enter into an agreed order and they 
are refusing and we make the threat that we will go to the next step of the 
commissioner's order. It is kinda frustrating when we can't get those issued. And 
there's been a real difference across administrations in their willingness to issue 
commissioner's orders. I think the word gets out that all the people outside know 
we won't issue a commissioner's order (RCRA enforcement, 10114/2006). 
Although it is very apparent that political influences exist in the enforcement or penalty 
process of RCRA, the inspection to ensure compliance side of RCRA does not note such 
strong influences. RCRA compliance officials note that: "It is not unusual to get requests 
or complaints that are funneled through different politicians. But we don't have any 
functional relationship" (RCRA compliance, 12/05/2006). 
In addition to the involvement by the commissioner acting on behalf of the 
governor, the EPA has some level of involvement in the enforcement process of RCRA 
in Indiana. However, this involvement is fairly minimal. " ... ifthere's some case that for 
some reason we would prefer EPA to do the enforcement we will refer it to them. That 
rarely happens though. EPA also does a small number of inspections annually, I think 
six. If they find a violation in one of those inspections they would also do the 
enforcement" (RCRA enforcement, 10114/2006). 
RCRA enforcement officers note that the EPA provides guidance and a definition 
concerning what constitutes a significant non-complier but they are in charge of doing the 
actual determination of whether a violator falls into that category. "There's some 
guidance on significant non-compliance status that requires a certain penalty. However, 
we have actually do most of the determination of what level of violation we consider the 
offense to be" (RCRA enforcement, 10/14/2006). 
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RCRA officials note that they are involved in determining financial assurance and 
post closure inspections. " ... we do some post closure inspections ... we have an 
individual on staff that we call our financial assurance officer and he is dedicated to 
financial assurance reviews" (RCRA compliance, 12/05/2006). The financial assurance 
and closure aspects of RCRA are connected to brownfields and some level of discretion 
is involved in this aspect of RCRA. 
Indiana Overall 
Indiana's brownfield remediation and redevelopment efforts are channeled 
through two different programs. The VRP is the standard voluntary cleanup type 
program offering investors, developers, and responsible parties' liability relief in return 
for participation. This liability relief includes relief from both further cleanups and from 
3rd Party lawsuits (3rd Party relief only for non-responsible parties). The program is 
funded through EPA grants and cost recovery. Although they are statutorily constrained 
in that they cannot deny certain sites entry even when they do not fit well into the 
program they indicate they are pretty autonomous in their functioning. The Indiana 
Brownfields Program declares itself an economic development program, however, its 
primary function seems to be providing funds to public entities in order to assess and 
cleanup some sites in Indiana. The Brownfields Programs, in theory is subject to a great 
amount of oversight by state officials on how they spend money and operate; however, 
the program is still very new and underdeveloped. 
RCRA in Indiana is far more impacted by political officials than are the 
brownfield programs. In fact in terms of RCRA enforcement, a politically appointed 
official can actually prevent ReRA administrators from issuing the highest enforcement 
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order. A key connection from RCRA to the brownfields programs is that a RCRA 
facility can complete a RCRA corrective action order under the VRP. This is not the case 
in every state. 
Florida 
Florida's brownfield program was created in 1997 with the passage of the 
Brownfields Redevelopment Act. Elected officials involved in the creation of this 
legislation cited two primary concerns that led them to believe Florida needed such a 
program: cost of cleanup and environmental justice issues. "You know we wanted some 
incentive system that would help or I guess keep Florida from having to pay the bill for 
these cleanups. We figured it would be less expensive to give incentives than it would be 
to just pay for the cleanup. You know also there is a real racial aspect to brownfields. So 
many of them are in minority areas that the state really has a duty to do something to help 
that to remedy that" (Policymaker #2, 10/2112006). News articles at the time also reflect 
an environmental justice aspect to the program's creation. "The Florida proposal was 
sparked by a report that showed nine of every 10 of 9,000 known Brownfield sites were 
in low-income and minority communities" (Christenson, 1997). In fact these same 
justice sentiments are echoed in the legislative intent aspect of the Act along with several 
other issues related to brownfields. 
The statute is very specific about the intent. The key legislative intentions in the 
statute are as follows: to reduce public health and environmental hazards on existing 
commercial and industrial sites; alleviate blight; to encourage voluntary cleanup through 
incentives; to provide clear and predictable remediation standards; to allow risk based 
cleanups; to address the prevalence of environmental hazards in low income and minority 
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areas; to potentially reduce neighborhood decline; and to provide for cooperation across 
governments and organizations (Florida's Brownfield Redevelopment Act, 1997). The 
statute is also very specific about the roles, duties, and requirements of the program 
explicitly outlining the processes and methods for entering into and completing the 
program. 
One interesting and potentially unique aspect of Florida's Brownfield Program 
was created within the statute itself by then-elected policymakers. 
A local government with jurisdiction over the brownfield area must notify the 
department of its decision to designate a brownfield area for rehabilitation for the 
purposes of ss. 376.77-376.85. The notification must include a resolution, by the 
local government body, to which is attached a map adequate to clearly delineate 
exactly which parcels are to be included in the brownfield area or alternatively a 
less-detailed map accompanied by a detailed legal description of the brownfield 
area. If a property owner within the area proposed for designation by the local 
government requests in writing to have his or her property removed from the 
proposed designation, the local government shall grant the request (Florida's 
Brownfield Redevelopment Act, 1997). 
As of the writing of this dissertation this is the only state where participation by the local 
government is statutorily required to designate a brownfield area as a precursor to 
participation in the program. Both elected officials and non-elected administrators 
concur on the purpose of this designation. "We didn't want the local governments to feel 
like the state was interfering in their rights and responsibilities" (Policymaker #1, 
09/15/2006). "The local government designation is very interesting. But I think that was 
very intentional on the legislature'S part at the time. There was a big concern that there 
was, well there was a lot of voices down there at the time it was being developed that said 
we want to make sure that the local government doesn't have this shoved down their 
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throats" (brownfields program administrator, 09/20/2006). As of February 5, 2007 there 
were approximately 145 designated areas in the state of Florida encompassing a total of 
78,198 acres of designated brownfield area (Florida Brownfield Areas, 2007). This entire 
acreage is not necessarily brownfields given the fact that many Florida localities 
designate blocks, census tracts, or other larger areas that encompass both brownfields and 
uncontaminated land. As of February 6, 2007 a total of85 sites had executed 
remediation agreements with the program with a total of 1,827 acres being included 
(Florida's Sites with executed BSRA's). The sites with remediation agreements actually 
encompass the brownfields part of the property in the designated areas making this an 
accurate acreage of brownfields, unlike the previous measure. 
This requirement of local government participation has not been without conflicts. 
In fact brownfield program officials and news articles demonstrate one interesting and 
recent conflict concerning the program and the designation. 
It's allover the paper in St. Augustine. They just designated one in St. Augustine. 
It was a historic golf course that the city was not able to purchase and the folks in 
the area wanted it to stay a golf course. But it turns out that there was some 
arsenic contamination that required cleanup. But there was some issue about 
whether the developer should be able to use cleanup tax credits. Really, it 
appeared that there were some people who just didn't want it to become a housing 
development and they were using many different types of ways to try and block it. 
I fielded a lot of calls on that one. It just got designated on November thirteenth I 
think" (brownfields program manager, 1111512006). 
Now, Stokes [developer] is trying to join the state's Brownfields Redevelopment 
Program, an initiative to encourage development as a way to clean polluted 
grounds. He could generate up to $500,000 in tax credits for a cleanup many 
people feel he should do without the financial assistance. Mayor George Gardner 
is one of them. "He went in knowing that it was an area that needed to be cleaned 
up. He started cleaning it up," Gardner said. "The Brownfields act, which is an 
excellent act, is meant for cleanup of industrial land that no developer wants to 
touch. This could be used as a golf course. It's not a gas plant or an oil refinery." 
A local resolution supporting Stokes' Brownfields request is required before the 
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state Department of Environmental Protection considers designating the former 
Ponce de Leon, a Brownfields site (Hunt, 2006) 
However contentious this particular situation was most officials in elected and 
bureaucratic positions associated with the brownfields program feel that the designation 
is a good thing that encourages and fosters local participation. In fact" ... an individual 
can request an individual property be designated a brownfield area and for most of the 
ones that have occurred this year they have been for individual properties rather than a 
specific part of town" (brownfields program manager, 09/2012006). Public participation 
was a key consideration when the program was created. "We wanted to encourage 
people to have a say in the process. You know to get involved. We wrote it so that at 
least one public comment session was required for a site or area to be designated" (Policy 
Maker #1,09/15/2006). 
After the creation of this program in 1997 the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) was charged with implementing the program. The DEP 
has a very vertical organization. The office that controls the Brownfields Program is at 
least 6 levels away from the appointed Secretary of the DEP. Specifically, within the 
DEP the Bureau of Waste Cleanup oversees the program. The Bureau of Waste 
Management is located under the regulatory programs branch of the Department-the 
same branch that oversees the RCRA program. Within that Bureau the program has three 
individuals working directly in the program. There is also one person who oversees the 
Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit program. 
All programs located in the regulatory branch of the DEP have what are termed 
regulatory districts. There are six of these districts across the state. Each district has its 
own office that deals with brownfield issues in their designated areas. "We are organized 
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into six districts and there is a brownfields coordinator in each district. Their 
responsibilities have to do with technical implementation once sites enter the program, 
assessment, and remediation. They are there to help the properties get through the 
process" (brownfields program manager, 09/2012006). 
Liability Provisions 
Florida's brownfield program is similar to other states' voluntary cleanup 
programs, although it is not formally called that. Upon the completion of an agreed upon 
cleanup a voluntary participant receives a No Further Action letter indicating that: 
Based upon the information provided by (property owner) concerning property 
located at (address), it is the opinion of (the Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection or approved local pollution control program) that (party) has 
successfully and satisfactorily implemented the approved brownfield site 
rehabilitation agreement schedule and, accordingly, no further action is required 
to assure that any land use identified in the brownfield site rehabilitation 
agreement is consistent with existing and proposed uses (Florida's Brownfield 
Redevelopment Act, 1997) 
This liability protection does not extend to 3rd Party lawsuits. The only 3rd party 
protection Florida offers is an assurance that 3rd Parties cannot litigate to force additional 
cleanup. However, participants in the Florida Brownfields Program do also enjoy the 
added liability protections associated with an EPA MOA for the program. Florida's 
MOA was originally signed in December 1999 and was renegotiated to allow for a wider 
eligibility in sites participating in the program in November 2005. Florida does not allow 
a responsible party to enter into the Brownfields Program and receive any liability 
protections or incentives if the contamination was caused after 1997. 
The state of Florida allows and encourages risk based cleanups and the use of 
institutional controls. " ... originally when the brownfields rule was passed in 1997 it was 
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one of the few ways a site could use RBCA in Florida. Since that we have passed a 
RBCA rule that pretty much encompasses all sites in Florida. Y es [we allow Institutional 
Controls] and we have a registry that is available online and it tracks any of these controls 
that might be used" (Brownfields Manager, 09/20/2006). 
Although the statute creating the program includes a lengthy list of possible 
incentives to be created for the remediation and redevelopment of brownfields under this 
program, the actual state level incentives stemming from the Brownfield Program itself 
are very few. There are not any real grants associated with the program: 
We do not offer any grants. We do have one through an EPA grant and we offer 
grants in services to successful applicants. For example, we are working with a 
mission over in Jacksonville that is trying to build a group home and they need 
soil removal done. We are going to be conducting the soil removal with one of 
our own contractors so we don't actually give grants but provide services 
sometimes (brownfields program manager, 09/20/2006). 
Additionally the state does not have a revolving loan fund. Although it is noted that 
several Florida cities have their own revolving loan fund capitalized by the EPA. The 
one major financial incentive that Florida does offer is a Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit 
Program (VCTC). Both sites in the brownfields program as well as certain dry cleaning 
sites that cannot participate in the state dry cleaning program are eligible for these tax 
credits. In 2006 these tax credits were increased substantially to provide for up to 
$500,000 in tax credits as well as enable responsible parties to access the benefit 
(Florida's Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit). Department guidance is still being worked on 
and little can be said yet about these changes. " ... we are all working on rule changes 
based on legislative activity this year" (brownfields program manager, 09/20/2006). 
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Although the actual Brownfield Program as located in the Department of 
Environmental Protection a separate agency called the Florida Department of Tourism, 
Trade, and Economic Development offers several brownfield related economic 
development incentives. Brownfield properties are eligible for: Loan Guarantees and 
bonuses for jobs created through the aforementioned economic development agency. 
Additionally, brownfields are eligible for sales and use tax exemptions for building 
materials through the Department of Revenue in Florida. Virtually all of these incentives 
located in other agencies are incentives that existed without reference to brownfields and 
have subsequently been altered or have decided to allow and to include brownfield 
redevelopments in their potential beneficiaries. 
Unlike all of the other states with voluntary cleanup programs, there is no fee to 
enter the Florida Brownfields Program. "There is not a fee to the department. We don't 
charge a fee to enter the program or to review documents. The only fee associated with 
brownfields in Florida is a $250 application fee for the tax credits" (brownfields program 
manager, 09/2012006). This program is instead funded partially by the state and partially 
by EPA funds. 
Brownfield program administrators indicate that they are quite impacted by 
appointed officials following guidance from the governor. "The department has an 
agenda that is spelled out very specifically by the secretary and we just had a change of 
administration and we are getting a new governor so we will likely get a new agenda next 
year. Our primary job is to implement what we are given by the legislature and we make 
changes when we get new rules from them" (brownfields program manager, 09/20/2006). 
The program officials also indicate that as administrations change so does their 
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involvement with elected officials. In addition to having strict guidance about how the 
program is to be administered, the program also is required to file an annual report with 
the state. In this report they are required to detail all their activities for the year including 
cleanup agreements, economic impacts, economic expenditures, and designated sites. 
In addition to oversight and monitoring relationships with elected officials the 
program also reports to the EPA. 
We talk to them [EPA] quite a bit. We have one brownfields grant and we have 
one of the state tribal response grants and we have chosen to keep this separate 
from administering the program so I talk to them a lot about that grant. You 
know some states use the state tribal response grants to actually administer their 
programs, we don't do that. We do have a MOA for CERCLA and RCRA so they 
don't really override what we do, but we interface with them a lot concerning the 
money they give us (brownfields program manager, 09120/2006). 
Florida's ReRA 
Florida's RCRA program is also located in the regulatory branch of the DEP. 
This program is divided into six districts just like all the other programs in the regulatory 
branch of the DEP. Brownfield program officials acknowledge a connection between the 
two programs. "I just sent an email to them [RCRA employees] about a site that is under 
RCRA cleanup that entered our program. That is sort of a new thing that is something 
that was added to our MOA during the revision. You didn't used to be able to use the 
Brownfields program if you were in RCRA cleanup, now you can" (brownfields program 
manager, 09/20/2006). 
Florida's RCRA program does not have a PP A with the EPA. As a result the 
RCRA manager explains how sites are selected for inspection: 
We negotiate a work plan with EPA Region IV to outline minimum inspections 
for the year. If you look at the OECA guidance [EPA guidance on inspections] 
we follow the suggested usual drill of about half of the permitted facilities are 
114 
inspected in any year and a percentage of the other facilities (RCRA manager, 
1110212006). 
In addition to the negotiated work plan with the EPA region the EPA conducts a small 
number of inspections in the state. 
An interesting aspect, with potential ramifications, is the abilities and duties of the 
six districts in Florida. Each of the six districts in Florida have the power to enforce and 
sign enforcement letters in the field (RCRA Field Manager, 11103/2006). "Each of the 
five major environmental programs we have out there each of the DDMs [field managers] 
are authorized by the secretary to manage the day to day compliance enforcement. If it is 
a big enough issue or concern, like the Everglades, it is actually handled out of the 
Secretary's Office" (RCRA manager, 11102/2006). It is also noted that the central RCRA 
office does very few enforcements in the field-with each of the six districts handling 
most of the RCRA processes on actual facilities. 
Funding in the RCRA program is cited as the biggest concern. " ... well the 
biggest thing is dollars to run the program. We are on a combination of EPA grants and 
general revenue. The EPA grants just have not increased in the last several years and our 
share of the program has gone up. So where before we may have only been paying for 
55% of the program now it's crept up towards 60%" (RCRA manager, 11102/2006). 
Although the program reports to and works closely with the EPA regional office, 
the program officials site very little interaction with elected or appointed officials. "The 
secretary's office has reporting requirements, but not for the RCRA program per se. 
Sometimes something might get passed by the legislation that says they want a report in x 
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months. Then we will compile that report and submit it but we have to coordinate with a 
legislative office the department has" (RCRA manager, 11102/2006). 
Florida Overall 
Florida has only one brownfield program that follows the typical voluntary 
cleanup structure seen across the United States. Brownfield exclusive financial 
incentives are very minimal, but the program has adopted a number of economic 
development incentives for their own program. The brownfields program and the elected 
officials in Florida both indicate that the program has specific guidance both written in 
statute and given to them by the Secretary on an annual basis. 
Both the brownfields program and the RCRA program are organized into six 
districts with powers delegated to each district over various aspects of the programs. In 
the case of the brownfields program the districts only guide participants through the 
process. However, in the RCRA program the districts actually perform inspections and 
enforcements of facilities. These RCRA districts then report back to the central RCRA 
office in Tallahassee which in turn handles any EPA, EPA region, or state involvement. 
Additionally, the Secretary's office handles all of the big environmental concerns, like 
the Everglades-thereby bringing certain properties closer to appointed and elected 
officials. 
The Brownfields Program's requirement of a local government delegation of a 
brownfield area facilitates a greater level of public participation than might otherwise be 
achieved. This greater level of public participation has contributed to some pretty 
contentious issues in the recent past. This requirement not only encourages public 
participation but it also allows local officials a say in the brownfield process. 
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Nevada 
Nevada's efforts at brownfield remediation and redevelopment started in earnest 
in 1999 and include two separate programs: The Nevada Brownfields Program also called 
the Land Recycling Program, and the Nevada Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP). Both 
programs are located within the Bureau of Corrective Actions within the Nevada 
Department of Environmental Protection. The bureau of corrective action: 
... oversees cleanup of releases of regulated substances using a multi-media (air, 
water, soil, and ecological resources) approach. The bureau also administers the 
environmental response program, superfund and brownfields programs, a 
reimbursement fund for petroleum claims, and a certification program for 
environmental consultants" (Nevada Bureau of Corrective Actions Home). 
Nevada's RCRA program is located in the Bureau of Waste Management in the Nevada 
Department of Environmental Protection. These programs were once in the same bureau. 
"We used to be in the same bureau. I believe ten years ago the bureau of waste 
management and the bureau of corrective action were the same. Now the bureau of waste 
management does primarily RCRA" (VCP Manager, 01124/2007). Both of Nevada's 
brownfield programs are very small and underdeveloped in many ways. 
The Land Recycling ProgramiBrownfields Program 
Although program officials in both brownfield related programs admit the 
programs are small, the Nevada Land Recycling Program (LRP) is the more active 
program of the two. This program is also called the Nevada Brownfields Program. The 
program was created in 1999 as grant program for Nevada public entities (Brownfields 
Coordinator, 01103/2007). This program relies solely on funding from the EPA and does 
not receive any support from the state of Nevada. "The State of Nevada has received 
federal funds intended for use in encouraging brownfields redevelopment; the Nevada's 
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Land Recycling Program manages these funds for use in a holistic approach to 
redevelopment where environmental concerns may be present as a barrier" (Nevada Land 
Recycling Program). To date this program has helped cleanup 25 sites in the state of 
Nevada and employs only one individual directly for all oversight and administration of 
the program. 
The LRP receives approximately $600,000 annually from the EPA in the form of 
CERCLA 128a funding to administer the program and give out grants to public entities. 
Each year Nevada has up to $400,000 of that total to award to grant seekers for 
brownfield projects. The main goal of this program is to just give out as much of that 
money as possible (brownfields coordinator, 01103/2007). The grants they award pay for 
everything for site assessments to the actual cleanup of contamination (brownfields 
coordinator,01l03/2007). The LRP also has a revolving loan fund capitalized with EPA 
funds. To date the RLF has not completed any loans. " ... we have not had any success 
with the revolving loan fund. As of yet we have not given out even one loan in the life of 
the grant" (Brownfields Coordinator, 01103/2007) 
The program official and policymakers alike do not report a substantial 
connection by elected or appointed officials on this program. "Our department head is 
appointed, but he oversees the entire department .... he is way up there. He doesn't have 
any day to day conflicts or participation in our program .... My program is a grant 
program and I do not run off of state funding so they do not really involve themselves 
with my program" (brownfields coordinator, 01103/2007). "The EPA handles most of the 
oversight and monitoring of that program. It's their money you know" (Policymaker #1, 
January 24, 2007). 
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As was the case in the other two states, this program reports an oversight and 
reporting relationship with their EPA region. "We have quarterly reports and quarterly 
meetings. We get along quite well" (brownfields coordinator, 01103/2007). 
Nevada Voluntary Cleanup Program 
Nevada's Voluntary Cleanup Program was created in 1999 through the state 
legislature. This program offers a similar structure as compared to the other state VCPs 
where a voluntary party can obtain a liability release from the state for completing a 
cleanup of a property. Nevada has: 
... established cleanup requirements for soil and groundwater that has been 
contaminated with hazardous substances or petroleum products. Sites requiring 
cleanup are usually identified through property transfer assessments or reports of 
contamination from the owners of a property or the general public. The owners of 
the property are required to remediate the property to State cleanup standards until 
the State determines that No Further Action will be required" (Nevada Voluntary 
Cleanup Program Fact Sheet). 
The state cleanup process that is separate from the VCP allows for an end-use appropriate 
cleanup level, although they do not specifically use RBCA as formally defined. A 
property that is cleaned up under a state required cleanup does not offer any legal release 
ofliability. Conversely, the VCP " ... provides a means of giving permanent relief of 
liability to owners of a property where a cleanup is conducted ... " (Nevada Voluntary 
Cleanup Program Fact Sheet). 
The Nevada VCP charges an oversight fee to participants. This fee is varied and 
is determined on a case by case basis. Although the program has been in place since 
1999 only one site has entered the program and that site has not completed the cleanup 
yet. This one site is the University of Nevada at Reno-a state owned facility. The VCP 
supervisor reports that, "1 honestly think the main reason it is part of the VCP is because 
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the university has an academic interest in the program" (Vep supervisor, 0112412007). 
The program's supervisor feels that individuals do not enter the vep because: 
The RP's do not take advantage of the program because they are happy with our 
regular cleanup process. Our state process. vep gives them a little more liability 
protection and so far most folks don't feel like they need that. The big 
disadvantage of this program is that we charge for our oversight (Vep Supervisor, 
01124/2007). 
The vep program's supervisor is also in charge of the Nevada Superfund 
Program, the overall brownfields program, an environmental assistance program directed 
at outreach to rural parts of the state concerning emergency responses, and the revolving 
loan fund. All of these programs combined have a total of four employees. Only the 
environmental assistance position is funded through state appropriations, with the 
remaining three positions being funded through EPA grants. The brownfield programs 
cumulatively do not receive any appropriations from the state. "We are very proud of 
that" (Vep supervisor, 01124/2007). 
The vep supervisor reports no real oversight or monitoring relationships with the 
state elected or appointed officials. However, he does note that, " ... we have to report to 
the environmental response committee how many spill calls we get and how we 
responded. And then we have performance requirements tied to the biennial budget we 
do. Like we may have a question of how many brownfield sites did the program have in 
the last two years? Then we would answer that as a way of showing our performance, 
but they don't really hold us accountable for much" (Vep supervisor, 01124/2007). 
The vep in Nevada also reports a strong tie to the EPA region. 
Our relationship is really good, but overall there is some friction between the state 
and the federal EPA in general. But as far as the programs I work with we have a 
lot of programs that we grant money. We have one superfund site and the EPA 
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has given us complete control over that site. We have a lot of terms and 
conditions with the grants we receive. We have some paperwork and bean 
counting that goes along with getting money" (VCP supervisor, 01/24/2007). 
ReRA in Nevada 
Nevada's RCRA program was noted as being exceptionally high in the number of 
inspections conducted as compared to the other 49 states in the overall state database. 
What was not able to be captured in the quantitative values in the database is an 
explanation for this high level of inspections. This illustrates evidence of why qualitative 
inquiry is necessary at times. 
We have an agreement with our two largest counties by population, Washoe 
County which is Reno and Clark County which is Las Vegas. We basically have 
a contract with the local health departments to do inspections. They do the real 
small ones. They get paid about $250 an inspection. They do about 75 a quarter. 
So that's 600 annually. They really pull up our numbers. We just don't have the 
staff time or resources to do that (RCRA supervisor, 02/28/2007). 
Although this contractual relationship for inspecting the smaller facilities partially 
explains the high level of inspections in Nevada, other components of the program are 
pivotal to Nevada's inspection rate. The final sites to be inspected are determined 
through a negotiation with the EPA region. "The state has committed to inspection of all 
of our large quantity generators annually and all of our small quantity generators every 
other year. We do a lot more than the EPA holds us to. They want us to do something 
like 25% annually" (RCRA supervisor, 02/28/2007). 
RCRA program officials and policymakers report little oversight or involvement 
with their program by state elected or appointed officials. "The only time we ever have a 
political influence is when they are asking us to look at something specific, like a 
121 
complaint. We are not a very large state" (RCRA Supervisor, 02/28/2007). "We have 
little involvement there" (Policymaker #2,02113/2007). 
Nevada Overall 
Nevada has strict requirements that any property with a known hazardous 
contamination on their property must clean it up to their state mandated standards. At 
the end of the general state cleanup process individuals are given No Further Action 
letters that carry no liability protections. Only one individual has accessed the VCP and 
only 25 public entities have received grants from the LRP-making both of these 
programs very small. All of Nevada's Brownfield programs are entirely funded by the 
EPA and as such policymakers and program officials report little connection between 
state elected or appointed officials and the program. Another cited reason for the lack of 
oversight by the state legislature is the fact that Nevada's legislature is only in session 
ever other year-not giving them a lot of opportunity to monitor or oversee the programs. 
The EPA provides oversight and monitoring requirements for all the programs. 
However, that oversight tends to be directly tied to the funding received. 
Initially Nevada appeared to be very heavy in terms of regulatory nature by virtue 
of their reported inspections and enforcements in EPA's ECHO database. However, this 
number is inflated through a delegated process of inspections to local health departments. 
Although this fact explains the high level of inspection and enforcement reporting, 
Nevada still appears to be heavy in terms of regulation of environmental harms. In terms 
of RCRA the program has set the bar much higher than the EPA requires them to. 
State law dictates that any release or known contamination by a hazardous 
substance is required to be cleaned up to state standards. The oversight for this process is 
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free and funded by the state. The VCP is not free, but provides real liability relief for the 
contamination. It is possible that with a heavy regulatory environment and booming 
economy properties do not often make it to the point of brownfields to enter into these 
programs. 
All Three States 
Looking across the three case studies, we have seen a great deal of variation. We 
have seen a state plagued by deindustrialization with two relatively successful programs 
that help private and public entities. We have seen a state where the lower governments 
and public participation is pivotal, allowing for both public and private entities to 
participate. We have also seen a very small underdeveloped program that receives all of 
its funds from the EPA and has only helped a total of 26 sites-all public entities. 
Across these three states are a multitude of financial offerings ranging from EPA 
grant funded assessment and cleanup money to state tax credits and loan guarantees. 
Two of the states show money available only to public entities, while one has money 
available for everyone with few restrictions on whether the entity is public or private. 
We have seen two programs using the entirety of its CERCLA 128a funds for grants to 
public entities and for administration of the program; and one where it is used to offer 
grants-in-services to communities and non-profits. We have seen two states with 
revolving loan funds and one without. 
We have seen a varied RCRA environment in the three states. One with very 
high levels of inspection and enforcements-in fact much higher than the EPA requires 
them to perform. We have seen a state with an agreement with the EPA that spells out 
the percentages they must reach in inspections. Finally, we have seen a very 
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decentralized RCRA program where six districts each have their own decision making 
and inspection discretion-although the percentages of each type of facility is determined 
at the central state level through negotiations with the EPA region. Across these three 
states we have seen a state who has always allowed RCRA facilities to utilize their 
voluntary cleanup program for RCRA corrective actions; one that has recently allowed 
them to do so; and one where they cannot use the VCP for RCRA corrective action. 
The overall diversity, complexities, and relationships across these states is very 
striking and provides some interesting questions about state level brownfield efforts. The 
following chapter will delve into discussion of what lessons we might gain from the 
database and these case studies as well as provide some insights into what this data may 
mean in the bigger picture. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research agenda for this dissertation involved two distinct goals. The first 
goal was to determine what the fifty states are doing in the quest to remediate and 
redevelop their brownfields. Taken alone, this is a significant contribution to the 
literature on brownfields, because the data currently available is unreliable, 
underdeveloped, and incomplete. The database described in Chapter Four, and partially 
presented in the Appendices, is the product of this research. The size of this database 
prevents presentation in this printed document, however, as stated in Chapter Four, it is 
available online. The second research goal of this dissertation included taking a closer 
look at three specific state programs while adding to and expanding upon bureaucratic 
discretion and legislative control theories. This is accomplished through an in-depth 
comparative case study of three individual states. As was pointed out in Chapter Two, 
this dissertation seeks to use the more complex state level government as a vehicle for 
informing these theories, which at this time are primarily concentrated on the federal 
government. Part of the complexities at the state level is the interdependence between 
other state level programs and agencies as well as federal level programs and agencies. 
This chapter draws on the themes discovered in this research to critically assess the two 
overarching research goals of this project. First, some findings and conclusions are 
presented concerning the overall data on the fifty states sometimes supplemented with 
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findings from the cases. Following the discussion of the fifty states, the theories of 
bureaucratic discretion and political control concerning the case studies are discussed. 
This chapter also includes some policy recommendations and overarching conclusions. 
What have the "laboratories of democracy" taught us? 
One potential key to the goal of remediation and redevelopment of hrownfields is 
to enable and foster an effective public effort. Understanding the differences across the 
fifty laboratories of democracy and what can be learned from these differences is a 
valuable lesson in policy. To be sure, each state has a different set of resources, level of 
brownfield problem, and desires to remediate these properties-however, with public 
investment into these programs growing each year, it is wise to take a moment and learn 
a little more about what is being done across the states and what implications these 
programs may have. 
The database has shown that liability concerns and financial costs of redeveloping 
brownfields across the states have been handled in a diverse, sometimes unequal, way. 
The database also shows unique differences in state level RCRA program enforcement 
and compliance. Questions posited in Chapter One included: How, if at all, does the 
regulatory environment of a state influence their brownfield program? What can the 
states learn from each other? Are there any commonalities across the fifty states that are 
interesting to the quest for remediation and redevelopment of brown fields? Drawing 




The data gathered in the fifty state database shows interesting and striking 
differences in the numbers of inspections at RCRA regulated facilities. As was detailed 
in Chapter Four an examination of the entire universe ofRCRA regulated facilities 
reveals some states with extremely low inspection rates and some states with relatively 
high inspection rates. Using this data as a proxy for the environmental regulatory nature 
of a state reveals that, in fact, some connection may exist between the two. More 
specifically, if the states with higher levels of inspections and enforcements are viewed as 
being more environmentally protective than states that do not, then it is possible to 
examine the details of the brownfield programs to see if they have attributes that are 
equally as environmentally protective. To do this we can take a sample of states with the 
highest inspection rates and a sample of the states with the lowest inspection rates and 
compare them across their stated mission/purpose of their brownfields programs. 
BF Mission 
NV "'The Nevada Land Recycling Program ofNDEP maintains 
(44.75%) technical staff which can oversee assessments and site cleanups to 
ensure they are consistent with Nevada laws and are protective of 
human health and the environment". 
MT "'The primary focus .... .is to facilitate investigation and cleanup of 
(24.91%) releases of unregulated hazardous substances". 
VT 
(1.83%) "VRCPP is a road for invigorated community growth". 
NH(1%) "The New Hampshire Brownfields Program encourages the 
redevelopment of contaminated properties through a variety of 
initiatives that address the uncertainty and liability concerns 
associated with brownfields sites". 
Table 6.1: RCRA Inspections and BF Missions across small sample of states 
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Examining Table 6.1 shows that in the two states with the highest propensity to inspect 
and enforce environmental regulations, their brownfield programs have a mission that is 
rhetorically centered on environmental remediation. Conversely, the two states with the 
lowest propensity to inspect and enforce RCRA environmental regulations have a 
brownfield purpose/mission more centered on the economic development aspects of 
brownfields. Taking a look at additional specifics of these four state brownfield 
programs seems to lend further credence to this finding. For example, in Nevada the two 
brownfield programs only offer an EPA funded revolving loan fund and EPA funded 
grants to public entities. Comparing this to New Hampshire where that state offers 
nineteen separate grant programs that range from EP A grants to state funded grants 
drawn from various administrative agencies shows a state more focused on funding 
environmental remediation to facilitate the redevelopment of a brownfield. As has been 
stated throughout this dissertation, I am not testing a theory---but providing an 
exploration of the issue. These possible connections are something that further research 
can explore to see if states can be characterized in an environmentally protective versus 
economic development oriented manner. If a measure like this is possible, then future 
quantitative studies of brown fields can be facilitated through the use ofRCRA ECHO 
data as a proxy for environmental regulatory versus economic development nature of the 
programs. 
In addition to these indirect connections between RCRA and Brownfield 
Programs, direct connections exist that make it logical to study the two in conjunction. 
Certain hazardous substances being removed from brownfield sites may be regulated 
under RCRA, providing a direct link between the two. These substances will likely have 
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at least two facility connections with RCRA: first, the act of transporting the substances 
will fall under RCRA's Transporters regulations; second, the end resting place for these 
materials will likely be a TSD (Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facility) that is often 
not in the same state. Florida, for example sends RCRA hazardous waste to Alabama or 
North Carolina; and Kentucky sends waste to Oklahoma. Although as was discussed in 
Chapter Four, TSD's are the most heavily inspected and regulated facility type across the 
fifty states, Transporters did not receive this same consistent level of enforcement of 
RCRA. Referring back to the four extreme states touched on above reveals the following 










Table 6.2: Specific RCRA facility inspection rates in selected states 
New Hampshire 
TSD: 50% 
Transporter: 31 % 
Even in just these four states, a wide variation exists in the transporters who get inspected 
under RCRA regulations. Leaks, accidents, carelessness, or even fraud in these 
transporters of hazardous materials being removed from brownfields can cause serious 
environmental harm-potentially resulting in another contaminated property somewhere 
new. 
Another direct link to Brownfield Programs is that of RCRA corrective action. In 
some cases when a violation is discovered in inspections or when a facility is closing, 
corrective action is ordered under the RCRA regulations. This cleanup process can 
possibly be able to be completed in a state's Voluntary Cleanup Program. Although the 
database is not able to provide an exact tally of which states allow this connection, the 
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three case studies provided some additional infonnation here. In Indiana and Florida, 
RCRA corrective action sites are able to be cleaned up under the brownfields programs; 
in Nevada it is not allowed. Another state of note is Colorado, where RCRA corrective 
action is strictly prohibited from participation in the Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup 
Program. It is likely that further qualitative inquiry across the other states will reveal 
more states where RCRA corrective action is allowed to be completed under the 
brownfields program. Enabling RCRA corrective action sites to utilize a state's 
brownfield program has a number of implications for RCRA and for the brownfield 
programs. First, the allowance of an actively operating facility into a program 
presumably geared for inactive or abandoned sites changes the nature of the entire 
cleanup. The capacity of the brownfield program to accommodate these differences is 
unknown and can potentially be detrimental to the purpose ofRCRA to the environment 
as a whole. A second implication comes with accountability for funding. We know from 
the database and details presented in Chapter Four that most brownfield programs across 
the fifty states utilize a combination of user fees and EPA grants to operate. The EPA 
grants were awarded to the states from the EPA to enable more brownfields to be 
remediated and redeveloped-not necessarily to enable a RCRA facility to obtain 
liability relief for their faults under RCRA. The accountability for these EPA grants as 
well as the capacity of the brownfield program to properly oversee a cleanup in an active 
RCRA facility is unknown. 
Examining the two seemingly independent programs, RCRA and Brownfield 
Programs, has revealed that connections do exist, making it logical and necessary for 
future brownfield program studies to further investigate the connection between these 
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two programs. In some cases the lines between the two programs become very blurred 
with accountability to the EPA, the state, and the citizens being in question. It would also 
seem that using RCRA inspection and enforcement data may be able to provide a 
reasonable indicator for the nature of that state's brownfield efforts, although further 
inquiry in this respect would be fruitful in future studies. In all cases across the 48 
RCRA authorized states, the RCRA program is operated in the same Department as the 
Brownfield Program, thereby potentially working under the same institutional culture. 
Judging from the cases outlined above, something between the two programs seems to be 
connected, or at least being influenced by the same thing. Future studies could 
potentially use the highly quantitative RCRA inspection data to provide a measure of 
environmental protectiveness of a given state when studying brownfield programs. 
Additionally, future studies could use the implications ofRCRA corrective action 
cleanups using the brownfields programs as an interesting inquiry into intergovernmental 
relations and financial accountability. 
Lessons Learned? 
Both the database and case studies of this dissertation enabled a look at the 
complexities of these programs. No two states are identical in how they handle their 
brownfield programs. As was pointed out in Chapter Four, brownfield literature is 
dominated by the premise that brownfields are not more widely developed as a result of 
developer's liability concerns and concerns over the financial costs of cleanup. Table 6.3 
restates, in a simple form, the basic foundations of these programs that exist across the 
states in relation to these two aspects of brownfield remediation and redevelopment. 
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Liability Abatement 
-48 of 50 states have liability protections 
-23 of 48 states have an EPA sMOA 
-Approximately 50% of states allow 
responsible party to receive liability 
protections 




-EPA funded grants 
-Revolving Loan Funds 
-State Funded Grants 
-Loan Guarantees 
-Tax Incentives: Sales, Property, 
Income 
-RBCA/Institutional Controls 
Table 6.3: State Liability and Financial Abatement Methods 
First, in the 47 states with a typical Voluntary Cleanup Program, liability 
abatement is a pivotal part of that program-in fact sometimes it is the only benefit of the 
program. The concept and goal of achieving voluntary cleanups in exchange for liability 
protections is one that is not without opponents and detractors. First, in some ways it 
relieves the responsible party of duties to cleanup contamination that they have created 
because as it is quite possible that a voluntary party will step in and cleanup the site. 
Second it likely allows for cherry-picking in sites. Making cleanups voluntary and 
providing public resources for that purpose, does create the potential for less than 
equitable results in what sites will be remediated. That is the sites with the most 
redevelopment potential, in the best markets, will likely be redeveloped using the benefits 
of these programs. However, there is a risk that these 'best' sites would have been 
redeveloped anyway, leaving all of the most undesirable sites behind. Without future and 
additional studies, this is not something that this dissertation can prove, however, 
logically from the data gathered this makes sense, and as such, it warrants future studies. 
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Although some amount of cherry picking probably occurs as a result of these 
voluntary programs, it is certainly true that before these liability mechanisms were in 
place many current property owners and municipalities were at risk of being held liable 
under state and federal law for contamination that they may not have created or even 
contributed to. The liability mechanisms in the voluntary cleanup programs certainly can 
help get the redevelopment process started for a number of sites where the parties are all 
innocent. Irregardless of the benefits to be gained by providing these liability relief 
documents they are not without detractors and problems. With the number of states 
possessing EPA MOA's for their VCPs and allowing responsible parties to participate 
fully, have these liability protections gone too far? Have the remedies for the 
unanticipated consequences of the strict environmental laws of the 1980s, gone so far as 
to possibly recreate the potential for similar harms that prompted the original strict 
environmental laws? 
The CERCLA strict liability that the brownfield laws were passed to relieve may 
very well be quite an effective incentive to prevent future contamination. By 
encouraging cleanup through liability relief guarantees, it is possible that liabilities for 
future contamination become less feared and less avoided, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of future problems: a sort of unanticipated consequences problem. That is, 
taking away the liability concerns may leave cities and states vulnerable to future 
contamination and problems. An additional concern with these liability protections is 
present in the eleven states with 3rd Party liability protections. It is quite possible that 
harms to other individuals will not be able to be litigated to an acceptable solution in 
these states. This type of liability protection may provide little recourse to individuals 
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who may have suffered as a result of contamination in a neighboring property or as a 
result of groundwater contamination. Although it eases the developers concerns, what 
implications might this have for the injured innocent party? Finally, providing a 
mechanism for liability relief may encourage businesses to cleanup, but may result in 
giving tax dollars to these businesses to perform cleanups they may have been 
responsible for or that they may have performed without the program at all- the so-
called cherry picking problem again. 
These liability relief documents in some states go further with an EPA M.O.A. 
Just under half of the states have a MOA for their Yep. The same implications and 
unanticipated consequences could result to a greater degree under the states with an EPA 
MOA. From a developer's point of view, a state possessing a MOA may be looked upon 
more favorably for the location of potential development, or in this case redevelopment. 
This EPA MOA can be looked at as beneficial in providing extra assurances to 
developers concerning their potential for future liability--- but it could also be viewed as 
an additional way in which the responsible party for contamination cannot be required to 
pay for their own cleanup. Almost thirty states allow the responsible party to participate 
and receive liability protections from the state. Fourteen of these states also possess an 
MOA with the EPA. In essence, these states are providing double liability assurance to 
the responsible party. Allowing the responsible parties to obtain this level of liability 
protections has potentially troubling implications for environmental problems that 
science may not yet know about, or that the state has not identified on a list of hazardous 
substances. As was outlined earlier in this dissertation, the states do not uniformly 
identify hazardous substances or require that they be cleaned up to a specific, uniform 
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level. With this variation across the states, this double liability protection for responsible 
parties potentially leaves citizens in very unequal situations. 
Some further important questions raised by the growing acceptance and use of 
voluntary cleanups are: is it good use of tax dollars and policy to utilize public resources 
to provide a voluntary party liability relief in order to clean up contaminated property if it 
means the entity at fault for the contamination never has to pay for it? Or, as is true in 
Pennsylvania, is it good policy to provide state and federal cleanup and 3rd Party liability 
relief to someone who may have been partially responsible for the contamination, even 
though they, by former laws, should have cleaned up the contamination anyway? The 
answers to those questions are certainly debatable. 
Financial Costs 
The second often cited impediment to brownfield redevelopment is the added 
financial costs associated with cleaning up brownfields to ready them for redevelopment. 
There is a logical relationship that exists between liability relief and financial incentives 
in the quest to get brownfields redeveloped. Obviously, liability relief documents reduce 
the risk on the part of the developer. With a reduction in developer's risk, the risk 
premium2 for obtaining and developing a brownfield will be lower, thereby theoretically, 
requiring fewer financial incentives to get the brownfield done. In states where liability 
protections are less comprehensive, those states may be able to compensate by offering 
more financial incentives to developers. The most commonly offered incentives as 
explained in Chapter Four were: EPA assessment and cleanup grants; loan guarantees and 
revolving loan funds; and various tax incentives. Some states have begun drawing from 
other economic development programs as a way to encourage and facilitate 
2 The reward for holding a risky investment rather than a risk-free one (lnvestorwords, 2007). 
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redevelopment. The use of these types of financial mechanisms may be able to offer 
enough incentive to get developers to invest into brownfields---achieving the remediation 
and redevelopment of brown fields. However, much like the liability relief aspect of these 
programs, financial opportunities offered across the states are not without some 
concerning aspects. 
A majority of financial incentive programs offered across the states stem from the 
EPA's grants to the states-although in terms of total dollars state investment is likely 
higher. In fact, one large (in terms of grants directly to states) grant that was created in 
the 2002 federal Brownfields Law, CERCLA 128a, provides up to $50 million a year for 
states to expand or establish their brownfield programs. An interesting component of this 
funding is that the states must apply through their EPA Regions for this funding. As was 
seen in Chapter Four funding is quite varied across the states. For example, Montana 
received $976,426 from this grant program last year while Minnesota received $753,000. 
Translating this into per capita reveals that Montana received an average of $1.03 per 
person living in the state while Minnesota received $0.15 per person. This is quite a 
discrepancy. Most states report using these funds for administrative purposes, 
formulation of a database for brownfields, and for cleanup and assessment grants to 
public entities. This use of federal brownfield money across the states appears to be 
diverse and has the potential to be awarded in a discretionary manner with less than fair 
results. Unfortunately, as was detailed in Chapter Four, the amounts these states receive 
are not made readily available by the EPA or the EPA Regions and must be gathered on a 
state-to-state basis. Some potential policy recommendations concerning these funds 
include: A transparent tracking system by the EPA. Public funds provided to public 
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entities should be made readily available to policy analysts and researchers. Relying on 
state responses to inquiry to determine amount of funding received does not enable 
accountability to citizens. Additionally, funding should not solely be done by grant 
applications by the states. Certainly, many states have been in the brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment process for much longer and have a potentially unfair 
advantage in the experience and awarding rates for grants. In fact, what is seen in the 
states that CERCLA 128a funding is known, is that the states with the most established 
programs are actually receiving more money than those with less established programs. 
F or a grant program directed at states for the purpose of expanding brownfield efforts-
this makes little sense. Certainly, future research should further expand on this tracking 
to determine whether discrepancies exist across regions and how the EPA regions 
determine which grant applications to approve. 
The brownfield efforts across the fifty states have not widely offered financial 
incentives from their own funds---particularly direct grants. In some ways it seems that 
states are relying more heavily on abating the risk on the sites in order to achieve 
remediation and redevelopment. What grants that are offered tend to be tied to the EPA, 
and many of those EPA grants are awarded on the basis of grant applications. Again, this 
implies that those states with more experience and more persistence will likely be able to 
obtain greater EPA funding. This may not always be the states that need it the most. 
Furthermore, since brownfield policies at the state level are not directly related to any 
federal standards, remediation standards are left to the state decision makers who may 
make decisions based upon the costs and willingness of developers. Brownfield 
programs, in essence, are replacing environmental health with risk relatively-something 
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that might result in higher cleanup standards in wealthier areas and lower standards in 
poorer areas (Landy, 1999). Additionally, Bullard (1993) has pointed out that poor and 
minority communities are oftentimes willing to accept lower levels of remediation for 
fear of missing all economic investment and development. The so called, "environmental 
blackmail". 
Outside of these EPA funds, the primary state originated incentive comes in the 
form of tax related incentives. The use of tax incentives requires a financial commitment 
by the states, and sometimes by local governments. In some of these tax incentives the 
local government is required to take the financial burden of these incentives. More 
specifically, many states permit their local governments to provide property tax 
abatements or reductions for remediated brownfields. Although this may work to 
encourage remediation and redevelopment, it is at the expense of the local government. 
not the state. Arguably the local government is the most ill-equipped of all levels of 
government to absorb this cost. In some of these property tax programs, current revenue 
is forgone either voluntarily, or by state requirement, through a partial or full exemption 
of property tax on a brownfield being redeveloped. To be sure, in the poorer cities it may 
not be economically feasible to forgo revenue in order to get remediation done---even if 
in the long run the property brings in more revenue for the local government. 
Some states that offer property tax incentives ask or require that the local 
government forgo future revenue for a specified period of time by not taxing the 
additional value of the remediation or redevelopment of the property. Certainly from a 
local government's perspective the tax incentives based on future revenue are more easily 
dealt with and is very similar to the process used by Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for 
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other economic development projects. However, it can still pose a problem to local 
governments by creating an increased demand on services as a result of the 
redevelopment without an immediate or even near-future increase in tax revenues. For 
example, if a brownfield is remediated and redeveloped into a large scale housing 
development in a city where the property tax is frozen for several years, that city will still 
be forced to provide local services to that development and its residents but will receive 
no additional funding to do so for the period of the program. These sort of financial 
incentives that require the local government to either forfeit current or future revenues, 
has a strong likelihood of producing unfair and unequal results across localities. 
Another key incentive offered across many states is income tax deductions and 
credits. Generally, these income tax credits and deductions allow a developer or 
individual to deduct (or obtain a credit) for a certain percentage of the cost of 
remediation, or sometimes the equipment or labor costs, from their state income tax. 
Credits are certainly the bigger and better incentive, as they will count as the equivalent 
of a payment to the state department of revenue, unlike a deduction which only counts to 
reduce taxable income of a business or entity. In order for this incentive to provide a 
substantial relief from financial costs the entity obtaining the deduction or credit would 
need to be a significantly large enough entity to have state tax liability or the state would 
need to provide for the ability of the credit or deduction to roll over to the following year 
if all of it is not able to be used. Some states do allow for roll over of the tax incentives, 
but not all. This is certainly an area where states could improve. Providing credits with 
roll over capacity will help alleviate some of the potential unanticipated consequences 
associated with these types of incentives. This form of incentive favors larger developers 
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with greater tax liability, over smaller developers with less state tax liability. A business 
or individual with marginal state tax liability will likely not see this sort of incentive, with 
the exception of extremely small brownfield sites with equally as small cleanup bills, as 
helpful as other forms of financial assistance. Furthermore, this sort of incentive requires 
that the developer pay for the cost of remediation upfront and recoup a portion of the 
costs later through their tax deduction. Again, this favors the larger entities that have the 
upfront funds to conduct the cleanup. It is possible that these sorts of incentives are 
working to encourage big box development. Something that may not have been 
considered by the state administrators or policymakers creating these types of incentives. 
RBCA and LUCs 
Another key financial aspect seen across the fifty states are the risk based 
corrective action and land use control allowance that reduces the cost of remediation of a 
brownfield. Almost all of the states provide a mechanism for the use of these cleanup 
mechanisms. By allowing for flexible cleanup standards, these programs have 
circumvented the whole issue of "how clean is clean" that filled environmental debates 
for years. Under these flexible guidelines clean enough is accepted even if that means 
contamination still exists in the groundwater or soil. In most states that allow for risk 
based cleanup levels, intuitional controls and engineering controls are attached that that 
particular site to provide for monitoring and public notice of the remaining 
contamination. 
Most often the institutional controls used across the states are notations on the 
deed and/or a registry providing the information to the public. The public notice capacity 
and publicly available database for land use controls across the states is extremely varied. 
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As was seen in Florida, the state has an extensive system in place to both inform the 
public and to allow the public complete transparency in what controls exist across the 
state. However, other states do not have this same level of transparency or public 
information availability. Overall, the process of LUCs, although it likely reduces the cost 
of cleanup, has some potential unanticipated consequences associated with it. First, these 
controls on residential property may very well not be understood by individuals 
purchasing the property. With the high number of states with underdeveloped and 
potentially ineffective land use control monitoring and reporting systems, it is quite likely 
that a purchaser of a property with these controls or restrictions may not fully understand 
what that control means. Additionally, this leaves open the possibility for controls to 
become completely untracked, essentially falling through the cracks, as a result of 
administrative negligence or disorganization. Furthermore, some individuals may find 
the lower costs of these sites the only affordable option to them in some markets across 
the country possibly leading to a disproportionate number of lower income individuals 
and minorities living in homes, or operating businesses that were erected on sites with 
contamination still present. 
An additional issue that is present with the use of flexible cleanup standards is 
that it favors industrial and commercial developments where the end-use dictates a lower 
level of cleanliness in the contamination. To be sure, across the states the level of 
cleanup is the highest for residential developments. Providing for flexible cleanup 
standards is certainly a disincentive to developers to invest in residential developments 
where the costs are going to be the highest for cleanup. In fact, by having these flexible 
guidelines, middle and low priced residential developments are not going to be as 
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economically feasible as commercial, industrial, or high end residential. Furthermore, it 
is relatively few markets that high-end residential development can take the place of a 
brownfield- leaving developers to decide between industrial or commercial end use. 
Unfortunately for this situation, many of the brownfields are located in former industrial 
centers surrounded by residential development where the most appropriate use would 
likely be residential. However, the use of these flexible standards is likely discouraging 
the more appropriate end use in some areas. Overall, with the increased use and 
acceptance of flexible cleanup standards, even on residential developments, some serious 
environmental justice and equity implications exist. 
One theme that is apparent across the state's financial offerings is that the states 
with heavier industrial backgrounds tend to offer incentives specifically focused on 
distressed urban communities. This is a stark difference from some states, such as 
Nevada or Iowa, where incentives and assistance are often geared towards more rural 
communities. Key states that have distressed or urban specific incentives are: Ohio, New 
Jersey, Michigan, and Massachusetts. These states specifically have a financial program 
restricted for use within distressed and/or urban areas. Other states, those with higher 
unemployment rates, have tied some brownfield incentives to the number of jobs created. 
Delaware and Oklahoma are two examples of this. This structuring of incentives reflects, 
to some degree, a state that recognizes their economic development needs and places that 
need onto the brownfield programs incentives. What is interesting about this so-called 
need oriented incentive, is that it clearly illustrates a view of brown fields as an economic 
development opportunity-and less of an environmental hazard. 
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It is probable that financial incentives do actually encourage remediation of 
brownfields, however, they are not to be taken lightly and they are not without 
unanticipated consequences that deserve further study. Each of the various types of 
incentives will likely work to encourage certain types of development. For example, in 
Oklahoma the Quality Jobs Act will actually pay a developer quarterly incentives for 
locating on a minimum of a 10 acre brownfield and employ a certain number of people. 
This form of incentive will naturally encourage commercial or industrial use of 
brownfields, which create the prerequisite number of jobs required to receive the 
incentive. 
Overall each of the primary incentives offered require both a risk and forgone 
revenue or explicit costs on the part of either the state or local government. Additionally, 
loans and loan guarantees require a level of risk that may be too great for states to take 
and create a problem in states with a balanced budget requirement. As the state 
governments are being handed more and more responsibility over federal programs, these 
incentives may not be accomplishing exactly what they are intended to accomplish and 
each state should look internally to analyze what the state's development needs are, what 
their environmental situation is, and redirect their scarce financial abilities to those that fit 
best with their states situation. They should also include general economic development 
tools to their brownfield efforts. In the states where economic development tools are not 
encouraged or allowed to be used for brownfields, the state is essentially providing yet 
another disincentive for investment in brownfields. 
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Discretion and Control of the programs? 
As was pointed out in earlier chapters, a number of issues are known from 
previous scholarship to impact program implementation and administration. As was 
discussed in Chapter Two the literature concerning bureaucratic discretion and political 
control theories is currently concentrated at the federal level-this study has enabled an 
examination of the much more complex state level with the goal of informing these 
theories and providing the groundwork for future studies. These case studies are not 
intended to test these theories, but to inform them through the examination of a more 
complex administrative and political environment. Several themes were uncovered in the 
three case study states that may offer some insights into how these programs are 
influenced by administrators and political officials alike. The major themes across these 
states were: money/funding, EPA region and lower-level government officials. 
Money 
All three state case studies indicated oversight and monitoring in relation to their 
funding. All three states receive money from the EPA and as a result are accountable to 
the EPA for that funding. In addition to the reporting requirements associated with this 
funding, political officials also indicate a lack of interest in oversight as a result of the 
program's non-reliance on state appropriations. For example, as was detailed in Chapter 
Five, a Nevada policymaker concedes that they do not get involved with the programs 
because it is the EPA's money funding the program. This lack of oversight has some 
very interesting implications for the actions of these programs. As contaminated 
properties increasingly move through these voluntary programs, jUdging from these three 
programs, the public seems to have little direct recourse in the programs where the state 
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does not provide funding. The non-elected administrators are administering, with little 
oversight by state political officials, a program where the potential for human health harm 
is quite real. Furthennore, the level of decentralization in some of the programs likely 
allows administrators to become more discretionary. For example, in Florida where the 
brownfield program and RCRA program both are divided into six separate districts with 
each district having discretionary abilities, these programs are further removed from 
political oversight and monitoring. This is not something that has been accounted for in 
bureaucratic discretion or political control theories. Certainly, these and other state level 
programs influence the daily lives of citizens, and they are perhaps offered less political 
oversight, and thereby popular control, than the federal program analyses that 
demonstrate political control. In many ways these state level programs are more 
influential to citizens than are some of the federal programs-making discretionary and 
control issues much more relevant and important. These three cases seem to be showing 
that the level of direct political control is associated with the funding, not the results or 
operation of the program. RCRA is an exception to this in Indiana where the political 
officials have actually exerted direct control over the program, but not for the purpose of 
protection the environment. This has very real implications for popular control of these 
programs. 
A commonality across found in two of the states was that a fee was made part of 
the program so that the program would not have to rely on appropriations. Both Nevada 
and Indiana policymakers indicated this was a key consideration when detennining how 
to design the program. Florida, is an exception and policymakers indicated that other 
issues were more important to them rather than impose a fee on participants. More 
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specifically, policymaker #2 indicated, "We had a pretty significant situation with the 
racial report that I mentioned. Attaching a fee to this program would have certainly 
impeded participation and the goal was to help and encourage participation, not prevent 
it" (Florida Policymaker #2, 10/2112006). Important to note here is that Florida is the 
only program of the three that does not impose a fee, and is the only voluntary program 
that doesn't at least allow for a charge across the entire United States-thereby relying 
upon state appropriations. As a result of these appropriations it is also the only program 
of the three to indicate a significant political oversight and monitoring from the state 
level. 
It is possible, perhaps even likely judging from lessons of these three states, that 
states which offer state-funded financial incentives are faced with more oversight than the 
states that do not have such programs. Again, this would be oversight tied to financial 
contributions at the state level. Future research should certainly pursue this form and 
level of oversight. Popular control of the government relies on accountability to the 
citizens. However, if oversight and monitoring is tied to funding and budgets in these 
programs, then the utility of oversight is questionable for the accountability to the public 
and purposes of the program. 
Overall, jUdging from these three states, it would seem that oversight and 
monitoring in these programs is tied strongly to funding and money. At the state level 
state policymaker interest is highly centered on accountability for funds provided. In 
essence these policymakers want to know exactly what have they gotten in return for 
their investment? In Nevada, where no funds are provided by the state, very little 
oversight and interest was reported. However, in Florida, where state funds are being 
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used, policymakers took a much more keen interest in monitoring the program's actions 
and successes. It seems that on some level, the discretion ability of administrators may 
be, in part, determined by who they get the funding from. This implies that in 
discretionary terms, the administrators who are funded by federal grants may have 
oversight and monitoring by federal officials but not state officials. This, too, has real 
implications for a democracy that rests upon the popular control of the government. If 
these administrators are not being held accountable to the citizens of the state they 
operate in, what control do the citizens have over how they operate? While federal 
oversight appears present, the reality is that there will be less detailed scrutiny than would 
be possible - or possibly expected - if a state were monitoring its own internal programs 
and activities. 
With discretion and control being tightly related to who is funding the programs, 
some interesting implications for discretion and political control questions emerge from 
the relationships with the EP A and the EP A Regions. Specifically, with state programs 
reporting to federal EPA administrators, not elected officials, how do the citizens of that 
state ensure representation in something that likely impacts them? How does political 
control manifest itself in these programs when it comes from a few steps above? To be 
sure, EPA headquarters and EPA regional staff have oversight by Congress and the 
President; however how that oversight gets channeled down to the lower level state 
administrator is yet to be seen and cannot be answered in this dissertation. 
A further consideration concerning funding and discretion, is when the EPA 
provides funds to the states to use in administration and granting--- how those funds are 
being distributed in the state is left to the state level administrators. It is quite possible 
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that in order to be able to show results the state level administrators use these funds to 
facilitate the easiest redevelopments, again leaving the less than marketable sites 
unremediated. 
EPA Region 
The EPA is a highly complex administrative body. Decisions, influence, and 
control is channeled down from Washington to the Regions and then on to the States. 
Implementation of brownfield programs is likely impacted by decisions made at the 
federal level, regional level, and the state levels all working together in some manner. 
Due to this complexity, coupled with the highly administrative and vertical organization 
of the EPA, political control of the state level programs are not as clear or as easily 
identified as is in the federal studies of this topic. All programs, including the RCRA 
programs, noted that their respective EPA region was pivotal and key in their relationship 
with the EPA. In fact all reported little-to-no contact with the headquarters of EPA at all. 
What is interesting about the EPA region in relation to discretion and political 
control theories is that the EPA regions are a set of administrators acting on behalf of the 
EPA. This provides an interesting funnel of political control. How CERCLA and the 
brownfields legislation are being funneled down the set of non-elected administrators is 
again something which is being missed in current political control and bureaucratic 
discretion theories. What level of discretion exists at the EPA Region may well impact 
what level of discretion the state level administrators, and perhaps even local 
administrators, possess in determining how to implement and administer a program. 
Although most states have passed enabling legislation for their brownfield programs, the 
state programs are all still relying, in whole or in part, on federal EPA dollars to operate 
148 
their program, including administrative expenses. When the EPA funds state programs in 
some capacity and level, the programs are faced with oversight and monitoring from the 
individual EPA regions. EPA regions are comprised of non-elected administrators which 
may have varying levels of discretion across them. How EPA regional officials respond 
to their non-elected administrator bosses, who in turn are responding to appointed and 
elected officials at the national level illustrates a very complex discretionary and political 
control environment. Even in Florida where state officials are overseeing and monitoring 
the program more acutely than in Nevada and Indiana, the program is also responsive and 
accountable to the EPA region. 
Lower Level Government Involvement 
An interesting theme that came from these three case studies is the role lower 
level governments sometimes play in the state brownfield programs. Although the exact 
role varied across the three cases, the fact is that the lower level governments were still 
involved, making it worth noting. This relationship can be purely informational or for 
communications like in Indiana. However, the relationship can also be more controlling 
like in Florida where a local government and its elected officials must approve a 
brownfields area in order for individuals to participate. To be sure, an aspect of the 
various programs that either require or encourage local government participation is 
subject to many of the problems associated with local government implementation. That 
is corruption and poverty may often act as an impediment, or leave some local 
communities prone to excess influence from wealthy outsiders, to any measure that 
requires local level participation. Furthermore, in the states where grants are provided to 
the local governments for assessments and remediations, it is likely the cities who need 
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the funds the most are also the most ill-equipped to be persistent in the application for 
these grants from the state. This is a fact that is also likely true at the state level. That is 
the poorer a state is, the more likely it is to be less able to be persistent to their respective 
EPA region in the application for grants and funds. If a state or local government is 
strapped for funds, they may quite likely not have the funds for an employee to become 
educated and persistent in grant applications to their EPA region or EPA headquarters. 
In terms of local government participation, Florida is likely the most unique in 
that it both allows and requires local government participation. However, in many state 
programs the customer of the brownfields programs are local governments. For example, 
as was seen in Nevada- the only participants in any of the programs are public or non-
profit entities. Local government participation in the state brownfield programs, whether 
through direct participation as in Florida or through indirect participation as the customer, 
is fundamentally shaped by their political coalitions and economic abilities, something 
not accounted for in current brownfield literature or in current political control and 
bureaucratic discretion theories. 
Overall 
Not so long ago the fears of red ice and purple dogs associated with contaminated 
sites struck fear in citizens and businesses. Stemming from these fears harsh federal 
legislation aimed at punishing those responsible for the contamination and preventing it 
from happening again were created. Certainly, this harsh outlook on contaminated 
properties provides a very real incentive for industry to avoid future contamination. 
However, as a result of a complex set of circumstances, many sites remained 
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unremediated and undeveloped years after industry left. Many cities are in decline and 
liability and fmancial cost concerns keep developers away from these sites. 
However, in the past fifteen years or so, we have seen a shift in the public 
response to contaminated properties that is quite striking. Gone are the days of wide 
public support for Superfund and strict liability. With New Jersey, Minnesota, and 
Illinois leading the way in the 1980's states began to develop ways to help get these 
properties developed. Some states started the process with legislation, others with 
agencies creating administrative codes. Throughout the nineties the remaining states 
began to create similar redevelopment programs. The Federal government came on 
board in 2002 and the last state, South Dakota, created a program in 2004. 
State efforts at remediation and redevelopment of brownfields rely heavily on the 
private sector to do the remediation and redevelopment. Most states provide market 
incentives in the form of liability relief, flexible cleanup, and financial opportunities to 
try and help developers see brownfields as a marketable, viable alternative to Greenfield 
development. In essence these programs are seeking for the private sector to voluntarily 
remediate and redevelop properties that were already, for whatever reason, unmarketable. 
Cities are in distress because industry moved out and left behind contaminated, unusable 
land. These programs are offering financial opportunities and liability relief, but it very 
well may not be enough to address the reasons why the industry left in the first place. 
Some of the communities that have the most brownfields are faced with real estate 
market conditions that exhibit low marketability on even the cleanest property. Adding 
contamination to an already bad market only further exacerbates the problem. These 
voluntary brownfield programs focus on making sites profitable to a developer so that 
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these sites will be invested in. Any time profit is a key consideration, discrepancies 
across states and localities will ensue. To be sure, states and localities do not have equal 
economic capacities, political willingness, and market conditions. In states like Florida, 
Nevada, and Arizona where market conditions are extremely favorable, brownfields 
become more competitive with greenfields for development. However, in states like 
Mississippi, Kentucky, and West Virginia where market forces are not so strong, the 
properties are not going to be so successfully or easily dealt with. Unfortunately, some of 
the states with the most brownfields, are also the states with the least capacity to address 
them. The states with the biggest problems and least capacity to address them will 
require more creative mechanisms and more federal assistance to successfully redevelop 
their brownfields. 
The movement to invest public funds into voluntary brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment programs has spurred a plethora of mechanisms and variations across the 
fifty states. The database and the case studies have shown just how diverse these 
programs truly are. With this diversity come a number of significant questions and 
implications that only future research will provide insights into. 
Findings from this research include: 
• The States have very diverse, unequal mechanisms to promote brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment. A variety of balance between risk abatement and 
financial incentive mechanisms are distributed across the states. Some states are 
providing extensive, far reaching liability abatements, while others are providing 
the barest. 
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• State political officials are minimally providing oversight. That oversight is often 
tied to funding. The EPA Regions playa pivotal role in oversight. Popular 
control of these programs can be seriously questioned judging from the three 
states examined in this dissertation. 
• Bureaucratic discretion seems to be, in some ways shaped by other non-elected 
administrators as well as political officials. The discretionary ability of the EPA 
regions and states answering to these regions is a logical next step for research. 
• Political control of environmental programs, particularly RCRA, can sometimes 
be contrary to the political goals of the program. 
• Environmental protection and regulation has gone through a dramatic 
transformation in the last fifteen years, with yet to be seen consequences. 
• Understanding Brownfield programs requires understanding RCRA programs-
They are undeniably connected. 
• RCRA program activity may be able to reflect and measure the regulatory nature 
of a state in terms of their brownfield programs. 
Some policy implications for these findings are: 
• State political officials should tie oversight and monitoring of these programs 
more closely to the potential impact they can have on the public instead of strictly 
controlling and asking for accountability for funds allocated. 
• The balance between liability and financial incentives should be determined by an 
individual states level of resources. However, unanticipated consequences of 
flexible cleanup standards need to be thoroughly understood and recognized 
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across the states. Environmental Justice issues are likely under these flexible 
cleanup standards. 
• Land Use Controls should have greater consistency and states should pass the 
Unifonn Environmental Covenants Act. LUCS have the potential for great public 
hann if not tracked or monitored effectively. States need to make this a priority. 
• Brownfields have lost some of the stigma previously associated with them. States 
are increasingly moving to more flexible, less controlling, perspectives on these 
properties. Policymakers should critically assess whether the current trend and 
level of flexibility is appropriate. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONTENTS OF DATABASE 
Br~wnfield Specific 
Year Initial Legislation Passed 
Administrative Organization 
Citizens Ideology Measure of Program 
Inception Year 
Government Ideology Measure of Program 
Inception Year 
Citizen Ideology Measure most recent year 
Government Ideology Measure most recent 
year. 
Employees in Overall Agency 
Employees in Program( s) 
Status of Head of Agency 
Name ofProgram(s) 
Additional Names? 




Otherl3rd Party Liability 
Re-openers? 
# of Spinoff Programs 
EPA Approved UST Program? 
Non-approved UST Program 
Drycleaner Program 
Others 









Restrictions on PRP Participation? 
128a Funding most previous year 
128a Funding Cumulative 
RBCA? 
Other Risk Based Standards? 
Institutional Controls? 
Tracking System? 
Costs to enter program? 
RCRA Related 
Base Program: RCRA Authorized State? 
Number of key RCRA rules authorized? 
RCRA Corrective Action? 
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions? 
RCRA Closure Standards 
RCRA Remediation Waste Management 
Requirements? 
Number ofRCRA regulated facilities (July 
2006) 
Absolute number of facilities with 
inspections 
Percentage of facilities with inspections 
Absolute number of NOV /Informal 
enforcements 
Percentage of Facilities with Informal 
EnforcementslNOV 
Number of Facilities with inspections and 
informal enforcements 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 
informal enforcements 
Absolute Number of Formal Enforcements 
Number of formal enforcements in 
facilities with inspections 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 
formal enforcements 
Percentage of facilities with formal 
enforcements 
Number of facilities in SNC 
Percentage of facilities in SNC 
Number of NOV done by EPA 
Percentage of NOV done by EPA 
Total LQG facilities 
Inspections at LQG 
Percentage of LQG with inspections 
Total SQG 
Inspections at SQG 
Percentage of SQG with inspections 
Number of CESQG 
Inspections at CESQG 
Percentage of CESQG with inspections 
Number ofTSD 
Inspections at TSD 
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VCPMOA? 




Location relative to RCRA? 
Percentage of TSD with inspections 
Number of Transporters 
Inspections at Transporters 




THREE STATE EXAMPLES 
Of note: RCRA data in this appendix was updated in March 2007 to provide the most up-
to-date information. However, as a result the exact percentages may not match some of 
the examples in the text of this dissertation. However, all implications taken from these 
examples remain the same with the new calculations as the percentages are not extremely 
deviant after being updated. 
INDIANA 
Brownfield Programs Specific 
Year Initial Legislation Passed 1993; 2005 technical and many fmancial 
Administrative Organization 
Citizens Ideology Measure of Program 
Inception Year 
Government Ideology Measure of 
Program 
Inception Year 
components moved to IF A 
VRP: Indiana Department of 




Citizen Ideology Most Recent Year 43 
Government Ideology Most Recent Year 63 
Employees in OveraU Agency 
Employees in Program(s) 
Status of Head of Agency 
Name ofProgram(s) 
Additional Names? 




Other/3,4 Party Liability 
# of Spinoff Programs 
934 
8 in VRP; 12 in Brownfields Program 
Commissioner appointed by Governor 
heads IDEM; Board of appointed officials 
headsIFA. 
1. Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP) 






3rd Party protections for Non-Responsible 
Parties. 
Brownfield program offers Site Status 
Letters, Prospective Purchaser Agreements, 
and Comfort Letters--however, they do 
not protect from liabilities. 
3+ 
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EPA Approved UST Program? 
Non-approved UST Program 
Drycieaner Program 
Others 









Restrictions on PRP Participation? 
Re-Openers 
128a Funding most previous year 
128a Funding Cumulative 
RBCA? 
Other Risk Based Standards? 
No 
Yes 
Not a cleanup program; Voluntary 
certification program, and compliance 
assistance program 
Confined Feedings; Auto Salvage Program 
3+ 
Yes, in Brownfields Program only 
Assessment grants, cleanup grants, 
petroleum remediation grants, CDBG 
grants, revitalization grants. 
VRP has no funding available specifically 
through their program. The brownfield 
program handles all the financial 
components offered by the state of Indiana 
and the EPA in the state. 
Yes. 
EPA funded RLF awarded in 1999. Local 
governments are eligible for a low interest 
loan program offered through IF A. 
Amounts above $750,000 require approval 
by IF A board. 
Yes. 
Cleanup tax credit: Lesser of $200,000 or 
sum of 100010 of first $100,000 of qualified 
investment plus 50% of the amount of the 
qualified investment over $100,000. 
Yes, in most cases the VRP participant is 
the responsible party. RP cannot get 3rd 
party liability protections. 
Cannot receive 3rd party liability 
protections. Many of the financial 
incentives are for public entities. 
Allowed, but never happened. VRP staff 
reports that closure means closure to them. 
$751, 117 (since IF A created- shares small 
percentage with IDEM, but IF A actually 
receives the funds). 
$2,726,705 
Similar 
State RISC (Risk Integrated System of 
Closure) standards are in effect for VRP 
and brownfields program. Does not have 
force of law and must be used in 




Costs to enter program? 
VCPMOA? 




Location relative to RCRA? 
INDIANA RCRA 
guidance on how to identify contamination 
and what level it should be cleaned to for 
final development. 
IC's are viewed as acceptable to cleanups. 
VRP has a database and an inter-office 
database is under development. 
VRP has internal database, office wide 
database under development. VRP has 
public notice requirement that 'advertises' 
the use ofIC. However, no online or 
publicly accessible database exists. 
Required to be recorded on deed of 
property. 
Brownfield Program is Free. 
VRP has $1000 application fee. Cost 
recovery of oversight and time for 
participants in VRP. Municipalities are 
exempt from application fee of VRP. 
Yes, December 1995 
Yes 
IF A is a quasi governmental authority that 
houses all financial mechanisms for the 
brownfield effort in Indiana. 
IF A has some environmental components 
to it. 
Governor's office issues the CNTS. 
VRP and RCRA are both in Office of Land 
Quality of IDEM. 
RCRA Program Information 
Base Program: RCRA Authorized Yes 
State? 
Number of key RCRA rules authorized? 11112 
RCRA Corrective Action? 
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions? 
RCRA Closure Standards 
RCRA Remediation Waste Management 
Requirements? 
Number of RCRA regulated facilities 
(March 2007) 
Absolute number of facilities with 
inspections 









Absolute number of NOV!Informal 488 
enforcements 
Percentage of Facilities with Informal 6.4% 
EnforcementslNOV 
Number of Facilities with inspections 478 
and informal enforcements 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 37.25% 
informal enforcements 
Absolute Number of Formal 136 
Enforcements 
Number of formal enforcements in 122 
facilities with inspections 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 9.50% 
formal enforcements 
Percentage of facilities with formal 1.77% 
enforcements 
Number of facilities in SNC 28 
Percentage of facilities in SNC 0.366% 
Number of NOV done by EPA 2 
Percentage of NOV done by EPA 0.41% 
Total LQG facilities 552 
Inspections at LQG 420 
Percentage of LQG with inspections 76% 
TotalSQG 1108 
Inspections at SQG 389 
Percentage of SQG with inspections 35% 
Number of CESQG 5363 
Inspections at CESQG 356 
Percentage of CESQG with inspections 7% 
Number of TSD 96 
Inspections at TSD 65 
Percentage of TSD with inspections 68% 
Number of Transporters 525 
Inspections at Transporters 53 





Brownfield Programs Specific 
Year Initial Legislation Passed 1997 
Administrative Organization Department of Environmental 
Citizens Ideology Measure of Program 
Inception Year 
Government Ideology Measure of 
Program 
Inception Year 
Protection~ Regulatory Branch~ Division 




Citizen Measure of Ideology Most recent 46 
Year 
Government Measure of Ideology Most 
recent year 
Employees in Overall Agency 
Employees in Program(s) 
Status of Head of Agency 
Name ofProgram(s) 
Additional Names? 




Otherl3rd Party Liability 
# of Spinoff Programs 
EPA Approved UST Program? 
Non-approved UST Program 
Drycleaner Program 
Others 





3 in the central Tallahassee office; 14+ 
across regions. 
Secretary Appointed by Governor 
Brownfields Redevelopment Program 





No 3rd Party Liability Protections. 
Participants must have a brownfield area 
designated by the local government before 
accessing any liability protections or 




Yes. Drycleaner Solvent Cleanup 
Program. 
Cattle Dip Vat program 
2 
Not grant money specific in the 
environmental department. However the 
Office of Tourism, Trade, and Economic 
Development has a brownfield specific 
grant program. 








Restrictions on PRP Participation? 
grants~in~services to eligible nonprofit or 
public entities. Usually in the fonD. of soil 
removal or assessment using state and EPA 
funds. 
2. Office of Tourism, Trade, and Economic 
Development has a brownfield bonus. This 
brownfield bonus is designed to work with 
other job creation programs and provide an 
additional $2,500 per job created over the 
other job programs minimum requirements. 
It was expanded in 2000 to allow 
brownfield sites to get the $2,500 per job 
bonus even without participating in other 
job creation programs. This is a refund on 
taxes paid and only 25% can be taken each 
year. 
State does not offer any typical cleanup 
grants or grants in money to entities. 
Yes 
Loan Guarantees. State revolving loan 
funds. 
Yes. 
1. The brownfield Program itself has a 
Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit program 
(VCTC). This was initially created for and 
used by the drycleaners program. 
However, the brownfield program has 
utilized the program more routinely and 
has become the primary user. The VCTC 
is only good for corporate income tax and 
provides up to a $500,000 credit on 
corporate income tax. This is allowed to be 
rolled over to following years. 
2. The Governor's Office of Trade, 
Tourism, and Economic Development has 
a number of incentives that are noted as 
being for brownfields (among others). 
Notable brownfield relevant tax incentives 
are: Sales tax refund, target industry tax 
refund, and job tax credits. 
3. Department of revenue has sales tax 
exemption on building materials for 
brownfield redevelopment. 
Yes 
In order for a responsible party to 
participate the contamination must have 
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Re-Openers 
128a Funding most previous year 
128a Funding Cumulative 
RBCA? 
Other Risk Based Standards? 
Institutional Controls? 
Tracking System? 
Costs to enter program? 
VCPMOA? 




Location relative to RCRA? 
FLORIDA RCRA 
occurred before 1997 to be eligible. Any 
person responsible for contamination after 
1997 cannot participate. 
Technically yes. However, it is reserved 
for fraud in most cases. 
Approximately $1.2 million 
$3,491,000 
Similar 
Has set of risk based priciples written in 
statute and in administrative code. Will 
allow them in most cleanups. 
Yes 
The program has an extensive tracking 
system. It is online and publicly available. 
http://ca.dep.state.fl.us/imfl?focus=icr 
Brownfield Program is Free. 
Tax credit requires an annual fee of$250 to 
apply. 
December 1999; Revised in November 
2005 to expand eligibility including RCRA 
cleanup sites. 
Yes 
Governor's Office of Tourism, Trade, and 
Economic Development houses a number 
of brownfield related grants, loans, and tax 
incentives. 
RCRA is allowed to do cleanups under The 
Brownfield Redevelopment Program---
both are in the D EP, but in different 
bureaus within that agency. 
Department of Revenue administers the 
sales tax refund and exemption. 
Both are in the Department of 
Environmental Protection-~ Regulatory 
Branch-~ Division of Waste 
Management.. However, RCRA Is the 
Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste; 
Brownfield Program is in the Bureau of 
Waste Cleanup 
RCRA Program Information 
Base Program: RCRA Authorized Yes 
State? 
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Number of key RCRA rules authorized? 
RCRA Corrective Action? 
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions? 
RCRA Closure Standards 
RCRA Remediation Waste Management 
Requirements? 
Number of RCRA regulated facilities 
(March 2007) 
Absolute number of facilities with 
inspections 
Percentage of facilities with inspections 
Absolute number of NOV /Informal 
enforcements 
Percentage of Facilities with Informal 
EnforcementslNOV 
Number of Facilities with inspections 
and informal enforcements 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 
informal enforcements 















Number of formal enforcements in 244 
facilities with inspections 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 
formal enforcements 
Percentage of facilities with formal 
enforcements 
Number of facilities in SNC 
Percentage of facilities in SNC 
Number of NOV done by EPA 
Percentage of NOV done by EPA 
Total LQG facilities 
Inspections at LQG 
Percentage of LQG with inspections 
TotalSQG 
Inspections at SQG 
Percentage of SQG with inspections 
Number of CESQG 
Inspections at CESQG 
Percentage of CESQG with inspections 
Number of TSD 
Inspections at TSD 




















Number of Transporters 
Inspections at Transporters 








Brownfield Programs Specific 
Year Initial Legislation Passed 1999 
Administrative Organization Division of Environmental Protection~ 
Citizens Ideology Measure of Program 
Inception Year 
Government Ideology Measure of 
Program 
Inception Year 
Citizen Ideology most recent year 
Government Ideology most recent year 
Employees in Overall Agency 
Employees in Program(s) 
Status of Head of Agency 
Name of Program(s) 
Additional Names? 




Otherl3,d Party Liability 
# of Spinoff Programs 
EPA Approved UST Program,' 
Non-approved UST Program 
Drycleaner Program 
Others 






1 in Land Recycling Program; 2 in VCP; 4 
total in environmental cleanups. 
Governor appointed Administrator 
Land Recycling Program (LRP) 
Voluntary Cleanup Program 
LRP also called Brownfields Program 
1 
No 
Yes-can only receive this through VCP. 
No 





1. Environmental assistance program 
that provides outreach to rural 
communities concerning emergency 
responses to accidents or leaks or 









Restrictions on PRP Participation? 
Re-Openers 
128a Funding most previous year 
128a Funding Cumulative 
RBCA? 
Other Risk Based Standards? 
Institutional Controls? 
Tracking System? 
Costs to enter program? 
VCPMOA? 




Location relative to RCRA? 
contamination. 
2. MTBE (Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether) corrective action guidance. 
2 
Yes 
CERCLA 128a Funds are granted to public 
entities for all aspects of brownfield 
remediation from assessments to cleanups. 
No private entity funding available. 
Yes 





Yes, however no one has completed the 
VCP-so unsure about how this would 
actually apply in real situations 
$600,000 
Approximately $1.8 million 
Similar 
State specified end use appropriate cleanup 
levels are used. 
No 
No 
Brownfield Program is Free. 
VCP has oversight costs determined on a 






Both are in the Division of Environmental 
Protection. RCRA Is in the Bureau of 
Waste Management. Was in the same 
bureau many years ago-but were 
separated into two different bureaus. 
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NEVADARCRA 
RCRA Program Information 
Base Program: RCRA Authorized Yes 
State? 
Number of key RCRA rules authorized? 12/12 
RCRA Corrective Action? 
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions? 
Yes 
30f3 
RCRA Closure Standards Yes 
RCRA Remediation Waste Management Yes 
Requirements? 
Number of RCRA regulated facilities 1950 
(MARCH 2007) 
Absolute number of facilities with 1212 
inspections 
Percentage of facilities with inspections 62% 
Absolute number of NOV /Informal 254 
enforcements 
Percentage of Facilities with Informal 13% 
EnforcementslNOV 
Number of Facilities with inspections 253 
and informal enforcements 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 21% 
informal enforcements 
Absolute Number of Formal 39 
Enforcements 
Number of formal enforcements in 37 
facilities with inspections 
Percentage of inspected facilities with 3.1% 
formal enforcements 
Percentage of facilities with formal 2% 
enforcements 
Number of facilities in SNC 0 
Percentage of facilities in SNC 0 
Number of NOV done by EPA 12 
Percentage of NOV done by EPA 4.7% 
Total LQG facilities 91 
Inspections at LQG 84 
Percentage of LQG with inspections 92% 
TotalSQG 486 
Inspections at SQG 409 
Percentage of SQG with inspections 84% 
Number ofCESQG 1246 
183 
Inspections at CESQG 687 
Percentage of CESQG with inspections 55% 
Number ofTSD 11 
Inspections at TSD 10 
Percentage of TSD with inspections 91 % 
Number of Transporters 116 
Inspections at Transporters 22 
Percentage of Inspections at 19% 
Transporters 
PPA for RCRA No 
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